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ABSTRACT 
ATTRIBUTIONAL INFLUENCES IN THE SOCIAL WORKER'S 
ASSESSMENT OF tHE CLIENT'S PROBLEM 
JAMES ROLAND MCDONELL 
Social work practice theory has long been concerned with the issues of cause and 
responsibility inherent in efforts to define the unit of attention. This concern has focused, in 
part, on the potential for bias in the detennination of causality, generally expressed in terms 
of a person-environment dichotomy. The present emphasis on an eco-systems framework 
for assessment in practice is viewed as an ~ffort to respond to the debate which has 
resulted. These concerns of social work have been paralleled in attribution theory and it is 
suggested that this body of work provides an appropriate framework for an examination of 
the potential for causal and responsibility bias in the process of social work assessment. 
The present study employed a single factor completely randomized design to 
investigate the influence which information-presented by the client with respect to the cause 
of and responsibility for the problem of marital separation would have on the social 
worker's a) attributions of cau~ and resp~nsibility for-the client's problem, b) evaluation 
of the potential efficacy of social work intelVention c) attraction to the client, and d) belief 
in the veridicality of the client's statements. 77 experimental subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of four treatment conditions, with each condition representing one of four 
levels of a model of attributed responsibility. These are: a) causal responsibility, b) 
knowledge responsibility, c) intention responsibility,-and d) coercive responsibility. The 
independent variable was manipulated through client statements in audio taped interview 
analogues, and subjects were misled into believing that they were listening to an actual 
interview. Data analysis provided support for the hypothesis that the four treatment groups 
would significantly differ on the level of responsibility which subjects attributed to the 
client for the problem presented, indicating that worker's are differentially influenced by 
client information regarding the responsibility inherent in the problem which leads the client 
to seek help. It was also found that the treatment groups were differentiated on the basis of 
evaluations of the potential efficacy of social work intervention, indicating that the influence 
of attributional information presented by the client led subject's to differential conclusions 
about the potential for a successful treatment outcome. 
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Social work practice theory has, in recent years, moved increasingly in the direction 
of an ecological or eco-systems perspective. The basic tenet of such a perspective .holds 
that an individual and his or her environment are engaged in a continuous and reciprocal 
interaction in which each influences and shapes the other toward a progressively adaptive 
balance. Achieving a balanced relationship, often termed a "goodness offit", serves to 
minimize the incidence of social and personal stress, thereby releasing othelWise 
constricted energy for more constructive, creative and satisfying pursuits. Maladaption, in 
this sense, is seen as a reaction to the stress engendered by the demands of life or 
unfavorable environmental circumstances, or as a breakdown in the coping capaCities of the 
personality. More often, it is the interaction of these factors which is implicated in the 
development of personal and social prqblems. At any rate, the behavior which is attendant 
on the perceived stress, however defined, is viewed as an effort to restore balance in the 
person and environment system. 
Assessment in the eco-systems perspective, then, is primarily concerned with the 
relationship between the individual and his or her social and physical world. Particular 
emphasis is given to locating points of conflict which result in an imbalance in the 
inter-relationships of the person-environment system, and·on identifying the relative 
contributions of potential conflict sources determining a given problem or event. In 
essence, assessment is a search for those elements in a stated problem which cause the 
problem, and the location of causal elements at some point in a dynamic field consisting of 
person and environment. Assessment further implies a determination of directionality for 
causal elements with a subsequent assignment of responsibility for the problem. or event. 
The eco-systems perspective holds that causal elements may be multi-directional iri a 
reciprocal influence process. 
Professional social work has long been concerned with the issue of causality in 
human problems, a concern which is evident in the practice arena in efforts to define the 
unit of attention. In essence, the unit of attention has been conceived of as an interactional 
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field composed of all elements which are felt to influence the genesis and maintenance of a 
given state of affairs. The nature of this interactional field and the location of contributory 
elements in that field has been a matter of some debate in the evolution of practice theory. 
At any rate, these elements have been fairly consistently dichotomized into person on the 
one hand and environment on the other hand, with the e~vironment consisting of both 
people and objects, the social and physical world. The application of interventions, then, is 
dependent on the location of causal elements at some point in the field, generally 
predominating in either the person or the environment, or at some point in the interaction. 
This defines the unit of attention and provides the focus for ameliorative efforts. 
One concern of the profession in this regard has been a recognized tendency in 
practice to focus on the individual to the exclusion of environmental attention. This 
concern is evident in the recent literature. Germain (1970) notes, for example, that the 
medical model, disease model influence on casework has led to a consistent bias against 
environmental attention despite efforts to define the unit of attention as the 
person-in-environment configuration. Germain and Gitterman (1980) note that: 
For social work, ecology appears to be a more useful metaphor 
than the older medical-disease metaphor that arose out of the 
linear world view ... the medical-diseas~ metaphor tends to locate 
people's problems and needs within the person, obscuring 
social processes in which the person is embedded (p. 5). 
Meyer (1983) has also noted a tendency for caseworkers to become preoccupied with 
the person rather than the environment. She feels that the legacy of the medical model and 
its essentially linear construction of human problems is, in part, responsible. She adds, 
however, that a person focus is also influenced by the fact that skill in working for change 
in people is much easier to acquire since the theory from which it is derived is fairly 
specific. Environmental change, on the other hand, requires knowledge of diverse theories 
which are, perhaps, less familiar to casework practitioners and more difficult to distill into 
an assessment and intervention approach. Meyer proposes the eco-systems perspective as 
a means of addressing this bias, providing a more holistic framework for practice. 
Concern with regard to issues of causality in human events, and the potential for 
causal bias, has been paralleled in social psychology, particularly in the field of attribution 
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theory. Jones and Nisbett (1971), for example, cite evidence which demonstrates that an 
. 
actor and an observer in a situation will maintain much different perspectives on those 
elements which contribute to, or cause, the actor's behavior. It has been found that the 
actor will attribute his or her actions to the perceived requirements of the situation whereas 
the observer will attribute the same actions to stable characteristics, or dispositions, of the 
actor's persomility. Jones and Nisbett see this phenomenon as resulting from forces which 
impel the salience of situational or personality information under certain circumstances. 
The actor will focus on environmental cues because he or she is not in a position to 
effectively note subtle variations in his or her own behavior. The actor can, however, cast 
the environment in a more objective light, thereby inferring the environment as the causal 
agent. The observer, on the other hand, attends closely to the actor's behavior because it is 
the action itself which provides the most apparent information to explain any behavioral 
outcome. Thus, situational cues are largely ignored and the actor is left as the most likely 
causal candidate for any observed behavior. 
Arkin and Duval (1975) have cast the Jones and Nisbett (1971) divergent perceptions 
hypothesis in terms of a focus of attention-causal attribution formulation. That is, for any 
event with two or more plausible causal objects, the more a person attends to anyone 
object over others, the greater the attribution of cause to that object. Focus of attention is 
determined by the differential analysis of event cues in an effort to arrive at a reasonable 
causal explanation for an event. Duval and Duval (1-980) have suggested that the force 
impelling this process may be a quest for simplicity in cognitive organization, for stability 
and predictability in one's view of the world. 
More recently, Shaver (1985) has examined the issue of causal and responsibility 
attributions in the formulation of an atributional theory of blame. Shaver notes that 
attributional processes are engaged in response to negatively valued events, events that call 
for explanation and accountability. Here, observers to an event make social judgmen~s 
about the extent to which culpability for the event may be aSsigned to properties of the 
individual in question or to aspects of the relevant environment. The necessary preliminary 
step in such a process is a determination of causality. That potential bias is present in the 
attribution of causality is evident through a recognition that it is rare in social events for any 
outcome to be engendered by a single, unambiguous antecedent event. It is more typically 
the case that multiple antecedents are both sqfficient and necessary for the occurrence. 
Such mUltiple antecedents may include both human actions and the circumstances in which 
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such actions occur, and the cause for the event may rest in either the person or some aspect 
of the circumstance. In short, the wide mnge of attributional options available to an 
observer renders the process of causal detennination complex at best. It is this complexity 
in the causal field which serves to increase the likelihood of misattribution for both the 
cause of the event and the resulting responsibility assigned. 
The attribution literature has also directly examined the issue of ascribed 
responsibility and has Iioted attributions of responsibility to be an extension of causal 
detennination. Responsibility, in this sense, implies, behavioral autono~y, the freedom to 
act in a manner other than that observed for the event in question. Kruglanski and Cohen 
(1975), for example, note that when the cause for a behavior may be assigned to the actor's 
person, a considerable attributional stability with regard to his or her freedom prevails. 
Since the actor is seen as responsible for his or her behavior there is no need to consider 
alternative sources of causation. By contrast, when personal causation may be ruled out, 
possible situational causes become more important in the detennination of causality. That 
is, behavior may be constrained by the demands of the situation, effectively absolving the 
individual of any responsibility. 
Ickes and Kidd (1976) cite several studies as offering support for the notion that 
attributed responsibility for an outcome varies as a function of causal locus, with internal 
causes leading to a greater attribution of responsibility than external causes. The authors 
point out, however, that in some circumstances responsibility denotes intentionality, the 
presence or absence of behavioral choice regarding a particular event or problem. This is 
an important distinction, holding, as it does, the implication that an observer may attribute 
cause for an event to an actor but not attribute responsibility for the event to the actor if it is 
believed that there were constraints on the actor's behavior. 
Shaver (1985) has drawn a distinction between cause and responsibility in noting that 
while causes can exist independently of human action, such as in an earthquake causing 
damage to buildings, it is not possible to consider responsibility without human agency, 
either as cause or as observer or both. Shaver notes that the assignment of responsibility is 
. a purely social judgment while the attribution of cause is a physical judgment. To assign 
responsibility one must first detennine that human agency was, at least in part, causally 
implicated in the event to be attributed. Then, to the extent that some human action is 
detennined to have caused the event, an observer is free to enquire as to the extent to which 
the person who caused the event may be held accountable for the observed outcome. Thus, 
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an attribution of causality is a necessary precondition for any consideration of an attribution 
of responsibility. 
Clinical applications for attribution theory have been noted. Batson (1975), for 
example, follows Jones and Nisbett (1971) in citing a number of studies which indicate that 
professional helpers are more likely to see a person in need as the source of the problem. 
Batson cites several reasons for this. First, a professional may be aware that it is often far 
easier to bring about change in the individual than it is to bring about change in the 
individual's social circumstances. Second, professional helpers may have learned that 
failing to spot a troubled individual is a more serious error to make than suggesting that 
someone is troubled when, in fact, they are not. Finally, the professional helper's 
exposure to troubled individuals may be greater than his exposure to the social 
environment, making individuals more salient as the loci of causation. 
Batson ( 1975) has also noted that casting background information into a medical 
model may have two unintended effects. First, a medical model necessarily focuses 
attention on the person as the source of the problem. Second, information cast in a medical 
model may result in a reduction of information processed by the helper by casting doubt on 
the reporting person as a reliable source of information. That is, once the person is seen as 
having caused the problem, this is taken as presumptive evidence that any information 
given is subject to distortion or fabrication. Batson conducted a study using taped client 
interviews which were constructed for the pUlposes of the research. The "client" in the 
study attributed a problem to social circumstances, such as school, friends or parents, with 
which he needed help to change. The results revealed that only 31 % of 228 obselVer 
attributions were to social circumstances as the lo.cus of the problem. 
Rowland (1980) combined the results of three studies to show that trained counselors 
exhibit the attributional bias common to all observers. In these experiments, all counselor 
groups demonstrated relatively more person-based attributions of causality than situational 
attributions of causality. Furthermore, it appears that counselor dispositional attributional 
bias increases with training and experience. Student counselors demonstrated more 
dispositional bias than did naive subjects and advanced counselors indicated significantly 
more dispositional bias than did either naive subjects or student counselors. 
Issues of cause and responsibility bear importance for professional social work in 
several respects. First, it is apparent that causal considerations form part of the 
determination of the unit of attention in social work practice. That is, assessment may be 
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said to essentially constitute a process of causal determination, a process which serves to 
defme the unit of attention. Specification of the unit of attention, in tU!D, serves to identify 
the potential foci for intervention. Thus, an understanding of attributional processes as 
they serve to influence an understanding of the unit of attention would serve the profession 
in more clearly delineating the arena for assessment and intervention. 
Second, it is clear that attributional processes are a pervasive phenomenon, 
permeating virtually every aspect of human life. The desire to understand the world and to 
engender stability in such an understanding, thereby rendering the world a predic~ble place 
in which to live, appears to be a most compelling feature of human affairs. The 
attributionalliterature suggests that all people make attributional judgments as a normal part 
of everyday life. As such, it is essential that social work practice account for such 
processes in any attempt to understand human problems. 
Third, it may be assumed that any client requesting services with regard to a particular 
set of problem events will make attributions of cause and responsibility for the problem 
events reported. Thus, as the client's story unfolds in the process of assessment, the 
worker hears the client's attributional understanding of the people and events which are 
perceived to have created the problem situation which the client brings to the social work 
encounter. Again, creating an awareness of these processes would serve the profession by 
providing an additional framework for assessment. 
Finally, it is reasonable to assert that the worker also makes attributions of cause and 
responsibility for the problem events reported by the client. As noted earlier, assessment is 
essentially a process of causal determination and, as such, it falls to the worker to arrive at 
a causal understanding of the problems which the client brings to the worker for 
assessment. The client's situation, with rare exceptions, involves behavior on the part of 
the client and involves, in addition, the behavior of an array of other people with whom the 
client is in intimate interaction. Thus, the w~rker not only determines causality for the 
client's problem events but assesses the relative level of responsibility of the client and 
others in the development and maintenance of the problems as causally defined. 
A recognition of the importance ofattributional processes for problem assessment in 
social work suggests the questions with which the present study is concerned. Essentially, 
it is of interest to determine the extent to which attributional processes do, in fact, serve to 
influence the worker's understanding of the client's problem," particularly in view of the 
potential for bias in the process o( attribution. It is also of interest to determine the extent to 
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which worker attributions of cause and responsibility serve to influence the evaluations 
which the worker makes regarding the potential efficacy of social work intervention. 
Finally, it is of interest to determine the extent to which worker attributions of cause and 
responsibility serve to influence the workers attraction to the client and belief in the client's 
truthfulness in reporting information for the assessment .. 
Thus, the following questions are posed: 
1. What is the relationship between the client's attributions of cause and 
responsibility for an event and the workers attributions of cause and 
responSibility for the same event. 
2. What is the re~ationship between the workers attributions of cause and 
responsibility for an event and the workers judgment with regard to the 
potential efficacy of social work intervention. 
3. What is the relationship between the workers attributions of cause and 
responsibility for an event and the workers attraction to the client. 
4. What is the relationship between the. workers attributions of cause and 
responsibility for an event and the workers belief in the veridicality of the 
client's presentation. 
The present study, then, has been undertaken in an examination of the role which a 
client's attributional statements play in the workers understanding of the client's problem 
and in the workers evaluations with regard to the potential for successful social work 
intervention, attraction to the client as a person and a belief in the client's truthfulness in 
presenting information relevant to the assessment. An experimental methodology was 
employed which utilized four assessment analogues, each presenting differential 
information with respect to the relevant dimensions of a model of attributed responsibility 
(Shaver, 1985). This resulted in four stimulus conditions expressing the stimulus variables 
of 1) causal level responsibility, 2) knowledge level responsibility, .3) intention level 
responsibility, and 4) coercive level responsibility. In the first stimulus condition subjects 
heard the client assert that she was the cause of the marital problems but did not know that 
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her husband might leave her and did not intend that the sepamtion take place. In the second 
stimulus condition, subjects heard the client assert that she was the cause of the problems 
which led to the marital sepamtion and knew that a sepamtion might occur but did not 
intend that the sepamtion take place. In the third stimulus condition, subjects heard the 
client assert that she caused the marital problems, knew that her husband might leave her 
and intended to bring the couples' difficulties to the fore. In the fourth stimulus condition 
subjects heard the client assert that she caused ihe problems which led to the separation, 
knew that her husband might leave her and intended to bring attention to the couples' 
difficulties. Additionally, subjects in the fourth stimulus condition heard the client present 
several environmental stressors which may have coerced the client into acting in the manner 
described. 
Subjects then completed a set of scaled item responses which measured the extent to 
which responsibility was assigned to the client at each of the four levels of cause, 
kn~wledge, intention and coercion. In addition, subjects completed a set of scaled item 
responses which measured subjects' evaluations with regard to the potential efficacy of 
social work intervention, attraction to the client and a belief in the client's veridicality. 
Thus, the four stimulus variables were examined against a set of dependent attributional 
variables of 1) causal level responsibility (cause), 2) knowledge level responsibility 
(knowledge), 3) intention level responsibility (intention), and 4) coercive level 
responsibility (coercion), and a set of dependent evaluation variables of 1) potential efficacy 
of social work intervention (efficacy), 2) attmction to the client (attmction), and 3) belief in 
the veridicality of the client's informational presentation (veridicality). The methodology 
employed in the study will be more fully examined in chapter three. 
A consideration of the questions posed above suggests the following hypotheses. 
First, it was hypothesized that, taken as a whole, a significant difference in the mean 
responses to the scaled dependent attributional variables of cause, knowledge, intention, 
and coercion would be found between the four stimulus condition groups. Consistent with 
Shaver's (1985) attributional theory of blame it was proposed that subjects would attribute 
increasing levels of responsibility to the client for each of the scaled dependent attributional 
variables from stimulus condition one to stimulus condition two to stimulus condition 
three. At stimulus condition four responsibility would still be attributed to the client but at a 
level which would fall somewhere between those of stimulus condition two and three. The 
individual hypotheses expressed therein may be stated as follows: a) the absolute lowest 
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level of attributed responsibility for each scaled dependent attributional variable will occur 
at stimulus condition one; b) the next highest level of attributed responsibility for each 
scaled dependent attributional variable would occur at stimulus condition two; c) the third 
. highest level of attributed responsibility for each scaled dependent attributional variable 
would occur at stimulus condition four; d) Finally, the absolute highest level of attributed 
responsibility for each scaled dependent attributional variable would occur at stimulus 
condi tion three. As noted, it was further proposed that these levels of attributed 
responsibility would be significantly different across stimulus conditions. 
Second, it was hypothesized that a significant difference in the mean responses to 
the scaled dependent evaluation variables of efficacy, attraction and veridicality would be 
found across stimulus conditions. These hypotheses may be stated as follows: a) the 
most favorable evaluation with regard to the potential efficacy of social work intervention, 
attraction to the client and belief in the veridicality of the client's statements would occur at 
stimulus condition four; b) the second most favorable evaluation with regard to the potential 
efficacy of social work intervention, attraction to the client and belief in the veridicality of 
the client's statements would occur at stimulus condition one; c) the third most favorable 
evaluation with regard to the potential efficacy of social work intervention, attraction to the 
client and belief in the veridicality of the client's statements would occur at stimulus 
condition two; d) finally, the least favorable evalUation with regard to the potential efficacy 
of social work intervention, attraction to the client and belief in the veridicality of the 
client's statements would occur at stimulus condition three. This is consistent with Batson 
(1975), Ickes and Kidd (1976), Wills (1978) and others, in that differential attributional 
assessments with respect to the detennination of cause and responsibility for an event will 
result in differential evaluations of the person who is potentially responsible for the event. 
That is, to th.e extent that a person may be held responsible for the outcomes of their own 
behavior there will be a corresponding tendency to negatively evaluate the person and to 
view &Ily potential helping response as not being contextually appropriate. 
Third, it was hypothesized that as subject's attributions of responsibility to the client 
increased, evaluations of the client with regard to the potential efficacy of social work 
intervention would decrease. This is consistent with Berkowitz and Daniels (1965), 
Schopler and Mathews (1965), Schopler and Batson (1965), and Ickes and Kidd (1976) in 
that responsibility is a function of the perceived dependence of another person's outcomes. 
In a helping situation, the perception that one is dependent on a potential helper through no 
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fault of one's own increases the likelihood that help giving behavior will ensue. 
Conversely, the extent to which another person's needs in a potential helping situation are 
detennined to be a function of their own behavior, that is, that they are responsible for 
their own outcomes, tends to diminish a belief that an offer of help will produce any 
meaningful change. Thus, offers of help are not likely to be forthcoming. 
Fourth, it was hypothesized that as attributions of responsibility to the client 
increased, attraction to the client would decrease~ This is suggested by BenUfer and 
Kiesler (1972) who note that the professional helpers tendency to locate problems within 
the client may result in a percepti<;>n of the client as less well-adjusted and as less likable. 
This is supported by Wills (1978) who notes that likability is one of several dimensions 
along which clients will be rated by professional helpers in the process of detennining the 
client's potential for the helping endeavor. The author notes that likability is, in part, a 
function of perceived attractiveness. Wills cites a number of studies in support of the 
contention that persons who are detennined to bear causal responsibility for their problems 
will be seen as less concerned about their problems, as having,less potential for change and 
as less likable. 
Fifth, it was hypothesized that as attributions of responsibility to the client increased, 
evaluations with regard to the veridicality of the client's infonnational statements would 
decrease. This is suggested by Batson (1975) who notes that the infonnation which a 
client presents to a worker may be discounted to the extent that the client is seen as bearing 
causal responsibility for the problem for which infonnation is to be gathered. That is, it is 
inferred that the infonnation which the client presents is subject to greater distortion by 
virtue of the client being the major source of his or her own troubles. 
In sum, the hypotheses are as follows: 
1. A significantdifTerence between the four stimulus groups will be found with 
respect to the dependent attributional variables of cause, knowledge, intention 
and coercion. 
a. For each of the dependent attributional measures of cause, 
knowledge, intention and coercion, the lowest level of attributed 
responsibility will be found in the responses to stimulus condition 
one. 
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b. For each of the dependent attributional measures of cause, 
knowledge, intention and coercion, the next lowest level of attributed 
responsibility will be found in the responses to stimulus condition 
two. 
c. For each of the dependent attributional measures of cause, 
knowledge, intention and coercion, the next lowest level of attributed 
responsibility will be found in the responses to stimulus condition 
four. 
d. For each of the dependent attributional measures of cause, 
knowledge, intention and coercion, the highest level of attributed 
responsibility will be found in the responses to stimulus condition 
three. 
2. A significant difference between the four stimulus groups will be found with 
respect to the dependent evaluation variables of efficacy, attraction and 
veridicality. 
a. For each of the dependent evaluation variables of efficacy, attraction 
and veridicality, the most favorable evaluation of the client will be 
found in the responses to stimulus condition four. 
b. For each of the dependent evaluation variables of efficacy, attraction 
and veridica1ity, the second most favorable evaluation of the client 
will be found in the responses to stimulus condition one. 
c. For each of the dependent evaluation variables of efficacy, attraction 
and veridicality, the third most favorable evaluation of the client will 
be found in the responses to stimulus condition two. 
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d. For each of the dependent evaluation variables of efficacy, attraction 
and veridicality, the least favorable evaluation of the client will be 
found in ~he responses to stimulus condition three. 
3. As responses to the dependent attributipnal variables of cause, knowledge, 
intention and coercion increase, a significant decrease will be found with 
respect to the dependent evaluation variable of efficacy. 
4. As responses to the dependent attributional variables of cause, knowledge, 
intention and coercion increase, a significant decrease will be found with 
respect to the dependent evaluation variable 9f attraction. 
5. As responses to the dependent attributionaI variables of cause, knowledge, 
intention and coercion increase, a significant decrease will be found with 
respect to the dependent evaluation variable ofveridicality. 
It is proposed that attribution theory provides a·useful framework for an examination 
of these issues in social work assessment. It is further proposed that a study designed to 
examine these issues will provide valuable inform~tion with regard to assessment processes. 
If, as has been suggested, there is a bias in the direction of internal, person-based 
ascriptions of cause and responsibility, and if these are reflected in clinical judgment, it 
would say much about the need .to develop educational and training strategies to increase the 
sensitivity of social workers to the biasing effect of attributional processes, and to the need 
to consider environmental factors in the assessment of human problems. An understanding 
of the role of cause and responsibility attributions in assessment may also 
provide a useful stimulus and framework for further research efforts into issues germane to 
the professional practice of social work. 
Chapter two, which follows, will present the literature relevant to the treatment of 
cause and responsibility in social work practice theory and the literature relevant to the 
treatment of cause and responsibility within the field of attribution theory. In addition, 
literature relevant to the clinical implications of attributions of cause and responsibility will 
also be reported. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Cause and Responsibility in Social Work Theory 
Social work practice theory has long granted the notion that human problems are 
determined through a process of individual and environment interaction, although there has 
been historical and continuing debate as to the extent to which attention is given to the 
environmental side of the equation. The profession's concern for the individual in 
environment is historically evident, however, and reflects an effort to introduce new 
elements into the process of understanding personal functioning. An expanded awareness 
of the range of potential causes of individual distress, through attention to both person and 
environment, serves to increase the number of options available to the worker for effective 
intervention. The worker, then, gains more freedom to act in the client's interest as the 
domain of the case broadens to include elements which lie outside of the client's person. 
The inner forces of the client's self and the outer forces of the client's social and physical 
environment are seen as converging over time in the creation of personality. 
Maladjustments in living, then, are also the product of the interaction of these forces. 
Thus, in social work's early development, the interaction between the individual and 
his or her social world was clearly recognized. This interaction was, however, cast in 
essentially linear terms. Mary Richmond (1922), for example, notes that casework 
consists" ... of those processes which develop personality through adjustments consciously 
effected, individual by individual, between men and their social environment (pp. 98-99)." 
The essential thrust of any effort at change, then, is directed toward the personality and the 
mechanism of change is to be found in the client's social relationships. Again, Richmond 
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notes that casework's special domain is " ... the development of personality through the 
conscious and comprehensive adjustment of social relationships (p. 98)." Here it is 
suggested that there is a cause and effect relationship between social context and individual 
development which is essentially linear in nature. Recognition is given to the fact that 
mutuality of influence is extant in the relationship but the elements of that relationship are 
cast on a continuum, with personality and social environment marking the endpoints. 
Thus, the preponderance of case data would suggest both the direction of influence and the 
location of the difficulty as lying toward either endpoint. That is, the difficulty would be 
located either in the personality or in the social environment and the direction of such 
influence would be either inner to outer or vice versa. 
It has been suggested (Germain, 1970) that this linear conceptualization was derived 
from the approach to scientific inquiry extant at the tum of the 20th century. This scientism 
was ~oncemed with issues of ultimate causation and casework practitioners of the time 
believed that there was also an ultimate or root cause in human problems. Uncovering the 
core causal elements in any problem situation would suggest the steps to be taken toward 
remediation. Richmond notes, 
But if social workers are justified in their belief that by its 
very nature personality depends in considerable part upon 
healthy action and reaction between the total social environment 
and the individual, then many of life's tragedies can be traced to 
the attempt to make some one social relationship serve for all the 
others (p. 111). 
This suggests that the client's perceptions of his or her world and the client's reaction to 
those perceptions has been rather narrowly constructed, with wants and needs limited in 
their range of social expression. Patterns of social responsiveness will be found to be 
consistent over time and the astute worker can trace these patterns to their core development 
in significant and influential social relationships. The potential causes of current distress, 
then, are to be found in the evolution of social relatedness, with contemporary expression 
in the client's personality in interaction with the social environment. As noted, however, 
these potential causes are felt to be located in a single sphere of the client's life. That is, 
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causal elements are either located within the structure of the personality or within the social 
environment and not in both simultaneously. This beliefleads the worker to act 
predominately in one domain of the client's life in efforts to effect change. 
Richmond (1917) cautions caseworkers through an explicit recognition of the dangers 
of single cause constructions. She says, "The common inclination is to seek for one cause. 
Social workers, however, need to bear in mind .that where cause must be sought in human 
motives, as is apt to be the case in their work, they must not expect to find that it is a single 
simple cause but that it is complex and multiple (p. 92)." Here, too, is a recognition of the 
potential for causal bias. That is, to the extent that a single cause is sought, and found, the 
probability that such a cause might be located in a unitary sphere of the client's life is 
increased. Here is also found a recognition that an understanding of human problems 
involves not just a causal determination but also contains an implicit determination of the 
responsibility inherent in the problem. That is, Richmond notes the profession'S 
concern with examining individual motivation as a potential causal force. This essentially 
denotes amt people may act on their own behalf and in a manner which may serve to 
engender the problems brought to the caseworker. In short, individuals may be held 
responsible for the problem circumstances which their voluntary and intentional behavior 
was instrumental in producing. 
Support for the linear problem construction in casework came from the influence of 
Freudian thought in the 1920's and 1930's. Essentially, psychoanalytic ~eory held that 
the causes of behavior were to be found in the conflicts of early childhood development and 
were manifest in the psyche, the tripartite seat of the personality. Uncovering these early 
developmental conflicts would serve to free the psychic energy which bound the conflIct, 
resulting, in tum, in change in the derivative neurotic behavior. The focus of attention was 
toward the individual as the target of change and the client was portrayed as the repository 
of all information concerning the genC?Sis of neurotic conflicts. The environment was given 
recognition but only as a peripheral object in which the personality was fonned incident to 
innate forces or drives within the individual. Neurotic behavior, then, is the effect of a 
linear causal process originating within the personality, which is fonned over time with 
influence from environmental forces (cf. Hamilton, 1958, Goldstein, 1984). 
Some divergence between Richmond's (1917, 1922) conception of casework and 
psychoanalytic thought are noted. Psychoanalysis, for example, devoted almost exclusive 
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attention to the individual's intrapsychic make-up, an attention which effectively obscured 
the social processes which were stressed by Richmond and her followers. Additionally, 
Richmond's casework looked toward creating environmental change opportunities, as 
deemed appropriate to the client and the client's situation. These opportunities, in tum, 
would allow for change to take place in the structure of the personality. Hers was a dual 
focused approach which stressed environmental study as well as personality study as the 
key to unlocking the core causes of the client's trouble. Freudian psychology, on the other 
hand, stressed a unitary approach in which any environmental change occurred as 
peripheral to intrapsychic change. 
Social work was much influenced by psychoanalytic thought, however, and many 
caseworkers came to rely on Freud's work, as well as other advances in the field of 
psychiatry, as the guiding theory of practice. Robinson (1930), for example, notes that "It 
is important ... to distinguish between family work with an environmental approach and 
psychiatric work with personality factors. That the problem in either case is fundamentally 
a personality problem .. .is pointed out ... (p. 78)." Here is an explicit negation of the utility 
of environmental work without recognition that human problems are fundamentally 
personality based. Caseworkers who do not attend primarily to personality issues are 
essentially missing the major arena for intervention and, according to Robinson, the only 
legitimate opportunity to defme social work practice. 
Concern for this development, with its individual, client based focus, prompted 
Hamilton (1951) and others to reassert the importance of the individual in interaction with 
the social environment as the appropriate framework for assessing human behavior. 
Noting the dimensions ofa social case, Hamilton says: 
A social case is composed of internal and external or 
environmental factors. One does not deal with people in a 
physical sense or with environments in a physical sense but 
treats individuals in relation not only to their social experiences 
but also to their feelings about these experiences. So when one 
thinks of a social case one must always consider it in tenns of 
both inner and outer interacting factors (p. 4). 
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Thus, human problems are asserted to be multi-determined and emphasis is given to the 
interactional nature of elements in both the personality and the social environment which 
influence causation. This marks an extension of the earlier ideas of Richmond ( 1922) with 
respect to causation and reestablishes the profession's fundamental assumption that" ... the 
human event consists of person and situation ... (Hamilto.n, 1951, p. 3)." 
Again, the domain of the case is expanded to include those events which are part and 
parcel of the client's social context. Problems in living are not fotmed in isolation. The 
study process, therefore, is seen as consisting of 
.. .intervie~ with the client and those significantly involved in 
his situation, contact with selected aspects of the client's 
economic, cultural and social milieu, such as his home, his 
occupational, educational, religious and recreational associations 
and with medical or social agencies and institutions ... (Hamilton, 
1951, p. 182). 
To understand the client and his or her needs requires a distillation and synthesis of 
infonnation from disparate sources, a recognition of the "client-in-situation". 
Reynolds (1951), echoes Hamilton (1951) ~ she also stresses the role of the 
environment in shaping what she terms "problems in social living." She notes that 
assessing the environment, as through home visits, for example, is an essential element in a 
comprehensive understanding of the case. Reynolds says, "The fallacy .. .lies in the 
assumption that emotions are separate from what happens to a person in daily living ... (p. 
129)." For Reynolds, however, the context of services is also an important aspect of 
problem remediation. Foreshadowing contemporary notions of service delivery in the. 
workplace, Reynolds was instrumental in developing a union based social service program. 
Despite this emergent organismic view of the person-in-situation configuration, 
however, the approach to help giving is essentially linear. Hamilton (1951), for example, 
stressed the role of perception in the casework process and noted, "The client's reality and 
his feeling about his reality become the constellations of casework effort wherein familial 
and other interpersonal factors constantly impinge upon and modify diagnosis and the goals 
of treatment (p. 25)." Thus, it is the client's inner construction of the self and the social 
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milieu which becomes the focus of casework pmctice. Any changes necessary in the 
structure of the social environment, then, are left in the hands of the client. In this sense, 
cause emanates from within the client's social context and is manifested within the client's 
personality. Reynolds (1975) offers support for this view by defining social casework as 
that which" ... helps people to test and understand their reality, physical, social and 
emotional, and to mobilize resources within themselves and in their physical and social 
environment to meet their reality or change it (p. 131)." Again, it is the client who is the 
agent of change, a c.hange necessitated by a faulty interpretation of social and physical 
reality. 
This notion does not belie the importance of objective reality since the worker must 
necessarily be aware of any perceptual distortions which may influence the client's 
problems. It does, however, stress the client's interpretation of reality, the perceptual 
construction of life events and the client's awareness of how these events influence an 
ability to effectively function in an objective social context. In this sense, the caseworker's 
primary effort is directed toward the client as the agent of change, toward helping the client 
understand that he or she is shaped by, and in tum can help to shape, the social events 
which chamcterize the problem situation. Helping the client to broaden a perceptual 
understanding of the problem-in-situation serves to increase the client's freedom to respond 
to environmental demands and individual needs. Thus, the client becomes aware that the 
social and physical environment are not necessarily static entities comprised of unyielding 
forces which dictate problem behavior. Freedom of choice exists and, through the 
casework process, the client develops the skills necessary to a recognition of choice points 
and potential change strategies. 
It is clear, however, that this view tends to locate problems primarily in the client at 
the same time that environment vicissitudes are recognized as impinging on the client's 
perceptual understanding of his or her place in the world. Here falls the potential for a 
recognition of the client's motivational role in determining the problem situation. Hamilton 
( 1951) recognizes that the client may bear some responsibility in problem development and 
feels that this becomes an explicit part of the assessment. She says, "Diagnostic thinking 
strives to arrive at causes because this means a more precise definition of the problem. The 
fact that the client himself may be a contributor to his own social problems complicates the 
formulation, but does not change the aim of diagnosis (p. 218)." Hamilton further 
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recognizes that assessment is essentially a social judgment process in which the worker 
seeks to understand the client's ability and willingness to take part in the casework process 
and to contribute in a meaningful way to problem resolution. Again, the worker seeks to 
determine the extent of the client's motivation to' assume responsibility for both process and 
outcome. 
Contemporaneously with the contributions of Hamilton ( 1951) and Reynolds (19 51), 
there emerged an essential debate within the profession which was centered on issues of 
causation and the focus of casework efforts. The adherents of Freudian psychology and its 
derivatives continued to take issue with the person-situation notions of Richmond (191 7, 
1922), Hamilton (1951) and others, asserting that such a focus tended to emphasize 
environmental concerns at the expense of a more client focused, dYnamic casework. 
Robinson (1930) said, for example, 
If the history of social casework teaches anything it 
teaches this one thing outstandingly, that only in this field 
of the individual's reaction patterns and in the possibilities of 
therapeutic change in these patterns through responsible self 
conscious relationships can there be any possibility of a 
legitimate professional case work field (p. 185). 
Taft (1942), Robinson (1949) and others who developed and adhered to the 
Functional school of social casework looked to the use of the casework relationship as the 
focus of change effort. Functional theorists believed that human distress could best be 
understood as a relationship problem which would be expressed in the context of the 
worker-client relationship and in the client's relationship with the casework agency. 
Change took place through the structured use of these relationships in an effort to help the 
client better understand the use of self in a relationship context. Achieving such an 
understanding would help the client maximize use of self-in-relationship toward the end of 
an appropriate satisfaction of needs. Thus, the client is the focus of attention in the 
casework effort. The cause of the client's problem is found in the perception of social 
relationships and in the application of self in the context of those relationships. The social 
environment is clearly recognized and assumes importance in the conceptual understanding 
/ 
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of the client's problem. An over-focus on environmental issues, however, would serve to 
obscure the client-worker relationship focus in Casework. 
Taft (1942) noted the tendency for social casework to shift back and forth between a 
focus on extemalcausal factors and a focus on internal causal factors and said, 
It is necessary to know and appreciate the economic, the 
cultural, the immediate social setting of those who constitute' our 
clientele, it is essential to understand and accept tolerantly, but 
without evasion, the human psychology that is common to 
worker and client in our culture, but this is only the beginning. 
There is one area and'only one~ in which outer and inner, 
worker and client, agency and social need can come together 
effectively, only one area that offers to social workers the 
possibility of development into a profession, and that is the area 
of the helping process itself (pp. 10 1-102). 
Taft further notes that the causal implications of the client's problems can only be 
understood as the client struggles with the limits imposed by the agency setting and the 
casework relationship on the sa:tisfaction of need. The client, then, assumes primary 
responsibility for defining that need and the worker assumes responsibility for providing 
clarity with regard to the limiting factors of relationship. 
Thus, for Taft (1942), Robinson (1949) and other proponents of Functional 
casework, the client bears responsibility for the problem to which the client has causally 
contributed. For example, Robinson (1949) cites Taft (1946) as saying "When a man is 
brought to the necessity of asking assistance from an outside source because of his own 
inadequacy or failure to manage his own affairs, whatever has been faulty in his way of 
relating to the other will be brought into focus as he tries to find his role as client of a social 
agency (p. 21)." There is a presumption, then, that the client has experienced difficulty due 
to a breakdown in the ability to gain instrumental satisfaction in the context of personal 
relationships. Within the determined limits of a relationship with the worker and the 
agency, then, the client comes to understand how selfhas been applied in the context of 
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relationships and how such relationships can be more effectively managed toward the end 
of need satisfaction and problem resolution. . 
While there are clear divergences in the concepts of Hamilton (1951) and Robinson 
(1930, 1949), as representative of the two main streams extant in social work theory at the 
time, there are also a number of similarities which warrant mention. First, in the 
approaches of both theorists it is the client's perceptual interpretation of social reality which 
bears importance in defining the client's problem. Objective data serves to identify 
distortions in perception, thereby providing clues for the development of change strategies. 
Second, both theorists are concerned with issues of causation and problem locus, 
conceived of dichotomously along an inner-outer dimension. Third, each theorist is 
relationship focused with a clear recognition of the interaction of various elements of the 
relationship. Relationships are portrayed as multi-determined and varying in structure and 
importance in relation to the problem and to the casework. Fourth, the problem process is 
defined in essentially linear terms, as a cause and effect sequence consisting of discrete but 
interacting relationship elements. Finally, for each there is an implicit assumption that the 
extent of the client's responsibility for the development and maintenance of the problem 
presented to the worker provides data for an understanding of the problem itself. The 
importance of these similarities rests in their application to efforts to grapple with 
fundamental issues of concern to the profession. They point to a common foundation in 
professional social work and to common concerns underlying debate on the relevant issues. 
The changing professional climate of the 1950's and 1960's saw a reemergence in 
emphasis on the social and environmental context of human problems and a focus on the 
unifying principles of practice, the commonalities in approaches to helping people. There 
occurred, moreover, a fundamental shift in practice theory toward a recognition of the 
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int~ractionaI nature of person and environment. Influenced by social psychology and the 
biological sciences, the interaction of person and environment is conceived of as a 
continually evolving reciprocal influence process. Perlman (1957), for example, notes that 
the client's problem both affects and is affected by the person's social functioning. 
Additionally, she stresses the client's social circumstances as impinging on the problem and 
as being affected by the client's psychological state. There is, then, a dynamic interaction 
between the personality and the social environment. Perlman notes that there is a " ... shift 
and reorganization of new and old elements in the personality-that take place continuously 
22 
just because the person is alive in a live environment and is in interaction with it {p. 6)." 
She goes on to say of the client, "It is this physical-psychological-social-past-present-future 
configuration that he brings to every life situation he encounters {p. 7)." 
For Perlman (1957), however, human problems are seen as a breakdown in the 
problem solving capacities of the individual. Problem solving is viewed as a natural 
process which evolves over time as a personality construct. Perlman says, "Our perception 
of a problem situation, our turning-over in our minds its causes and effects, our 
consideration and choice of some mode of dealing with it--aU this' may go on without our 
fully being aware that we are ... problem solving (p. 54);" Problem solving, then, is a 
cause and effect sequence predicated on an ability to analyze those factors which contribute 
to the distress. Assessment in social work, in tum, 'isa process 'of problem solving the 
client's problem in an effort to arrive at a dynamic diagnosis, the location of forces 
interacting" ... within the client himself, within his social situation and between him and his 
situation {p. 171)." Perlman continues, "The dynamic diagnosis seeks to establish what 
the trouble is, what psychological, physical or social factors contribute to (or cause) it, 
what effect it has on the individual's well being and what means exist within the client, his 
situation and organized services and resources by which the problem may be affected {p. 
171)." Identifying the causal elements in the client's problem is the first step toward 
developing potential change strategies. Perlman ~ys, 
The purposes of establishing recent or precipitating causation 
have ... been discussed ... as these: to clarify whether the problem lies 
chiefly in the client himself or in his life situation, to deal directly 
with the causal factors so as to nullify them or modify their impact, 
or, conversely, to take into account such causal factors as are 
immutable (pp. 175-176). 
Again, causation is seen as existing on a continuum of inner, psychological forces and 
outer, social-environmental forces. Locating causal elements at some point along this 
continuum is also seen as the key to the casework effort. 
Perlman (1957) distinguishes between the dynamic diagnosis' which seeks to 
understand the individual in the present context and the etiological diagnosis which seeks to 
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understand the problem through historical time. Perlman says, "The term 'etiological 
diagnosis,' as commonly used, relates less often to immediate causation and more often to 
the beginnings and life-history of a problem, usualJy to the probJem that Jies in the client's 
personality makeup or functioning (p. 176, emphasis added)." Here Perlman appears to 
suggest that the ultimate cause of the client's difficulty generally is to be found in the client 
rather than in the environment through historical time. While there is a recognition of the 
fact that the environment tends to shape and influence the client's development, it is 
the client's personality that is causally implicated in the problem and, thus, the client is the 
focus of the casework effort. Given such a formulation, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that the thrust of casework is toward change in the client and not change in the 
environment . 
. Perlman (1957) also presents a discussion of the motivational aspects of the client's 
"workability" and says, "The client should see himself as an active agent in relation to his 
pro~lem, either as contributing to it in the past or as working on it in the present. The 
caseworker needs to both test and promote the person's readiness to recognize that his 
behavior is an actual or potential dynamic in his problem situation {p. 188)." Here again, is 
recognition of the client's causal role in determining the development of the problem for 
work and an emphasis on the client as the target of the change effort. Moreover, implicit in 
the determination of motivation for casework is an assessment of the extent to which. the 
client assumes responsibility for the development of the problem and for the effort "to effect 
change. That is, motivation is enhanced to the extent that the client has an understanding of 
the fact that it is the client's behavior which works to maintain the problem as it is currently 
expressed. The client, then, not only has a causal role in shaping the problem but should 
be held responsible for the problem to the extent that the problem has been shaped by the 
client's actions. Implicitly, the client's actions are always implicated and, thus, the client is 
always responsible for the problem. 
Other casework theory emerged during the 1960's and 1970's, each with some 
conceptual variation centered on perceptions of causation and casework focus. Hollis 
(1964, 1970), for example, stresses causal agents as facts to be elicited in the psycho-social 
study and notes that causation is " ... the conve..gence of a multiplicity of factors in the 
person-situation configuration {Hollis, 1970, p. 52)." The focus of casework, however, is 
predominately toward the personality with environmental concerns receding into the 
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periphery of the casework process. The social environment is essentially a diagnostic 
construct subject to change in the context of personality development. For Hollis, then, 
casework is primarily a psycho .. dynamic approach to human problems. 
Smalley (1967) follows Taft (1942) and Robinson (1949) in stressing the function of 
the agency and the worker .. client relationship as central to the casework effort. She notes 
that in detennining a diagnosis" ... no attempt is made to know and set down on paper a 
'total individual in a total situation,' nor is there a like attempt for a group or a community. 
Rather the focus from the beginning of the relationship is on an understanding of the 
phenomena as related to the service being offered (p. 136, emphasis in original)." For 
Smalley, the only relevant context for a determination of causality is the client's relationship 
with the worker and the service agency. An understanding of the dient's.problem will 
emerge as the worker defines the parameters of the casework relationship and interprets the 
agency's function, and the client works to understand need satisfaction in that context. 
Thus, the client assumes causal responsibility for the problem for work, which is, by 
defmition,· a relationship problem. 
Additional responsibility for the problem accrues to the client by virtue of the role he 
or she plays in the course of personal development. Smalley emphasizes "the individual as 
central in his own development, as capable of changing from within through the use of 
inner and outer resources, but as not susceptible to change through coercion (p. 101, 
emphasis in original)." Thus, it is the client who detennines developmental purpose, 
through the exercise of will, and it is the quest for fulfillment of that purpose which serves 
to guide the individual's developmental course. Smalley stresses that the individual acts 
consciously and with motivation to achieve developmental purpose. The environment 
fonns a context against which the individual tests purpose and, to the extent that the 
environment is not conducive to the achievement of purpose, the environment is subject to 
change. The individual, then, is not changed by environmental circumstances but, rather, 
alters the environment to achieve purpose. Ultimate responsibility for the direction of a life 
course rests with the individual and any problems which emerge are wholly the individual's 
responsibility. 
Bartlett (1970) suggests that a focus on social functioning could be at the core of 
professional social work. Her use of the common base of social work practice is 
predicated on an assessment of social situations which induce the problem of concern, the 
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behavioral responses of the persons involved and the demands and supports of the 
enyironment. The assessment process draws from relevant theory to identify those factors 
most critical to the problem and to defIne their inter-relationships. This implies the location 
of causal factors which determine the client's problem in an effort to develop remediating 
strategies. Bartlett notes, however, that the assessment analysis" ... might, for instance, 
point most strongly to defIciency in coping capacity or defIciency in environmental . 
supports or some combination of the two (p. 145)." Again, cause is dichotomized into 
person and environment but with a suggestion that the person-environment continuum 
exists as a dynamic field. 
This latter point reflects the influence of systems theory concepts which, in tandem 
with the biological and social sciences and the profession's body of knowledge, led to the 
development of an ecologically based practice perspective. Meyer (1976) notes, for 
example, that an eco-systems perspective allows a social work case to be viewed in terms 
of the interdependence of all relationships, including the relationship between the person 
and the social environment. Meyer says, "In a systemic view there is no inner or outer, but 
rather an operational field in which all elements intersect and affect each other (p. 133)." 
Thus, the client's problem is viewed transactionallyagainst the backdrop of the social and 
physical environment. Cause, then, is also presumed to be transactional. Again, Meyer 
states, "Whatever the assessment of the case, the parameters for intervention are 
broader ... and causation may be any or all points of the field of the case (p. 139)". The 
complexity of causal determination within such a notion is readily apparent. It represents, 
however, a move away from a dichotomous conceptualization of person and environment 
and a recognition of the dynamic nature of the person existing in an ecological field. It 
further represents a move from linear to reciprocal causality. 
Germain and Gitterman (1980) note that problem defmition will bear directly on the 
development of strategies for change. A perception of the problem as located internally will 
. lead to the use of a psychodynamically based practice approach. The perception of an 
external cause, on the other hand, will call for social action directed toward organizational 
and environmental change. If, however, the problems are 
.. .located in the interface between person and environment, and 
defmed as maladaptive transactions within the life space, then 
the professional intelVention is likely to be fonnulated in tenns 
of reciprocal adaptive processes .... Goals will refer to a 
strengthened adaptive capacity and increased environmental 
responsiveness (p. 12). 
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Gennain and G,ittennan propose that casework is dual focused with simultaneous attention 
directed toward the personality, including the constructs of perception, cognition, feeling 
and action, and on supports in the social field and physical setting . 
. More recently, Meyer (1983}cites the O'Hare conference definition of social work 
purpose as: "To promote or restore a mutually beneficial interaction between individuals 
and society in order to improve the quality oflife for everyone (p. 7)." She suggests that 
the continued utility of the psychosocial paradigm for social work practice is dependent on 
the willingness of social workers to develop the necessary skills for environmental 
intervention. This calls for a concerted effort on the part of social workers in the 'field to 
look at human distress as occurring in a dynamic field in which all the elements of the field 
are reciprocally influential. Linear, cause and effect thinking tends to limit an 
understanding of the whole of problem development and, in tum, to limit the range of 
available intelVention strategies. 
While an ecologically based perspective has gained considerable purchase in the 
practice arena, there remains much debate with respect to the nature of assessment in social 
work practice. The literature continues to address relevant issues with regard to causal 
locus in understanding human problems and, by extension, the detennination of problem 
responsibility. Latting and Zundel (1986), for example, cite Sue (1981) as positing that the 
counselors world view influences the assessment process. To the extent that. the counselor 
holds a view of the world which presumes that people can overcome hardship through hard 
work and perseverance, the counselor is likely to infer that clients who experience 
difficulties are themselves the source of the problem. Then, to the extent that the client is 
determined to have caused the problem, responsibility for the problem will also be assigned 
to the client. 
Similarly, H. Specht and R. Specht (1986) discuss a range of factors which must be 
taken into account in detennining eligibility for service. Among these are what the authors 
have called "personal-resource requirements." The authors state, "In instances that involve 
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assessment of resources other than fmancial resources, agency personnel usually assume 
the obligation of selecting those applicants who are likely to make 'best use' of the 
service .... Best use suggests that professionals can predict which applicants will be most 
successful in using the service (p. 530)." Thus, it is the client's motivation which is 
subjected to assessment scrutiny. It is suggested that m~tivation may be seen as a function 
of the extent to which the client is willing to assume at least partial responsibility for the 
problem. Should a client indicate that the cause of any distress lies outside of the client and 
that responsibility for the problem is·to be assigned to other than the client, the worker may 
infer that the client is not motivated on the basis of a lack of insight into the nature of the 
problem presented. This is supported by Witkin (1982) who has examined sources of 
potential bias in the assessment of the client's problem. He notes that assessment involves 
the assignment of causes and reasons for the problem, implying a motivational dimension 
in an understanding of the problem. 
Thus, it is clear that social work's concern for causation, and for the role of person 
and environment as potential causal elements, has evolved from a linear, cause and effect 
construction to a more dynamic mutual influence process. The role of the environment in 
this process has moved from one of peripheral importance to a more substantive and central 
role, providing a new perspective on the person-environment interaction. It is equally 
clear, however, that the profession remains concer:ned with issues of cause and 
responsibility, whether cause is defined as occurring at an "interface" or confluence of 
interactional elements, or at some point on an essentially dichotomous continuum of inner, 
psychological forces and outer, environmental forces. The relevant issues in this 
regard have yet to be effectively resolved either through professional debate or empirical 
investigation. 
Given these concerns, it is interesting to note the literature on attribution theory which 
suggests that causal attributions reflect a cognitive schema developed as a personality 
construct. This is viewed as a natural process constituting, essentially, a hierarchical cause 
and effect paradigm which is linear in nature. This notion, at face, stands somewhat at 
odds with contemporary social work thought. It seems, however, to offer an opportunity 
for gaining some insight into the natural human process of understanding cause in everyday 
life, a process which bears importance in the causal processes of social work assessment. 
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If the profession is to truly understand cause as a function of assessing human problems, it 
behooves pmctitioners to avail themselves of existing work in the area. 
It is suggested, therefore, that attribution theory provides a useful framework for 
investigating causal issues in social work pmctice. The relevant issues in this regard will 
be subsequently discussed in a review of the literature in the field. First, a caveat is noted 
in the argument that the reciprocal intemction model of the eeo-systems perspective belies 
the utility of such a linear construct. It is posited, however, that a linear, attributional 
approac~ is not incompatible when one considers that one is examining a static component 
of a dynamic process. The utility lies' in the provision of base information from which an 
interactional model may be developed. 
The Attribution of Cause and Responsibility 
Attribution theory evolved primarily in the 1950's and was essentially formalized in 
the work of Heider (l958a, 1958b, 1958c). Heider was concerned with the impact of 
perception on the determination of causality and subsequent behavior. He identified a 
tendency for individuals to see persons as causes, as opposed to object causes, and he felt 
that this reflected a broadened opportunity to balance a mnge of perceptual phenomena. 
That is, if a change or action is seen as originating with a person, there is an opportunity to 
offset the change through the person. Attributing cause to another person reduces the 
likelihood of self as the causal agent. The other person is, in this sense, a part of the 
observer's environment. Heider further suggested that there is a tendency to order 
incoming perceptual stimuli against a stable environment, thus providing a framework for 
causal analysis, an economic description of a mnge of complex perceptual data. He felt 
that, in interpersonal situations, the chamcteristics of the other person formed the stable 
anchor against which perceptions could be ordered. 
With the environment perceived as a stable backdrop in ambiguous situations, there is 
a suggestion that in social relations it is the individual rather than the physical environment 
29 
which draws perceptual attention. Heider (1958c) notes, " ... behavior in particular has 
such salient properties it tends to engulf the total field rather than be confined to its proper 
position as a local stimulus whose interpretation requires the additional data of a 
surrounding field--the situation in social perception (Heider, 1958c, p. 54)~" The search 
for the dispositional qualities underlying a given event is seen as an effort to control the 
environment, both person and object, in support of a consistent and predictable world 
view. Heider says, " ... man is usually not content simply to register the observables that 
surround him; he needs to refer them as far as possible to the invariances of his 
environment ... the underlying causes of events, especially the motives of other 
persons .... (Heider, 1958c, p. 81)." Thus, the motives underlying another's behavior 
become a paramount consideration in the determination of cause for the behavior. 
Heider (l958c) distinguishes between personal and impersonal causality, viewing the 
former as denoting intentionality and ability, and the latter the effect of the environment. 
Intentional action, in tum, is characterized by both equifinality and local causality but 
" ... only within certain limits, and these limits defme what the person 'can' do ifhe tries (p. 
102)." Thus, personal causality, the power of another to produce change in oneself, is 
dependent on the motivation and ability of the other, notions that for Heider defme a 
concept of "can". Environmental forces also playa part in this process, forming a set of 
forces which must be overcome by "can" in an effort to achieve the desired end state. 
Attributions of personal causality, then, essentially serve to reduce the number of 
conditions necessary for change to just one, " ... the person with intention, who, within a 
wide range of environmental vicissitudes, has control over the multitude of forces required 
to create the specific effect (p. 102)" 
Heider (1958c) notes the relationship between causality and responsibility, with 
responsibility essentially being a function of the actor's intention to produce the outcome 
observed given the constraints of the relevant environment. To the extent that 
environmental forces are felt to contribute to the actor's action outcome, attributions of 
personal responsibility are diminished. Heider notes five forms of the concept of 
responsibility, which he somewhat ambiguously refers to as both phases and levels. First, 
an individual may be held responsible for any event outcome which has been connected to 
the individual in any manner. That is, the person is essentially held responsible by 
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association mther than by direct action. Second, an individual is held responsible for any 
outcome which has been produced by the individual's actions. Here the actor is a 
necessary condition for the outcome even though the outcome could not have been foreseen 
and the actor may not have acted with the intention of producing the outcome 
Third, an actor is held to be responsible for any outcome which the actor might have 
foreseen but which the actor did not intend to produce. That is, the potential result of the 
action could reasonably have been known to the actor in advance but the outcome was not 
part of the actor's goal structure. Fourth, an actor is responsible for any outcome which 
was intended by the actor's behavior and where the intention to act is seen as deriving 
wholly from within the actor. That is, the actor was internally motivated to act in the 
manner obseIVed to produce the outcome obseIVed. ·Finally, an actor's intentions may not 
be entirely attributed to the actor but may be seen as a function of environmental forces. 
That is, there are forces in the environment which are arrayed against the actor such that 
any person would have acted in the manner obseIVed given the circumstances under which 
the action was performed (Heider, 1958c, p. 112-114). 
In sum, Heider (1958a, 1958b, 1958c) notes that perceptual stimuli originate in an 
environment which includes other persons with whom one either interacts or who one 
observes engaging in some behavior. There is, in addition, an awareness of self as a 
stimulus for intemction within the obseIVational field. There are, then, three essential 
sources of causality for any event, sources which may be dichotomized into personal and 
impersonal spheres. These are the self, the object environment and the person 
environment. In interpersonal situations, another person is more likely to be seen as the 
cause of an ev~nt since there is a need for ambiguous perceptual stimuli to be anchored 
against a stable environment. This anchoring, or ordering, of perceptual data, in tum, 
permits predictability for life events in support of one's view of the world. Attributions 0 f 
personal causality are a function of the perceived intentions of the actor in light of an 
assessment of the environmental forces armyed against the actor for any given situation. 
Finally, should personal causality be determined, the actor is likely to be held responsible 
for the outcome obseIVed to the extent that the environment is determined to have a low 
level of implication in the determination of the behavior which led to the outcome. 
Other attributional notions emerged from Heider's (1958) work. Jones and Davis 
(1965), for example, asserted the attribution process to consist of the identification of the 
.~ -.. :: -." 
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intentions of an actor in an event, insofar as they deviate from the typical actor in the same 
situation. The observer infers correspondence between the effects of an action and the 
intention behind the action to the extent that there are unique effects of the action when 
compared to alternative actions available to the actor, and to the extent that the actor's 
behavior is low in social desirability. Desirability, in this sense, involves the determination 
of the probability that the actor would behave in the manner observed given an 
understanding of the actor's experience and social role, and an understanding of the context 
in which the action is performed. In short, the behavior of the actor is salient a~inst the 
field of observation in that it is experientially unique and not generally desirable in context. 
Otherwise, by implication, the behavior recedes into a normal observational pattern and 
attributional processes are not engaged. Shaver (1975) has noted an implication by lones 
and Davis that an actor's behavior is perceived as reflecting one among many alternative 
actions such that an actor has made a choice in how to behave in a given situation. The 
attribution of causality, then, is based on the number of non-common effects of each 
possible action and the perceived social desirability of each possible action. Again, this 
holds true whether the attribution is to self or to the environment and the attribution process 
is an effort to stabilize one's view of the world. 
It has been noted (Shaver, 1985) that the lones and Davis (1965) fonnulation 
implicitly addresses the issues relevant to an attribution of responsibility. The attributional 
process with regard to causality is one of inferring the correspondence between the actor's 
underlying dispositions and the outcome of the action itself. The outcome data alone, 
however, may be insufficient to allow for the certainty necessary for an attribution to the 
actor's dispositions. Thus, additional infonnation is required. This infonnation consists 
of the actor's ability to produce the outcome observed, the foreknowledge which the actor 
had with regard to the potential outcome of the action, and the degree of intention with 
which the action was perfonned. Such factors may be reasonably inferred by an observer 
on the basis of normative experience and an assessment of the circumstances under which 
the action was perfonned. It is presumed that a disposition to act precedes both the 
knowledge of the potential effect of the action and the fonnation of the intention to act. 
Thus, an assessment of the actor as having possessed knowledge and intention will 
strengthen the correspondence between the outcome of the action and the disposition of the 
actor. 
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Kelley (I 967, 1973) notes that attribution theory" ... describes processes that operate 
as if the individual were motivated to attain a cognitive mastery over the causal structure of 
his environment (Kelley, 1967, p. 193)." He further notes that attributions, whether to 
self-environment or to other-environment, occur in the context of four assessment criteria. 
First, distinctiveness is the extent to which an attribution. for an event is unique to the entity 
or person under consideration. Second is the extent to. which the attribution for similar 
events is consistent over time. Third is consistency over modality, the attributional 
perception of an event as being stable over modes of interaction with. the event. Finally, 
there is consensus, the extent to which all observers to an event will attribute the 
event in the same manner. Kelley notes that attributions cast in light of these criteria will 
instill confidence that one's view of the world is essentially correct. When attributions do 
not fulfill these criteria, one is uncertain and hesitant in dealings with the world. This 
implies an attributional schema as an effort to restore cognitive balance in view of 
ambiguous and potentially overwhelming perceptual stimuli. 
Two additional points in Kelley's (1967, 1973) formulation need to be noted as they 
bear on a consideration of attributed cause and, by extrapolation, attributed responsibility, 
particularly in cases where there is only a single occurrence of the event. First, any 
potential cause for.an event is discounted to the extent that other potential causes are 
present. That is, potential causes are weighted dif(erentially against the total causal field. 
Second, potential causes are augmentedto the extent that forces in the environment are 
determined to mitigate against that causal factor. That is, the strength of the potential cause 
must necessarily be enhanced to overcome the array of environmental forces which inhibit 
that potential cause from producing the outcome observed. These notions bear importance 
for a consideration of attributed responsibility as follows: If a person who is the potential 
cause for an outcome has been observed behaving in a manner deemed sufficient to 
produce the outcome, the salience of the person's behavior will increase to the extent that 
other potential causal factors may be discounted in the presence of the actor's behavior and 
the actor's behavior may be augmented on the basis of a strong motivational intention to 
produce the outcome observed. G·~ven an action which is determined to be intentional with 
regard to the outcome and held to be sufficient to overcome any inhibitory factors in the 
environment, the actor who engaged in the action will be held responsible for the outcome. 
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Attribution theory, then, views the individual as perceiving and ordering events in the 
observational field in an effort to maintain a stable and predictable view of the world, to 
create an adaptive balance in one's relations with the social and physical environment. The 
dimensions along which causal attributions are made are essentially dichotomous, 
expressing the combination of relationships between self, other and object. Differential 
causal assessment is dependent on one's role in relation to an event, whether one is an 
active participant or a passive observer. The anchoring of potential causal data along a 
dimension of person (self or other) and environment suggests the possibility of some bias 
in attribution along the expressed dimension. That is, the location of causation at some 
point along a continuum suggests the probability that the location will lie off the midpoint in 
either direction depending on the perceived directionality of the stimulus for the event 
precipitating the attributional effort. The forces which impel perceived directionality 
involves a determination of the actor's motivations with regard to the outcome observed. 
To the extent that the actor may be said to have behaved with foreknowledge of the 
potential consequences and with an intention to produce the outcome, and to the extent that 
the actor's behavior is found sufficient to have produced the effect, the actor will be held 
responsible for the outcome. 
Jones and Nisbett ( 1971) first brought attention to the issue of potential causal bias by 
arguing that there exists a tendency on the part of actors to attribute their actions to the 
demands of the situation while observers attribute the same actions to stable characteristics 
of the actor's personality. The authors cite a study in which college student subjects 
listened to speeches or read essays and were subsequently asked to infer the 
communicator's actual opinion. The expressed opinions were the result of either choice or 
no choice with regard to the stand taken. The results showed that subjects were able to 
clearly discern between choice and no choice conditions but despite the constraints on 
choice behavior, they felt that the position espoused was the actual opinion of the presumed 
communicator. This suggests that observers attach little significance to the situational 
determinants of behavior and attribute behavior instead to a disposition of the actor. This, 
despite slim evidence in regard to the actor, suggesting, in addition, a pervasive 
attributional process at work. This "divergent perceptions" notion has been examined and 
validated in a number of studies and has been consistently.supported in the theoretical 
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literature (see, for example, McArthur, 1972, Nisbett, Caputo, Legant and Maracek, 1973, 
Gurwitz and Panciera, 1975, Bell, 1979, and Rowland, 1980). 
Jones and Nisbett (1971) distinguish between situations in which there is a passive 
observer and those in which the observer is an active participant. Under the latter 
circumstances, the authors feel that there is a tendency toward heightened salience of action 
for several reasons: First, that the observer is caught up in the action suggests that he will 
not be able to make leisurely appraisals of the setting in which the action takes place. 
Rather than being oriented toward understanding the relative contributions of person and 
situation, the actor-observer will be more closely attuned to the cues necessary to 
formulating his own next responses. Second, the presence and behavior of the observer 
may influence the behavior of the actor in ways not discerned by the observer. Finally, the 
surrounding environment is roughly the same for each participant in the situation. That is, 
as an actor-observer is aware of the environmental constraints of the situation and sees 
himself as behaving in accordance with his perceptions of those constraints, then any 
variation in an actor's behavior from that predicted by the actor-observer for the situation 
will be attributed to the actor's idiosyncratic interpretation of the situation. Thus, in a stable 
field, attributions will be toward the actor over the environment. The perception of one's 
role, however, will influence the process. 
This notion of perceptual status or role in a situation suggests that modifications in 
perspective will alter an attributional focus. Storms (1973) demonstrated that visual 
orientation has a powerful etTect on the inferences made by actors and observers about the 
causes of the actor's behavior. When a videotape replay of an event was not presented and 
subjects were left to assume their own orientation, actors attributed their behavior relatively 
more to situational causes than did the observers. Under conditions of reorientation, 
however, as when subjects saw a new point of view on tape, the attributional differences 
between actors and observers were exactly reversed. Following this, Taylor and Fiske 
(197~) reported two studies which tested and confirmed the hypothesis that attending to a 
particular individual in a social situation leads to regarding that individual as the cause of 
the situation. Thus, point of view, or focus of attention, determines information salience; 
perceptually salient information is, in tum, over-represented in subsequent causal 
attributions. The results of these studies show that perceptions of causality in social 
situations are markedly shaped by literal point of view. 
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Several studies have examined the role of empathy in causal attributions. Stephan 
(1975), for example, predicted that for defensive reasons actors would make personal 
dispositional attributions to a positive outcome and e~emal situational attributions to a 
negative outcome. The opposite was predicted for observers. The rmdings of the study 
undertaken suggest that both actors and observers have a fairly accumte grasp of the 
evaluative aspects of the other's causal attributions. In the reported experiment, it was 
found that actors made more positive attributions to their own behavior than they thought 
the observers would make, and the obselVers made fewer positive attributions to the actor's 
behavior than they thought the actors would make~ Regan and Totten (1:975) confirmed the 
hypothesis that an empathic orientation would make observers relatively more likely to 
provide situational attributions and relatively less likely to make dispositional attributions 
for the actor's behavior. Gould and Sigall (1977) assumed that empathic observers are the 
functional equivalent of actors with regard to attributional perspective and found that 
empathic observers, who were given equal expectancy for success and failure, made 
outcome attributions typically found for actors. That is, observers attributed success to 
dispositional causes and failure to situational causes. 
The notions presented above suggest that attributional processes are engaged in an 
effort to order the perceptual stimuli engendered by an event which is causally ambiguous. 
There is a bias·in the attribution of cause to self, other and environment on the basis of the 
differential assessment of the importance and relevance of the stimuli for the obselVed 
event. Duval and Wicklund (1973) have suggested that the differential salience of 
perceptual information may depend on the focus of one's attention in relation to an 
observed event. The authors cite the Jones and Nisbett (1971) divergent perceptions 
hypothesis in noting that neither party to an event has access to the same information. The 
actor is more likely to know the extenuating circumstances surrounding the behavior and, 
therefore, is more likely to attribute· causality to those circumstances. The differential 
salience of person-environment information is felt to stem from several sources. First, 
both the actor's and the observer's sensory receptors are directed outwardly. For the actor 
this means the environment rather than selfwhile for the observer it includes the actor's 
behavior. Second, many of the actor's responses are habitual in nature and do not require 
self examination. The observer, on the other hand, is confronted with the actor's changing 
behavior against a stable background. Finally, the actor is grappling with the changing 
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environment which requires his or her attention in order to achieve situational success. The 
role of the observer, on the other hand, dictates that attention should be focused on the 
actor. 
Duval and Wicklund (1973) conducted two experiments to test the notion that focus 
of attention detennines causal attribution. In the first experiment, subjects responded to ten 
items, each presenting potential situations caused by the subject or by another person. 
Subjects then estimated the percentag~ of their causal role. To. manipulate focus of 
attention, half of the subjects were asked to engage in a meaningless motor task while 
responding. In the second experiment, both positive and negative outcomes were used and 
a mirror was employed to focus attention on self mther than on the environment. The 
results of both experiments indicate that attribution to selfwas greater when attention was 
focused on self. The second experiment demonstmted, in addition, that this held true 
independent of whether the consequences were positive or negative. 
Extending this notion, Arkin and Duval (1975) conducted an experiment in which 
actors made a choice among seveml works of art in the presence of observerS. The factors 
of interest were (I) the source of the attribution, defined as actor or observer, (2) a camera 
condition in which the actor was videotaped or not videotaped, and (3) situational stability, 
noted to consist of a stable or dynamic environment. The authors found that actors 
attributed more causality to the situation than observers under nonnal circumstances, as 
when the camem was off, but that videotaping the actor reversed the usual actor-observer 
patterns. They further found that when the environment was stable, actors attributed more 
causality to the situation in the no camem than in the camera condition, while observers 
attributed less causality to the situation in the no camem than in the camera condition. 
Finally, both actors and observers attributed more causality to the situation when the 
environment was dynamic than when it was stable. 
In a similar vein, Pryor and Kriss (1977) tested the notion that the salience of an 
element affects its availability to memory and that this, in tum, mediates the causal 
attributions made to that element. Salience was manipulated by altering sentence structure 
f~lIowing McArthur (1972): For example, "John likes the movie" versus "The movie is 
liked by John". As a result, an agent was found to be perceived as more causal and more 
available to recall when it was made salient than when it was not. There was also found to 
be a tendency for persons to receive more causal ascriptions and to be more available for 
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recall than objects. This implies that in normal circumstances, an individual is more salient 
and more easily brought to memory than is an object. By extension, it is. reasonable to 
conclude that it is the behavior of the individual which becomes the focus of attention. 
More recently, Duval and Duval (1983) have drawn on the above work to propose 
that causal attributions are an effort to maximize simplicity within consciousness. 
Information about an event which cannot be readily assimilated into a preexisting causal 
structure is considered to be cognitively complex; that is, unconnected or unanchored in 
consciousness. Cognitive simplicity, then, may be maximized by connecting new and 
complex information to event data previously anchored in consciousness. These, in tum, 
form higher order causal structures, termed unit formations by Heider (1958c). The 
authors note, "If one element of a unit formation is defined as an 'effect' event and is 
connected with another event such that they become temporally ordered aspects of a single 
extended cause-effect sequence, then the unit formation is a process of causal attribution (p. 
1-2)." 
There is, however, an asymmetry in the cause and effect relationships which 
determine the potential causes for a given event. The temporal relationship between an 
effect and its potential causes and the magnitude of the properties of potential causes are the 
elements which influence this asymmetry. Additio~lly, there is a question of consistency 
between an effect and its potential causes such that. causality will be attributed to the 
possible cause with properties which are more similar to the effect than any other possible 
causes. Duval and Duval (1983) propose a model, therefore, in which external stimuli are 
translated into cognitions in a consciousness which is divided into focal and non-focal 
systems. The authors propose that to the extent that an effect is more similar to a 
cognized possible cause than to other possible causes in terms of the degree of focalization, 
defmed as duration times intensity, the consistency principle predicts that causality for the 
event will be attributed to that possible cause, all else being equal. 
In sum, the attribution of cause is a natural process which occurs in the context of 
personality. Its.purpose is to explain one's perception of events such that the integrity of 
one's world view is supported. Perceptual stimuli are ordered along specific dimensions, 
generally consisting of person and environment characteristics, and are differentially 
"anchored" toward one end of any given dimension. This anchoring is influenced by one's 
perception of one's status, or role, in relation to an ambiguous event, and the focus of 
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one's attention, specifically the amount of attention one directs to objects in the perceptual 
field. The perceptual field consists, essentially, of one's inner experience of an event and 
the mnge of objects in the environment, with other persons serving as environmental 
objects. There is a relationship among the various dimensions of the field such that the 
field or any combination of elements in the field may be seen as either dynamic or stable, 
with a tendency toward the stabilization of the perceptual field through a process of causal 
attribution. Then, to the extent that causality is attributed toward the person end of any 
attributional dimension, there is a tendency to detennine that the person producing an event 
outcome is responsible for that outcome. Responsibility, in tum, is a function of the 
perception of the knowledge and intentions of the actor and an assessment of the 
sufficiency of the observed behavior to overcome any inhibitory factors in the environment. 
The literature cited indicates that attributional phenomena occur rather pervasively across a 
variety of settings and conditions. The process is well enough defmed to lend itself readily 
to ~mpirica1 examination. 
The attribution literature has also focused specific attention on the issue of attributed 
responsibility. It has been noted (Berkowitz and Daniels, 1965, Schopler and Mathews, 
1965, Schopler and Batson, 1965, and Ickes and Kidd, 1976) that responsibility is a 
function of the perceived dependence of another person's outcomes. In a helping situation, 
the perception that one is dependent on a potential helper through no fault of one's own 
increases the likelihood that help giving behavior will ensue. This implies that dependency 
is a function of behavioral freedom under certain circumstances. That is, a potential helper 
is more likely to engage in help giving behavior if the dependent others behavior is viewed 
as being constrained by the contextual environment. 
Conversely, an attribution of choice behavior in the others dependency status is more 
likely to inhibit a helping response and to engender negative impressions regarding the 
dePendent other. This is particularly true when dependency is viewed as a negatively 
valued trait or condition. At any rate, i~ is the intention of dependency which is at issue in 
assessing responsibility for an event. 
Shaver (1970) conducted three experiments to examine the proposition that for 
defensive reasons an observer to an accide~t, to preclude the same accident befalling the 
observer, will attribute responsibility to another person who is potentially responsible. It 
was also proposed that the observer would attempt to differentiate from the potentially 
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responsible person. Further, it was felt that this tendency would increase with the 
probability of the occurrence and the severity of the outcomes. Across experimental 
conditions, it was found that heightened probability of occurrence, particularly in the form 
of personal similarity to the person involved, lessened the observer's attributions of 
responsibility and increased a sense that the person behaved in a careful fashion. Shaw and 
Skolnick (1971) provide support for this defensive attribution notion regarding a happy 
accident. 
Lerner (1971), on the other hand, cites earlier work which began with the assumption 
that people have a need to believe in a world in which the deserving are rewarded and the 
undeserving are appropriately punished. Given this need, the awareness of a person who 
is suffering under conditions of constraint will create a conflict for an observer. The 
observer can either conclude that .he world is not so just after all or persuade him or herself 
that the victim merited the suffering. The author suggests that one wayan observer can 
resolve this conflict is to decide that the victim, although innocent by deed, deserves the 
fate by virtUe of undesirable personal characteristics. This suggests a relationship between 
causal and responsibility dimensions. 
Chaiken and Darley (1973) examined both the defensive attribution notion and the 
just world hypothesis, both cited above, in conducting an experiment in which subjects 
watched a videotape of a supervisor-worker pair completing a routine coding task. During 
the coding, the supervisor caused an accident which had consequences for the worker 
which were either mild or severe in nature. The su~rvisor or the worker was made 
situationally relevant to subjects by telling them that they would fill one or the other role in 
a subsequent experiment at some future date. The results supported the just world 
hypothesis in that when the consequences of the accident were severe they were less likely 
to be attributed to chance causes. Future supervisors blamed the accident on the 
experimenter rather than the perpetrator or victim (due to faulty equipment). Future 
work~rs tended to blame the perpetrator, in this case the supervisor. This latter rmding 
provides evidence for the defensive attribution notion which was found to hold sway when 
in conflict with the just world hypothesis. 
Other research has moved toward an examination of perceived freedom and its 
relationship to causal issues. Kruglanski and Cohen (1973), for example, tested the thesis 
that an actor's freedom, as inferred from his actions by an observer, is dependent on the 
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degree to which the actions are attributed to the actor's person. In the experiment, subjects 
received information about a target person's predispositions and about his or her behavior 
in specific situations. Subjects then answered questions as to the perception of this 
person's freedom and attributed responsibility for the behavior depicted. Consistent with 
the hypothesis, it was found that greater freedom and responsibility were attributed to the 
target when the act was consistent with the target's presumed dispositions. It was also 
found that when the act was inconsistent with the target person's· dispositions, greater 
freedom was assumed when the act was also incongruent with situational demands. The 
authors conclude that when the cause of an act may be assigned to the actor's person, 
considerable stability with regard to freedom prevails. Thus, there is little need to consider 
other possible causes. By contrast, when personal causation may be ruled out, potential 
situational causes become more important in determining freedom. 
Worchell and Andreoli (1974) examined perceived threats to behavioral freedom and 
hypothesized that behaviors on the part of others which evoke the norm of reciprocity 
threaten behavioral freedom by dictating what behaviors one is expected to cany out in 
return. The strength of the resulting reactance should be a direct function of the importance . 
of the threatened behavioral freedom. The hypotheses were supported. Harvey, Harris 
and Barnes (1975) noted that when an observer sees an actor engage in a behavior with a 
moderately negative effect, the observer might feel some sympathy and let the actor off the 
hook, that is, make external attributions. When the consequences are severe, however, an 
observer may not feel much sympathy since to do so would imply sanction for the actor's 
behavior. As a consequence, the actor becomes a target of attributional analysis. This 
notion was experimentally supported. 
The recent literature has made a considerable theoretical contribution to an 
understanding of the relationship between cause and responsibility. Fincham and Jaspars 
(1980), for example, have examined the literature with regard to the philosophy oflaw and 
note that "Holding someone responsible does not explain anything directly but may be 
related to the explanation one gives (p. 83)." The authors note that a determination of 
causality is a necessary precondition for any determination of responsibility and conclude 
that, from a common sense perspective, the central ~otion with regard to the attribution of 
responsibility is the idea that a person can be held accountable for actions performed by the 
actor and for the outcomes of those actions, and may be held accountable for actions not 
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performed but expected by virtue of the actor's role or status. Finally, a person may be 
held not accountable for some action perfonned because the actor lacks the ability to fonn 
the intention to act in a manner consistent with the outcome. 
Fincham and Jaspars (1980) cite Hart and Honore' (1959) to conclude that the 
general structure of laws necessary to demonstrate causality do not indicate which of all 
possible conditions necessary for the occu~nce of an event may be at issue in a particular 
instance. Essentially, one may view the process of causal attribution as one of focusing on 
the one essential condition among many that may be present. It is noted that in common 
sense a cause is perceived as an abnonnal condition, a condition which may be said to be 
implicated causally because it is not present in the usual state of affairs. The authors state, 
A voluntary human action appears to be the prototype of such an 
abnormal condition. It occupies a special place in causal 
inquiries because it is seen as a primary or ultimate cause 
through which we do not trace the cause of a later event and to 
which we do trace the cause through intermediate causes of other 
kinds (p. 100). 
Thus, in common sense, causality is likely to be attributed to any intentional human action 
which is implicated in an abnormal situation which has produced an outcome which 
requires explanation. Such causal detennination, then, serves as a prelude to the attribution 
of responsibility for the event. Finally, Fincham and Jaspars (1980) note that conceptual 
confusion has arisen in the psychological literature because causality constitutes one 
meaning of the word responsibility. The authors conclude that the central meaning of 
responsibility is closely related to the question of causality because the detennination of 
causality appears to be critical to the detennination of responsibility both in law and in 
common sense. 
Shultz and Schleifer (1983) draw on the major attributional theorists and the 
philosophy oflaw to conclude that conditional analyses have generally attempted to account 
for causal connections in terms of the occurrence of one event being either a necessary or 
sufficient condition, or both, of the occurrence of another event. As a conditional 
statement, a necessary condition would be expressed as "q only if p" while a sufficient 
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condition would be expressed as "if p then q." The authors report research which appears 
to indicate that subjects use the necessity rule in detennining causality but thatinfonnation 
on sufficient conditions is not readily used to make judgments about caUsality. Essentially, 
the authors found that subjects do accurately identify whether or not a protagonist's 
behavior is a differentiating factor between the current situation and a standard situation, 
but subjects do not use that conclusion to determine whether-the behavior constitutes either 
a sufficient condition or a cause of the-hann. Thus, a determination of the responsibility 
attributable to a person rests on a determination that the acter's behavior was necessary to 
produce the outcome obsetved, rather than just sufflCient to account for the outcome. The 
authors conclude that among legal and moral theorists, judgments of responsibility are 
largely a matter of discounting various mitigating factors. Among the most common 
mitigating factors are voluntariness, foresight and intetvening causality. 
Finally, Shaver (1985) has engaged in a substantial review of the attributional 
literature and the literatures from both the philosophy oflaw and the philosophy of mind in 
the development of an attributional theory of blame. As have others, Shaver notes that a 
determination of causality is a necessary precondition to any assessment of responsibility 
and blame for an event outcome. The author presents a preliminary model of attributed 
causality which takes into account the variety of factors which influence such a 
determination. Essentially, Shaver holds that the first step in the process is the selection of 
the event to be attributed from among the range of events available and the selection of a 
specific action from within the range of actions available for the event chosen. In the event 
of a single and obvious cause, the base situation in causal detennination, causality is 
attributed to the single minimally sufficient causal subset which may contain single or 
multiple elements. 
In the event of possible multiple causes, on the other hand, the attributional process is 
differentiated on the basis of single case and repeated obsetvation occurrences. In 
instances in which there is only a single experience of the event action to be attributed, the 
process moves to an examination of potential causal elements with regard to their necessity, 
sufficiency and compensatory qualities. In the event of multiple necessary conditions, 
cause is again attributed to the single minimally sufficient causal subset with single or 
multiple elements. In the event of mUltiple sufficient conditions, one will engage in a 
process of discounting to arrive at the minimally sufficient causal subset with or without an 
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INUS condition. An INUS condition is an insufficient but necessary element in an 
unnecessary but sufficient causal subset; essentially, that one element among all elements 
which is critical for the effect to be produced. In the event of compensatory conditions, 
which iI~ply the presence of environmental factors mitigating against the outcome for any 
particular causal element, one will engage in a process of augmentation to arrive at the . 
minimally sufficient causal subset with or without an INUS condition. 
Finally, in the event of repeated observation, Shaver (1985) holds that the observer 
will engage in a process akin to Kelley's (1967, 1973) formulations and will examine the 
effect across the dimension of entities, time/modalities and persons. Furthermore, the 
observer will employ the assessment criteria of distinctiveness, consistency and consensus 
applied to each of the assessed dimensions resPectively. To the extent that covariation 
exists, the effect will be attributed to a minimally sufficient causal subset with or without an 
INUS condition .. 
Shaver (1985) notes that attributions of responsibility will be engaged for an event 
with negatively valued consequences which involves human action in the production of the 
event. The author presents a model of attributed responsibility which may be expressed as 
a multi-step attributional process as follows: First, an observer to an event will detennine 
whether a person whose behavior is the potential cause of an event outcome is actually the 
cause of the outcome. Should it be detennined that the actor is not the cause, the 
attributional process with regard to attributed responsibility is aborted as cause is attributed 
to some aspect of the actor's environment. To the extent that the actor is detennined to 
have been the cause of the outcome, however, the observer will next make a detennination 
as to whether the actor had, or should have had, knowledge of the potential consequences 
of the action. If it is determined that the actor did not have such knowledge and did not 
have reasonable access to such knowledge, responsibility will be attributed to the actor at 
the causal level. To the extent that it is determined that the actor did have reason to know 
the potential consequences of the action undertake~, the observer will next endeavor to 
determine whether the actor intended to produce the outcome observed. If it is detennined 
that the actor caused the outcome and had knowledge of the potential consequences but did 
not intend to produce the outcome observed, responsibility will be attributed to the actor at 
the knowledge level. Should it be detennined, however, that the actor did in fact intend to 
produce the outcome observed, the observer will next scan the relevant environment in 
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search of factors which might have coerced the actor into behaving in the manner observed. 
Should the ob~lVer detennine that the actor did cause the outcome in the presence of 
knowledge of the potential consequences and with an intention to produce the outcome 
observed, and detennine that environmental factors which might reasonably account for the 
actors behavior are not present, the obselVer will attribute responsibility to the actor at the 
intention level. Should it be detennined, however, that environmental factors did influence 
the actors behavior in the presence of knowledge and intention, responsibility will still be 
attributed to the actor but at the coercion level, a level which theoretically lies between that 
of knowledge and intention. Finally, Shaver (1985) holds that blame will be assigned to 
the actor to the extent that environmental factors influencing the actor's behavior are present 
but are judged by the obselVer to be insufficient to account for the "actor's behavior and that 
the actor caused the outcome obselVed, acting intentionally and with knowledge of the 
potential consequences. 
In sum, it is apparent that attributions of responsibility are attendant on a causal 
process which implies ascriptions of freedom for the behaviors exhibited with regard to a 
given event. Harvey (1976) states that in real life situations people are held responsible for 
their acts if they are considered free in their actions. That is, as Shaver (1985) notes, the 
actor could have done otherwise with respect to his or her behavior, given an appreciation 
of the circumstances under which the behavior was perfonned. It is noted that attributions 
of responsibility are predicated on a detennination of causality for negatively valued events 
involving human agency. It is possible, however, that persons may be held responsible for 
events in which they have not been directly causally implicated. That is, persons may be 
held responsible by association. It is more typical, however, that responsibility accrues to 
persons whose behavior is more directly causally implicated in an event outcome. The 
theory suggests that attributions of responsibility, then, will vary with a detennination of 
the extent to which a person causally responsible also had knowledge of the potential 
consequences of their actions and acted in a manner intended to produce the outcome 
observed. Given the presence of causal responsibility, knowledge of the potential 
consequences and the intention to produce the outcome, environmental factors which may 
have coerced the actor's behavior will selVe to mitigate attributions of responsibility but 
will not result in the actor being held free of responsibility for the outcome. 
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Given that attributions of cause and responsibility constitute a nonnal human process, 
it is reasonable to conclude that it is a process extant in a counseling situation. Counseling 
may be defmed as an event in the perceptual field of both the counselor and the client. 
There are, however, differences in the experience of the event for both counselor and 
client, particularly in early assessment interviews, as well as differences in the intent, or 
focus~ of the event for each party. The agency or office based counselor will experience 
the immediate physical environment as stable and under mediational control. Thus, the 
client represents a new element in the field and becomes the focus of attention. For the 
client, however, the task is to describe events in the client's life and to provide the 
counselor with infonnation to help each better understand the events described. Thus, the 
client's focus of attention is to the experience of an environment which is external to the 
counseling situation. This environmental focus of attention is, in tum, reinforced by the 
client's need to assimilate a new environment, consisting, in this case, of both the 
immediate physical setting and the counselor as an environmental element. 
That the counselor also experiences the client's environment is true. It is also true, 
however, that in most counseling situations, this environment is experienced through the 
eyes of the client. It is the "client's experience of the events described which provides 
infonnation concerning the potential causes of the client's problem. The objective 
experience by the counselor of the client's environment is predicated on the counselor's 
assessment of perceptual objectivity on the part of the client. Distortions in perception by 
the client serve as causal cues. It is acknowledged that there are objective aspects to the 
counseling situation, such as home visits and collateral interviews. The author is here 
concerned primarily with the counselor's assessment of the client's problem and problem 
events as described by the client. 
It is proposed that assessment is essentially a process of causal detennination and 
that, to the extent that such cause is detennined to involve human action, attributions of 
responsibility result. It is further proposed that the client enters the assessment phase of a 
counseling relationship having engaged" in an attributional process with respect to the 
problem events which have brought the client to seek counseling. That is, the client has 
attributed both cause and responsibility for various events in the client's life. These 
attributions, then, fonn the partial basis for the infonnation conveyed to the counselor in 
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the assessment interview. The counselor, in tum, then, engages in a process of attributing 
cause and responsibility for the events presented by the client. 
There is an underlying implication that there exists a professional attributional schema 
which is, in part, evolved from the counselor's· experience and training. Certainly, 
theoretical orientation will influence an assessment outlook, as will the nature of the 
problem and the counselor's familiarity with the problem and its implications for the 
client's experience. This professional attributional schema is differentiated from other 
attributional experiences by the professional's role in relation to a given event, in this case 
the assessment of the client's problem. Other influences on the development of a 
professional attributional schema are derived from professional and personal history and 
the nature of the task for which attributional processes are invoked. Given these and other 
considerations, an examination of the attribution and related literatures for the clinical 
implications of the relevant issues appears warranted. 
The Clinical Implications of Attributions of Cause and Resoonsibilitv 
Attribution theory and its related concepts have been applied to clinical efforts across 
a variety of dimensions. Hill and Bale (1978), for example, developed a mental health 
locus of control and mental health locus of origin scale and found that the more an 
individual believes that psychological problems are endogenously based, the more that 
person ~ll tend to expect that the appropriate client is a passive one involving minimal 
acceptance of responsibility. Similarly, a more active role is attributed to clients by 
individuals who understand the origins of psychological problems in tenns of interactions 
between the person and the social environment. Thus, a view of the client's problem 
field as a dynamic entity influences a perception of the extent to which the client participates 
in that field. 
Snyder (1976), on the other hand, notes Iones and Nisbett's (1971) divergent 
perceptions hypothesis in proposing that clinicians will view their client's behavior 
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(symptoms) as expressions of inherent defects, a belief that may hamper the progress of 
intervention and treatment. Clients, on the other hand, will tend to attribute any change 
which may occur to the efforts of the clinician rather than to their own efforts, thus 
effectively undermining any chances for long term maintenance of behavioral change. This 
implies that the client's perceptions are directed outwardly, thereby precluding self as a 
reinforcing agent in the change effort, while the clinician's perceptions are directed toward 
the client as the source of any difficulty expressed. 
-In an examination of helping behavior, Ickes and Kidd (1976) note that the dimension 
of success and failure must be considered. The authors note that if the counselor's 
perception of the client in relation to a specific event is one of failure, there may be a 
generalized expectancy for failure unless other factors mediate. This could appear as an 
expectancy for failure in counseling (i.e., not amenable to treatment, poor treatment 
prognosis, and so on). Another element of the helper's attributions for another's behavior 
is the perceived intentionality of the other's actions. Expressed as a dependency for 
perceived outcomes, the authors cite a study by Schopler and Mathews (1965) in noting 
that intentionality implies responsibility for an event and that attributions of responsibility 
may interact with the diInension of causality. The authors cite an additional experiment 
which indicates that the greatest responsiveness to a request for help may occur when a 
person ascribes his or her own favorable outcomes_ to ability but views the dependent 
other's outcome as unintentional and beyond that person's immediate control. 
Thus, if a counselor infers failure on the part of the client for any event, there may be 
a tendency on the part of the counselor to believe that the client will continue to fail in future 
like events and to believe that the present counseling endeavor will not likely have a 
favorable outcome. This is, in tum, mediated by the perceived intentionality of the client's 
behavior in relation to the event in question. If the client is felt to be constrained 
behaviorally due to circumstances beyond the client's immediate control, the counselor is 
more likely to engage in helping behavior than if the counselor perceives the client as the 
causal agent and as intentionally responsible. As noted elsewhere, the dimensions of cause 
and responsibility each form unique elements ofa problem analytic framework but with 
causal determination serving as a necessary precondition for the determination of 
responsibility. 
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Snyder, Shenkel and Schmidt (1976) conducted a study in which role perspective 
was manipulated for either the counselor or client role. It was found that counselor role 
subjects rated the client's problems as significantly more personality based than did control 
or client role subjects. The investigators also manipulated chronic versus first visit clients. 
Here it was found that chronic client problems were viewed as significantly more 
personality based than were first visit client problems. The interaction revealed that the 
control subjects, like the counselor perspective subjects, saw the problems as more 
personality located for chronic clients than did client role subjects. Control subjects, like 
client subjects saw th~ problem as more situationally located than counselor subjects 
when the client was first time. A caveat is noted in that experimental subjects were 
undergraduate students taking part in an introductory psychology course. 
The issue noted above was also addressed by Wills (1978) who cites a study in 
which 25 professional therapists and 25 matched lay adults were shown two films 
depicting, in one, a normal child and, in the other, a deviant child. The results ofa 
questionnaire revealed that both groups discriminated between normal and deviant children, 
attributing greater maladjustment to the deviant child. Therapists, however, consistently 
attributed greater maladjustment to both children. The author also cites evidence which 
indicates that experienced counselors rate clients with personal problems as less concerned 
about their problems, as having less potential for change and as being less likable. 
Additional evidence suggests that therapist's attitudes and behavior are substantially more 
favorable toward dependent or submissive clients than toward clients who are assertive or 
uncooperative. This implies that normal resistances to the counseling process are likely to 
engender unfavorable perceptions of the client on the part of the counselor. 
It seems evident, therefore, that attributional processes influence the counselors 
perceptions of the counseling situation and of the client. Dependent clients, for example, 
engender more favorable attitudes on the part of the counselor than do more assertive 
clients, clients who are likely to take a more active role in the course and development of 
their treatment. Dependency is, in part, a function of the perception of the client's problem 
situation as being dictated by environmental elements which are beyond the client's 
immediate control. There is a choicelno-choice dimension along which dependence is 
located such that dependency may be described according to the vicissitudes of the 
environment or to the client's own and voluntary actions as intending to produce the 
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dependent condition. This implies an attribution of responsibility for the problem 
circumstances. This is, by necessity, preconditioned by an attribution of causality to the 
client for the problem presented, and both attributions of cause and attributions of 
responsibility are part and parcel of the assessment process in counseling (See, also, 
Jones, et aI., 1971, Ickes and Kidd, 1976, Douds, Fontana, Russakoffand Harris, 1977, 
Frieze, Bar-Tal and Carroll, 1979, and Forsyth and Forsyth, 1982). 
The related literatures have provided additional evidence for attributional processes in 
counseling and for the presence of attributional bias. Segal (1970), for example, conducted 
a survey in a metropolitan welfare department to compare social workers' and clients' 
reports of the clients' activities. It was found that workers had no knowledge of the 
activities of several clients even though they had had one or more interviews with the client. 
Additionally, it was found that workers had incomplete information regarding their client's 
solitary recreational activities and that they lacked awareness of the client's performance of 
household chores. Discrepancies were also found in the perceptions of goals, particularly 
in regard to educational needs. These fmdings suggest a potential bias against relevant 
environmental information in arriving at an understanding of the client's manifest 
difficulties and present life circumstances. 
Benlifer and Keisler (1972) suggest that it is often a helper's job to look for 
weaknesses so as to be able to offer help. If this is the case, and if counselors are trained 
to look for such weaknesses, then these same weaknesses will become salient in the 
counseling relationship and the client will be perceived as less well adjusted. The client is 
also likely to be seen as less likable than if problems and weaknesses were less salient. 
The authors report a study in which experienced therapists and laypersons viewed 
videotapes of a disturbed child who was actually in treatment and a normal child who was 
described as being in treatment. The results revealed that the therapist subjects attributed 
greater maladjustment to the normal child than did laypersons. Further, therapists liked the 
disturbed child less than did laypersons. 
Support for these findings are found in a survey by Chalfant and Kurtz (1972) of 
social worker's judgments of alcoholics.' The results show that an alcoholic who possesses 
socially desirable characteristics, such as a high socioeconomic status, high motivation, 
self-referral and conforming behavior, is judged more positively and is more accepted than 
is an alcoholic who does not possess these characteristics. Again, this implies that selected 
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information concerning the client's interaction with the social environment is differentially 
assessed, influencing the worker's subsequent judgments. It further implies that the 
worker's judgments are derived from an assessment which essentially entails a causal 
process, since alcoholism is perceived along an implicit causal dimension. 
Attributional phenomena have also been cast in terms of a labeling process. Case and 
Lingerfelt (1974), for example, used open ended questions to elicit social worker's 
responses to videotaped case vignettes and found that negative labels predominated. 
Further, it was found that professional workers responded with a higher degree of negative 
labeling than did both graduate and undergraduate social work students. Graduate social 
work students, in tum, were higher in negative labeling than were undergraduates. Mental 
problems were more negatively labeled than were other problems. Gingerich, Feldman and 
Wodarski (1976) cite this and other studies to propose that professional training 
emphasizes pathology or deviance and results in a tendency to see deviance rather than 
normalcy when cues are ambiguous. Gingerich (1978) holds the view that labeling is a 
perceptUal event and implies that clinical judgment results from attributional processes. 
Gingerich, Kleczewski and Kirk (1982) note possible consequences ofa labeling 
process to arise in that once the client is labeled, the worker is induced to attend selectively 
to client behaviors, ignoring behaviors indicating strength and competency which would 
serve to disconfirm the negative label. The authors replicated and extended Case and 
Lingerfelt (1974) and, again, found that negative labeling predominated. The authors also 
found, however, that the worker's practice orientation made a difference with persons 
ascribing to a behaviorist orientation exhibiting the lowest incidence of negative labels, 
followed by worker's espousing a humanist orientation and, finally, psychoanalytically 
oriented workers. These fmdings have considerable implication for attributional 
processes in the assessment of client problems and in the formation of subsequent clinical 
judgments in that the worker is, in part, concerned with supporting initial psychosocial and 
diagnostic impressions, selecting out information which supports such a view to the 
exclusion of other relevant and potentially disconfinnatory data. 
In a related vein, Rubenstein and Bloch (1978) conducted a survey of workers and 
clients in a family service agency and found that workers identified intrapersonal problems 
as areas of difficulty to a greater extent than did clients. Clients, on the other hand, felt that 
homemaking and parenting were paramount concerns. Additionally, in discussing factors 
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they believed to be contributing most to client problems, workers gave relatively more 
emphasis to intrapersonal and interpersonal factors than to a lack of resources and tangible 
goods and services. Clients, on the oth~r hand, tended to emphasize lack of resources and 
interpersonal rather than intrapersonal problems. The authors report that clients rarely 
spoke of their own behavior as contributing to their problems. 
Maluccio (1979) examined worker's and client's perspectives on treatment outcome 
and, using only 25 cases, found disagreement on the ratings of outcome. Most clients 
rated their experience as satisfactory while most workers were either dissatisfied or 
ambivalent. Clients tended to see themselves as proactive and competent while workers 
tended to see clients as reactive, having continuing problems and underlying weaknesses, 
and as having limited potential for change. Maluccio stresses the need for workers to 
attend more closely to environmental issues. Finally, Settin and Bramel (1981) cite 
evidence which demonstrates that clinical judgments, including diagnoses and other 
attributionaI judgments of mental illness, are based on the context of the judgment process 
and on the therapist's expectations for the client's behavior (see also, Rees, 1976, 
Abramowitz and Dokecki, 1977, Kerson 1977, Witkin, 1982, Latting and Zundel, 1986 
and Specht and Specht, 1986). 
Essentially, then, professional training and experience, as well as the professional's 
theoretical orientation toward human problems, serves to focus the worker's attention 
toward the client's behavior and personality, thereby engendering selective attention to 
potential mediating factors in the social environment. In this sense, following Heider 
(1958c), client behaviors engulf the professional field. Cause, then, is presumed to rest 
within the client at the expense of environmental considerations. The divergent perceptions 
notion, in tum, would add that the client's perception of the cause of any problem behavior 
wUI tend to lie at some point in the social and physical environment. Thus, the client 
provides verbal information concerning such environmental perceptions and their role in 
problem development and maintenance. These cues are differentially assessed by the 
worker and serve to either confirm or disconfirm the worker's initial causal hypothesis. 
The predominance of negative perceptions, however, pulls the worker toward an 
other-internal causal attribution for the problem event. That is, the client's report of 
environmental factors influencing the problem are discounted by the worker in the interest 
of an assessment of the client's personality as the causal agent. Then, to the extent that the 
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client is detennined to be the cause of the problem presented to the worker, the worker will 
attribute responsibility to the client. As earlier noted, such attributions of responsibility will 
vary as a function of the perception of the client's knowledge of the consequences of any 
action and the intention of the client to produce the defmed problem. As potential 
environmental factors are discounted in the assessment process, there is an implicit 
disavowal of the potential of coercive elements in the detennination of both cause and 
responsibility. Finally, to the extent that the client is held to be responsible for the problem 
presented, the worker's judgments of, among other things, the 'client's motivation, interest, 
treatability and likability will be negatively influenced. 
In conclusion, it seems apparent that attributional processes are at work in the process 
. . 
of assessment and that substantial attributional bias may exist, particularly along a 
person-environment attributional dimension. It seems equally apparent that these 
attributional processes and biases influence the counselor's clinical judgment and, by 
extrapolation, the counselor's interactions and interventions with the client. That this 
implies a causal process and a detennination of responsibility for the client's problem has 
been previously noted. It has also been noted (Ickes and Kidd, 1976) that cause and 
responsibility may be distinct but related aspects of the same process, namely, the process 
of detennining help giving behavior. The relevant issues will now be summed and 
concluded. 
Summary and Conclusions 
It is proposed that attributions of causality and responsibility are each elements of a 
process in which human events are judged. This proposal is relevant to assessment in 
social work practice in that the problems and circumstances which the client brings to the 
social worker for help in resolving represent discrete events in the lives of the client for 
which attributional processes are engaged. This, in tum, serves to defme the assessment as 
a discrete event for the worker for which professional attributional processes are also 
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engaged. The worker perceives the client's experiences through the counseling 
communication in such a way that the worker arrives at an understanding of the client's 
problems, wants and needs in the context of the client's social milieu. The worker's 
perceptions are, therefore, influenced by the client's perceptual experienc;:e and, 
consequently, by the client's attributional analysis of self and of the social and physical 
world. 
Assessment, then, is a professional judgment process in which the worker locates 
potential causes of the client's problem either in the client or in elements of the client's 
social and physical environment. Identifying and locating potential causal sources allows 
the worker to define appropriate strategies for intelVention. To the extent that sOlile human 
action is causally implicated in the development of the client's problem, the worker will 
assign responsibility to the person engaging in that action at any of the various levels of 
responsibility of Cause, knowledge, intention or coercion. This assignment of 
responsibility may be either to the client or to other persons who constitute the client's 
social network. These attributional processes are significantly influenced by factors 
generally extant in the field of professional social work. For example, professional training 
in theory and practice, as well as professional and personal experience, help to detennine 
the focus of the worker's attention in the assessment and treatment phases of helping. The 
focus of the worker's attention, in tum, engenders perceptual biases which result in a 
differential assessment of potential causal sources and in a differential attribution of 
responsibility for the outcomes which constitute the client's problem for work. The nature 
of the task as a more or less explicit labeling process selVes to mitigate against the 
processing of the range of infonnation which would support or refute the causal label. Any 
bias whlch has then developed with regard to causal locus and the assignment of 
responsibility for the client's problem events would tend to be maintained by the selective 
use of infonnation. 
It is further proposed that the social work profession's historical debate with regard to 
the role of the person and environment in defining the unit of attention represents an·effort 
to address the salient issues found in the attribution literature with regard to causal and 
responsibility ascriptions. Social work has, in tum, contributed a consistent emphasis on 
the interactional nature of the problem field. Disaffection with linear cause and effect 
constructions of human problems has, however, obscured what may be an innate human 
tendency to perceive events in essentially linear, cause and effect tenns. The result has 
been an effort to develop an assessment model without adequate attention to the basic 
processes which influence a definition of human events. 
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The various dimensions on which attributional judgments of cause and responsibility 
rest are felt to be reciprocally interactive in a mutual influence process generally consistent 
with social work's eco-systems perspective. Thus, attributions fonn in a dynamic field and 
are understood as discrete elements of cause and effect data which, in differential analysis, 
suggest a predominant causal locus and, by extrapolation, a locus of responsibility. 
Attributions of causality, then, allow for an ordering of cognitions with regard to a defined 
event, while attributions of responsi1?ility allow for an anchoring of emotions with regard to 
the same event. 
It is additionally proposed that attributions of cause and responsibility essentially 
constitute elements of a professional attributional schema, a schema which is a dynamic 
part of the assessment process in social work practice. The interaction of schematic 
elements with various elements of the professional practice of social work, as well as 
worker and client characteristics, serve to define the worker's judgments with regard to the 
client's problem and its amenability to social work intervention. Thus, the bias of the 
worker's attributional analysis of the client's problem engenders bias in the worker's 
assessment of the client's person and influences the worker's judgments with regard to the 
potential efficacy of help giving. 
The questions which are raised by these proposals and the supportive literature are 
gennane to an understanding of social work processes and to the professional education of 
practitioners in the field in several respects. For example, attention to attributional 
phenomena will serve to add to the knowledge base of professional practice through an 
understanding of the influence of such phenomena in the worker's assessn:tent of the client 
and the client's problem. Such attention will also add to an understanding of the worker's 
subsequent judgments with regard to intervention and its potential for success. It is felt that 
attribution theory offers a unique opportunity to develop additional tools for social work 
assessment and an opportunity to more dearly define a model for assessment which 
incorporates a dynamic, interactional problem perspective based on attributional processes 
and social work practice theory. 
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In conclusion, then, a research effort is proposed which will examine attributional 
processes in the social worker's assessment of the client's problem and which will be 
addressed to questions concerning the relationship between the client's attributions of cause 
and responsibility for the problem event, the worker's attributions of cause and 
responsibility for the same event, and the worker's subsequent clinical judgment, attraction 
to the client and beliefin the veridicality of the client's presentation. The methodology for 





It is important to initially note the potential for confusion which may arise from the 
fact that the four levels of the independent variable and four of the dependent variables 
employed in the study bear the same names, those of cause, knowledge, intention and 
coercion. Efforts have been undertaken to reduce such potential confusion by employing 
the terms "stimulus attributional variables" and "dependent attributional variables" to note 
the distinction between the levels of the independent variable and the dependent measures in 
question. It is hoped that such efforts will serve to aid the careful reader. 
Design 
The study employed a one factor completely randomized design With attributed 
responsibility constituting the factor under consideration. The rationale for this choice of 
methodology rested in the utilization ofa model of attributed responsibility which defines, 
essentially, four levels of a unitary construct as follows: (1) causal responsibility, (2) 
. knowledge responsibility, (3) intention responsibility, and (4) coercive responsibility. 
Thus, the independent variable of attributed responsibility could be rendered active for a 
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between subjects structuring and subjects could be randomly assigned to each of the four 
levels of the independent variable. Consideration was given to defining a second factor, 
that of theQretical orientation, but a two factor randomized design was ultimately rejected 
after considering the sampling difficulties this posed. A two factor repeated measures 
design was rejected on similar grounds. Consideration was also given to employing a one 
factor repeated measures design but this too was rejected following consideration of the 
loss of generalizability which would result from an inability to mislead subjects as to the 
nature of the stimulus items employed. The unit of analysis for the study, then, consisted 
of individual subjects randomly assigned to one of four levels of the single independent 
variable. 
The design called for the development of four stimulus items, each reflecting one 
level of attributed responsibility as defined by the theoretical model, and a set of item 
responses applicable across stimulus items. Since the major research questions centered on 
the process of clinical assessment in social work practice, it was determined that the 
stimulus items needed to emulate, inasmuch as possible, actual interview conditions. 
Originally, this was to be effected through the construction of four videotaped vignettes of 
a bogus interview between a client and a social worker with each videotape expressing one 
level of the independent variable. Given resource limitations for the study, however, and 
in consideration of the considerable time investment involved, it was concluded that the 
stimulus items would consist of four separate audiotapes of the bogus client interview. 
Stimulus Items 
The stimulus items consisted ofa twelve minute (approximately) segment of an 
interview between a female client and a female social worker in which the client presented 
her recent marital separation and a decision with regard to the status of her marriage as the 
"problem". Marital separation was chosen as the problem area for the interview as this 
tends to be a fairly common problem area seen by social workers in counseling settings and 
would thus be familiar to most workers. This, then, would reduce potential bias 
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attributable to practice specialization. The gender of the social worker and client was 
selected with a mind to controlling for potential gender effects. That is, the social worker 
and the client were of the same gender to eliminate such effects in the stimulus items 
themselves and were made female since this reflects both the dominant gender in the 
profession and, typically, among clients seen by social workers. Finally, a female social 
worker and client were chosen since it was believed that the final sample would be 
predominately female. 
The independent variable of attributed responsibility, then, was manipulated through 
client statements and resulted in the four stimulus items of causal responsibility (Tape 1: 
Cause), knowledge responsibility (Tape 2: Knowledge), intention responsibility (Tape 3: 
Intention), and coercive responsibility (Tape 4: Coercion). The transcript for Tape 1: 
Cause is here presented in its entirety for illustmtive purposes. This is followed by an 
exposition of the differences between the stimulus items relevant to the manipulation of the 
independent variable. 
W: Good morning 
C: Good morning 
W: How are you today? 
C: Fine, thank you. 
Tmnscript for Tape 1: Cause 
W: I know that the circumstances here might make it a little more difficult for you to feel 
relaxed in talking about yourself .. .1 just want to let you know how much I appreciate 
your willingness to have our interview taped this morning. 
C: I'm glad to do it .. .1 am a little nervous though. 
W: If its any consolation, I'm a little nervous too .. .like we said before, though, any time 
that you want to stop or want us to tum the tape off, just let me know. 
C: o. K ... Thanks. 
W: Good ... Let's get started ... 1 know we talked a little on the phone about your reasons 
for coming in today but it would help if we started from the beginning this morning. 
So, I'd like for you to tell me a little bit about why you wanted to come in and talk to 
someone. 
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c: O.K ... Well, my husband and 1 separated pretty recently ... Um, he moved out of our 
house ... he's living with his sister now. I'm feeling a bit at a loss, 1 guess ... you 
know, a little confused about what happened and what 1 want to do. We've been 
having problems for some time and ... 1 guess 1 really need some help to make a 
decision about my marriage. You know, whether to stay separated and maybe get a 
divorce or to try to work things out and maybe get back together again. 1 guess 1 need 
to decide what 1 want for myself. Does that make any sense to you? 
W: Yes ... yes it does ... This must be a very difficult time for you. 
C: Yeah, it is. 
W: It also sounds like you've been giving the possibility of divorce some pretty serious 
thought? 
C: Yeah. 
W: And your husband ... is he thinking about divorce as well? 
C: Well, things are pretty much up in the air right now but 1 don't think so ... 1 think he 
would like for us to get back together. At least that's what he says. 
W: 1 see ... and how long have you been separated now? 
C: Well, he moved out about a month ago. Yeah, exactly a month ago. 
W: 1 see ... and 1 take it that you and your husband have had some contact since the 
separation? 
C: A little bit ... 
W: O.K. 
C: ... a little bit 
W: All right ... so you haven't reached a point where you're not talking to each other. 
C: No. 
W: And have you been pleased with the talks that you've had with your husband? 
C: Well, things are strained ... and he keeps asking me what I'd like to do about our 
marriage. 
W: And what answer do you give him? 
C: Well, so far I've told him that 1 don~t know ... that I'm thinking about it but that I've 
got to get some things worked out for myself first. 
W: 1 see ... When we first spoke on the phone, you mentioned that there had been 
problems for some time. When did some of the difficulties begin? 
C: Lets see ... 1 guess about six months ago ... 
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W: Uh, huh. 
c: ... Yeah, about six months ago. But things weren't so bad at the start you 
know ... It ... itsjust gotten gradually worse until about a month ago ... that's when he 
left. 
W: Uh, huh ... I s.ee ... and what was your husband's reason for moving out? 
c: Well, I'm not really sure ... 1 mean, I know we've been fighting a lot lately ... and 1 
mean a lot ... you know, it just seemed like we were arguing constantly. It was awful. 
1 think I brought most of it on. I've been on his case about everything lately. You 
know, its funny thoug~ ... 1 would jump on him for something he'd done and then 1 
would feel better for a while ... until 1 started thinking about it and I'd ask myself 'why 
did you do that' and then I'd start to feel bad all over again and start in on him 
again ... 1 mean he doesn't deserve the treatment he's been getting, you know ... 1 mean, 
1 really didn't like the way 1 was acting but 1 couldn't seem to stop myself. My 
husband tried to understand, you know, he tried to be patient but 1 guess it was just 
too much. Finally, he said he was going to leave ... that he thought we needed some 
time apart to sort things out. 1 wasn't in favor ofit at first but I finally agreed ... 1 
mean, after all, I'm the one that's been the cause of all of this ... I sure never thought 
that it would go this far though. 
W: What do you mean? 
C: Well, I guess 1 didn't realize that things had gone as far as they had. I mean, I knew 1 
was acting pretty badly but I sure didn't think we were going to separate. 1 had no 
idea this was going to happen and 1 sure didn't intend for it to come to this. 
W: Urn ... 1 see ... and these arguments have been going on for about six months? 
c: Yeah. 
W: Can you give me some idea what the arguments have been about? 
C: Just little things ... it really didn't much matter .. J mean, he could be a little bit later 
coming home from work than he said he would be ... or it could be something that he . 
said that 1 would take the wrong way ... or it could be that.he didn't pick something up 
around the house .. .it could be anything, you know. Just little things. It really hasn't 
taken very much to set me offlately ... any little thing will do. 
W: Mmrnm ... So .. .it sounds like there's been a lot of tension. You said that these 
difficulties started about six months ago. What was it that happened about that time? 
Did anything happen.that may have led to all the tension? 
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c: Well ... No, 1 don't think that anything happened .. .1 mean nothing you could really put 
your finger on ... That's just it .. .1 started giving him grief over nothing ... 1 really don't 
understand the way I've been acting ... 1 mean 1 could understand it if he'd done 
something but he hasn't. 
W: 1 see ... and what has been your husband's reaction? .. what has be said to you? 
c: 1 don't know ... 1 mean, he asks me what's wrong ... you know, and he tries to talk to 
me ... to get me to talk to him ... but 1 just cut him off ... you know, 1 just tell him to 
leave me alone, that Ml get it worked out ... he's really been very understanding. 
W: And how has be shown you that he's been understanding? 
C: Well, you know, he's really tried to be patient with me ... he's tried to understand but 
his patience has worn thin ... 1 guess that's to be expected when someone is jumping 
down your throat for no apparent reason ... 1 really don't understand this ... my husband 
is really a good man and things have been really good for him lately. 
W: What do you mean that things have been good for him lately? 
c: Well ... you know, he's been feeling really good ... 1 mean other that the trouble I've 
been causing ... Like, things have been going really well for him at work lately ... you 
know, he's been pleased with his job and all ... and, then, he's had more free time 
lately ... you know, time to do the things he wants to do. 
W: 1 see ... so have the two of you had more time together recently? 
c: Well, yeah ... I mean, we've had an opportunity to spend time together ... that's pretty 
much been the case all along ... you know, 1 mean, that's not any different than its been 
for us ... we've always had time to spend together ... The problem is that we don't really 
spend the time together, you know? 1 mean, lately when we're together 1 seem to 
spend all my time picking at him ... giving him grief over some little thing or 
other ... that's not his fault though ... you know, he really doesn't have anything to do 
with this ... Like 1 said, he's really been patient ... he's really tried to understand .. .it's 
been me ... just me ... 1 mean, I've really been giving him a rough time for no particular 
reason that 1 can see. I've juSt been acting badly and I've caused a lot of trouble for 
us. 
W: Hmmm ... so, can you think of any recent changes in your life ... anything different that 
you think might explain the difficulties you and your husband have been having? 
c: No ... no ... nothing at all ... things had been going well for us for the most part ... 1 
mean, 1 guess it sounds a little silly to be acting so badly when things seem to be going 
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so well ... 1 wish 1 understood this ... 1 just don't know why I've been so hard to get 
along with .. .it just doesn't make any sense and it's really starting to· get to me ... you 
know? 
W: Well ... 1 can certainly understand why you feel confused .. .it sounds like you're 
uncomfortable with the way you've been acting and ·can't seem to find an explanation 
for it. What have you done to try to ease things ... to come to teons with this? 
c: 1 don't know ... 1 mean, I've tried to talk to my husband but we just don't seem to be 
able to talk to each other any more ... that's not his fault though .. .1ike 1 said, 1 think 
he's really tried ... the problem is with me ... 1 start to say something to him and then 1 
stop myself .. .1 just find myself pulling further and further away from him ... Then I've 
. tried talking to some friends about how I've been acting but what can they say? 
W: 1 don't know ... what do they say? 
C: Well, for the most part they tell me to lighten up ... that I'm really being hard on my 
husband ... and myself ... Everybody thinks he's wonderful and in many ways he 
is ... my friends all say that he doesn't deselVe this so they tell me to try to get my act 
together. 
W: And have your friends been helpful to you? Have they been supportive? 
c: Yeah, 1 guess so ... 1 mean, 1 don't feel like anybody is really down on me. 1 even 
think my husband is ready to come back and try to work things out .. .1 just don't know 
if that's what 1 want. 
W: What would you like to see happen? 
c: 1 don't honestly know ... 1 mean, 1 don't think that my husband has done anything .. .! 
don't know why I've been treating him the way 1 have .. .1 really think that until 1 get 
that sorted out there's not much point in our getting back together. 1 just want to work 
at figuring this thing out. 
W: 1 see ... earlier you said that you didn't realize that things had gone this far. What did 
you mean? 
c: Urn ... just that 1 really didn't thiIlk my husband would leave ... 1 really had no idea that 
it would come to this ... 1 mean, 1 knew we were having problems but 1 didn't intend 
for us to separate. 1 just didn't know that it had become that bad. 
As maybe seen, the first transcript (Tape 1: Cause) expressed the stimulus dimension 
of causal level responsibility through client verbalizations indicating that she thinks she 
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caused the problems which led to the marital sepamtion but without having had prior 
knowledge that her behavior might lead to the sepamtion and without having intended the 
sepamtion. The second tmnscript (Tape 2: Knowledge) expressed the stimulus dimension 
of knowledge level responsibility through client verbalizations indicating that the client 
thought she caused the problems which led to the sepamtion and knew that her behavior 
was risking the possibility that a sepamtion might ensue. She continues to state, however, 
that she did not intend the sepamtion to occur. The third tmnscript (Tape 3: Intention) 
expressed the stimulus dimension of intention level responsibility through client 
verbalizations indicating that she thought she caused the problems which led to the 
sepamtion, knew that her husband might leave her and intended to "bring things to a head" 
to force a decision with regard to the marriage. Finally, the fourth tmnscript (Tape 4: 
Coercion) expressed the stimulus dimension of coercive level responsibility through client 
verbalizations in which the client continues to assert her causal role, continues to indicate 
foreknowledge of the potential consequences and continues to state her intention to force 
the issue through her behavior. Added, however, are seveml environmental stressors 
which may have served to influence the client into acting in the manner described. These 
stressors, a potential job jeopardy for the client and fmancial stress for the couple, 
were structured so as to be outside of the immediate control of the client and her husband. 
The stressors introduced into the fourth tmnscript were absent from the first three 
tmnscripts. All efforts were made to hold other information in the tmnscripts constant. 
While this presented little problem for the first three stimulus items, the fourth stimulus 
item represents a somewhat greater departure in content. The geneml tone of the interview 
and the thrust of the content, however, remains quite similar to the other three stimulus 
items (see appendix A). 
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Validation of Stimulus Items 
The transcripts of the constructed stimulus items were presented to a panel of six 
experts for validation. The experts participating in the validation process aU had either an 
earned doctorate in social work or were doctoral students in social work at the ABD stage. 
An but one of the raters were school of social work faculty members at four different 
universities. The rating instrument which accompanied the transcripts (see appendix B) 
contained Likert-type response items intended to capture the extent to which the stimulus 
items conveyed infonnation consistent with the dimensions of cause, knowledge, intention 
and coercion, and the extent to which the transcripts appeared to reflect an actual client 
interview (Real). The item responses were represented by a five point scale ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. The results of the initial ratings are presented in 
Table 1 and. are contrasted with the hypothetical ideal ratings which are derived from the 
theoretical model (Shaver, 1985). 
It is noted that causal level responsibility is introduced in stimulus condition 1 and is 
then present in each subsequent stimulus condition. Thus, it was anticipated that the mean 
actual ratings for the causal stimulus dimension would begin with strong agreement as to 
the presence of Cause in stimulus condition 1 and that these ratings would remain constant 
across aU stimulus conditions. It is also noted that knowledge level responsibility is absent 
in stimulus condition I, is introduced in stimulus condition 2 and then is present in each 
subsequent stimulus condition. Thus, it was anticipated that stimulus condition 1 would 
find strong disagreement with regard to the presence of Knowledge while strong agreement 
would be found as to its presence in stimulus conditions 2 through 4. It is further noted 
that intention level responsibility is absent in stimulus conditions I and 2, is introduced in 
stimulus condition 3 and remains present in stimulus condition 4. Thus, it was anticipated 
that stimulus conditions I and 2 w,ould find strong disagreement as to the presence of 
Intention while there would be strong agreement as to its presence in stimulus conditions 3 
and 4. Finally, it is noted that coercive level responsibility is absent in stimulus conditions 
I through 3 and is introduced in stimulus condition 4. Thus, it was anticipated that 
stimulus conditions 1 through 3 would find strong disagreement with respect to the 
presence of Coercion while stimulus condition 4 would find strong agreement with respect 
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to the presence of Coercion. It was also anticipated that strong agreement with respect to 
Real would be found across all stimulus conditions. As may be seen in Table 1, the mean 
actual ratings for Cause, Knowledge and Intention approximate the hypothetical ideal 
across all stimulus c·onditions. It was· felt, however, that the ratings for Coercion were 
mixed, approximating ideal only in stimulus condition 4, and that the ratings for Real might 
be improved given greater consistency in conveying infonnation with regard to coercion. 
Thus, it was determined that revisions in the stimulus items with respect to coercion would 
be necessary. 
Qualitative comments on the rating fonns and conversations with the raters suggested 
modifications in the transcripts of the stimulus items which would render them more 
consistent in conveying the infonnation intended. The revised stimulus item transcripts 
were then forwarded to the same panel of raters and ratings were secured on only the 
dimension found unacceptable in the initial effort, that of coercion. The second validation 
effort included only the first three stimulus conditions (Tapes 1, 2 and 3) since the fourth 
stimulus condition (Tape 4 ) was found to be acceptable in its entirety on the basis of the 
initial ratings. A second rating was also secured with regard to the extent to which the 
transcript appears to reflect an actual interview (Real) since it was hoped that the 
modifications in the stimulus item transcripts woul.d improve the ratings in this regard. The 
mean ratings for the second validation (T2) of the coercive dimension and the apparent 
realism (Real) of the interview are presented in Table 2 and are contrasted with the ratings 
at initial validation (T 1). The ratings at the second validation (T2) were judged to be 
acceptable. Table 3, then, presents the combined accepted ratings from the Tl and T2 
validation efforts. 
Following the validation of the transcripts of the stimulus items, the audiotaped 
stimulus items were produced. Experienced professional actresses were used in the roles of 
client and worker. It is interesting to note that in addition to considemble acting experience, 
the actress portraying the role of the social worker also held a Masters degree in Social 
Work. Both actresses were rehearsed extensively prior to the taping and the stimulus tapes 
were produced professionally in a recording studio. This resulted in high quality 
audiotapes which were free of background noise which might otherwise obscure the 
dialogue. 
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Table 1 Mean Actual and Ideal Ratings for Level of Responsibility and Real by Stimulus 















Actual Ideal Actual Ideal Actual Ideal Actual' Ideal 
4.8 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.7 5.0 4.5 5.0 
2.5 1.0 4.7 5.0 4.5 5.0 4.3 5.0 
1.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 4.0 5.0 4.3 5.0 
2.7 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.3 1.0 4.7 5.0 
3.8 5.0 3.8 5.0 3.8 5.0 4.3 5.0 
Table 2 Mean Ratings for Coercion and Real by Stimulus Condition 























Table 3 Mean Actual and Ideal Ratings for Level of Responsibility and Real by Stimulus 















Actual Ideal Actual Ideal Actual Ideal Actual' Ideal 
4.8 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.7 5.0 4.5 5.0 
2.5 1.0 4.7 5.0 4.5 5.0 4.3 5.0 
1.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 4.0 5.0 4.3 5.0 
1.7 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.8 1.0 4.7 5.0 
4.3 5.0 4.5 5.0 4.3 5.0 4.3 5.0 
69 
Pilot Test Instrument and Data Analysis 
A set of 105 Likert-type response items was then generated for pilot testing. This 
reflects a subset of 15 items for each of the dependent measures of: a) attributed causal 
responsibility (cause), b) attributed knowledge responsibility (knowledge), c) attributed 
intention responsibility (intention), d) attributed coercive responsibility (coercion), e) 
evaluation as to the potential efficacy of social work intelVention (efficacy), 0 attraction to 
the client (attraction), and g) the perceived veridicality of the client's presentation 
(veridicality). The range ofitems constructed for the pilot test reflects an effort to capture 
subtle language variations with respect to responsibility related words and person-based 
judgments, and the various ways in which these might be reasonably presented in statement 
form. Background data for the pilot test subjects were not considered relevant to the 
reliability of the instrument and, thus, were not collected. The pilot test instrument is 
included as appendix C. 
The stimulus item responses were then pilot tested with a sample of 77 students 
enrolled in the Master's degree program in social work at the School of Applied Social 
Sciences, Case Western ReselVe University. Pilot test subjects were sampled by 
convenience and were distributed across levels of the independent variable in such a 
manner as to ensure relatively equal representation in each of the four stimulus conditions. 
This resulted in 17 subjects in condition 1, 20 subjects in condition 2,20 subjects in 
condition 3, and 20 in condition 4. 
The pilot test data were first subjected to a Pearson product-moment correlational 
analysis to detennine subsets of item responses which could be used to form seven scaled 
dependent measures, representing the dependent variables of interest. The correlations for 
item responses were first examined within each stimulus condition and those items which 
demonstrated a significant positive correlation at alpha = .05 were retained for further 
analysis. These were then examined across conditions to determine the consistency of the 
item response correlations for all stimulus items. A minimum of five item responses was 
sought for each scaled dependent measure. This initial analysis produced a sufficient 
subset of item responses for each scaled dependent measure." To insure sufficiency, 
however, some item responses were included which produced significant correlations in at 
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least three of the stimulus conditions but which may have produced non-significant 
correlations in the fourth. These item response subsets were then correlated across 
stimulus items. Tables 4 through 10 present the .pilot test items included in each of the 
scaled dependent measures. The correlations for the selected items are presented in Tables 
11 through 17 with each table representing a separate scaled dependent measure. As is 
noted, the item correlations within each of the seven scaled dependent measures are quite 
good with all correlations reaching significance at p < .00 1. 
Finally, the pilot test data were subjected to a response item analysis to determine the 
reliability of the scaled dependent measures across stimulus items. The results of the 
reliability analysis are presented in Table 18. As is shown, the coefficients presented 
indicate that the scaled dependent measures are highly reliable, demonstrating alpha ranging 
from .86 to .94 (Nunnally, 1978, Hudson, 1982). The results of these analyses led to the 
inclusion of 38 items in the experimental instrument, with a minimum of five and a 
maximum of seven items per scaled dependent measure. Seven filler items were added to 
the fmal instrument for a total of 45 experimental items. The filler items were intended to 
reduce potential bias resulting from sensitivity to the experimental items. A brief 
demographic questionnaire was also included (see appendix D). 
The experimental questionmrlre, then, consisted of 45 items representing seven scaled 
dependent measures and seven filler items. Each of the scaled dependent measures yielded 
a single score for each subject expressing a) the level of causal responsibility for the marital 
separation attributed to the client, b) the level of knowledge responsibility for the marital 
separation attributed to the client, c) the level of intention responsibility for the marital 
separation attributed to the client, d) the level of coercive responsibility for the marital 
separation attributed to the client, e) the subject's evaluation as to the potential efficacy of 
social work intervention in the stimulus condition presented, 0 the subject's attraction to 
the client and e) the subject's perception of the client's veridicality in presenting the 
information contained in the interview. In addition, background information was collected 
consisting of the subject's gender, age, race, year of Master's degree, number of years of 
post-Master's practice experience, present practice arrangement (agency based vs. private 
practice vs. a combination), number of years at present agency or in private practice, 
primary agency responsibility, preferred method of practice and, finally, theoretical 
orientation to practice. 








The marital separation was the resul t of Ms. S's behavior. 
The source of the separation is to be found in Ms. S's actions. 
Ms. S caused her marriage to break up. 
Ms. S is the originator of the problems described. 
Ms. S was the cause of her husband's decision to leave. 
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Table 5 Pilot Test Response Items Included in Scaled Dependent Measure of Knowledge 






Ms. S probably realized the potential consequences of her actions. 
Ms. S was aware of the consequences of her actions. 
Ms. S could tell that a separation would result from her behavior. 
The potential for a separation was known by Ms. S in advance. 
Ms. S was most likely conscious of the effects of her behavior. 
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Table 6 Pilot Test Item Responses Included in Scaled Dependent Measure of Intention 
Item # Item Response 





Ms. S acted purposefully in bringing about her marital problems. 
Ms. S meant to cause the problems she described. 
The separation reflects deliberate actions on Ms. S's part. 
Ms. S behaved as she did with a clear intention. 
Table 7 Pilot Test Item Responses Included in Scaled Dependent Measure of Coercion 







Outside factors forced Ms. S to act in the manner described. 
Ms. S acted as she did due to forces outside of her marriage. 
Ms. S's behavior was compelled by forces beyond her control. 
Ms. S was made to act as she did by forces in the environment. 
Factors outside of Ms. S's marriage led her to act as she did. 
Environmental forces compelled Ms. S's actions. 
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The chances for the successful treatment of Ms. S are quite good. 
With help Ms. S has good prospects of resolving her difficulties. 
The prospects for a favorable treatment outcome are quite good. 
I think that treatment for Ms. S would have a favorable outcome. 
In this case treatment would most likely succeed. 
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Table 9 Pilot Test Item Responses for Scaled Dependent Measure of Attraction 






People like Ms. S are generally pleasant to work with in treatment. 
I would find working with Ms. S to be pleasant. 
I find Ms. S to be a likable person. 
Working with Ms. S would be an enjoyable experience. 
I would enjoy meeting Ms. S under other circumstances. 
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Table 10 Pilot Test Item Responses Included in Scaled Dependent Measure ofVeridicality 








I think that Ms. S has told her story accurately. 
Ms. S has told her story with honesty. 
Ms. S has been open and honest in describing her situation. 
Ms. S has accurately portrayed her situation. 
I believe Ms. S to have been honest in telling her story. 
Ms. S has been honest with the worker. 
I think that Ms. S has been truthful in her presentation. 
78 
Table 11 Intercorrelations Among Item Responses For Cause 
Item Response 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Item 9 
2. Item 17 .60 
3. Item 18 .55 .73 
4. Item 66 .60 .61 .60 
5. Item 81 .56 .64 .55 .63 
N=77 All correlations significant at p < .001 
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Table 12 Intercorrelations Among Item Responses For Knowledge 
Item Response 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Item 53 
2. Item 78 .56 
3. Item 87 .55 .67 
4. Item 88 .54 .64 .77 
5. Item 97 .58 .55 .60 .56 
N=77 All correlations significant at p < .001 
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Table 13 Intercorrelations Among Item Responses For Intention 
Item Response 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Item 21 
2. Item 22 .49 
3. Item 55 .60 .53 
4. Item 56 .57 .57 .72 
5. Item 58 .51 .50 .55 .68 
N=77 All correlations significant at p < .001 
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Table 14 Intercorrelations Among Item Responses For Coercion 
Item Response 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Item 12 
2. Item 71 .55 
3. Item 74 .55 .74 
4. Item 79 .48 .58 .52 
5. Item 86 .48 .64 .57 .42 
6. Item 98 .64 .65 .68 .61 .51 
N=77 All correlations significant at p < .001 
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Table 15 Intercorrelations Among Item Responses For Efficacy 
Item Response 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Item 11 
2. Item 16 .66 
3. Item 47 .77 .75 
4. Item 59 .75 ;71 .86 
5. Item 65 .73 .65 .83 .82 
N=77 All correlations significant at p < .001 
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Table 16 Intercorrelations Among Item Responses For Attraction 
Item Response 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Item 44 
2. Item 50 .64 
3. Item 62 .74 .72 
4. Item 92 .69 .70 .78 
5. Item 102 .67 .62 .66 .63 
N=77 All correlations significant at p < .001 
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Table 17 Intercorrelations Among Item Responses For Veridicality 
Item Response 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Item 3 
2. Item 26 .44 
3. Item 28 .56 .75 
4. Item 49 .59 .55 .58 
5. Item 61 .47 .75 .74 .66 
6. Item 67 .49 .83 .79 .60 .81 
7 .. Item 95 .46 .82 .74 .54 .81 .83 
N= 77 All correlations significant at p < .001 
Table 18 Reliability Coefficients for Scaled Dependent MeasureS for 
Pilot Test Data 
Scale Alpha Standardized Item Alpha 
Cause .88 .89 
Knowledge .88 .88 
Intention .86 .87 
Coercion .88 .89 
Efficacy .94 .94 
Attmdion .91 .92 
Veridica1ity .92 .93 
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Sampling Procedure and Experimental Protocol 
Experimental subjects consisted of a sample of 77 Master's level social workers 
with a minimum of two years post-master's practice experience. It should be noted that the 
equal number of subjects in the pilot test and the experiment resulted from serendipity 
rather than occurring by design. The experimental sample was drawn from human service 
agencies serving as field education sites for the School of Applied Social Sciences, Case 
Western Reserve University and subjects were all located in the greater Cleveland 
metropolitan Area. Limitations were placed on the practice area of the subjects included in 
the sample such that only social workers employed in counseling type agencies were 
solicited for participation. This was defmed as mental health, child guidance and family 
and children's services agencies and excluded medical service agencies and public and 
private welfare agencies. The rationale for the development of this sampling criterion rests 
on the nature of problem area focus and assessment in the respective practice areas. That 
is, a marital problem is likely to be a prim~ry problem area focus for assessment in the 
former agencies and would not necessarily constitute such a focus in the latter agencies. 
Initial contact with the agencies constituting the sampling frame was made with the 
director of the agencies selected. The purpose of the study was explained and permission 
was sought for the solicitation of individual staff member's participation. Agency directors 
were asked to designate a staff person as contact for the purposes of the research and 
through this person copies of a memorandum soliciting participation were distributed to 
members of the social work staffwho met the eligibility criteria (see appendix F). The 
memorandum informed potential subjects as to the nature of the research, employing a 
deCeption in this regard in an effort to reduce potential sensitivity to the issues under 
investigation, and requested participation which was noted by signing the memorandum. 
The nature of the deception employed in the experiment will be discussed below. These 
memoranda were then collected by the designated contact person and were forwarded to the 
investigator. As the memoranda were returned, persons who agreed to participate as 
subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four stimulus conditions through the use of 
a table of random numbers. The random assignment resulted in 19 subjects in stimulus 
condition 1, 18 subjects in stimulus condition 2, 18 subjects in stimulus condition 3 and 22 
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subjects in stimulus condition 4. In addition, 2 subjects were eliminated from the sample 
following administration of the research instrument. In one case, it was revealed that the 
subject did not possess a Masters degree in Social Work but, rather, possessed a 
masters degree in a related field. In the second case, the subject withdrew consent to 
participate folIowing debriefing, indicating offense at the. deception involved. 
Once assignment to the stimulus condition was completed, individual subjects were 
contacted to ~rrange a time for participation. In an effort to reduce the time involved in data 
collection, all efforts were made to run subjects in groups. This was not practical to any 
great extent, however, due to the potential for individual subjects in the same agency but 
assigned to different conditions to become seJl!iitized to the differential application of a 
stimulus as a result of not being seen together. Thus, in an effort to preserve the integrity 
of the design, subjects were informed, for the most part, that individual appointments were 
desired. At the designated appointment time, the investigator or a colleague would visit the 
subject's agency for the purpose of data collection. 
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At the time of the experiment, subjects signed a written consent to participate form 
which detailed the nature and requirements of the study (see appendix G). Subjects were 
then introduced to the experiment by reading a statement which indicated that they would be 
asked to listen to a portion of an assessment interview between a client and a student social 
worker and would then be asked to respond to a brief questionnaire. Two deceptions were 
involved in the experiment at this point. First, subjects were told that the study concerned 
social workers perceptions of marital disruption. This was consistent with the problem 
area content of the stimulus items and represented an effort to reduce potential bias reSUlting 
from sensitivity to the actual research question. Second, subjects were informed that the 
stimulus item reflected a literal tmnscription of an actual interview between a client and a 
social worker but with professional actresses portraying the roles of client and worker. A 
clear rationale was given for the use of professional actresses and subjects were encouraged 
to listen to the tape as an actual interview. This deception was further reinforced by 
informing subjects that the written introduction contained a slight misstatement to the effect 
that it was a literal transcription of an interview. Subjects were told that while this was 
essentially true, all name references had been eliminated to further protect the confidentiality 
of both the worker and the client and that vocal pauses had been eliminated to render the 
tape easier to which to listen. Subjects were then exposed to the stimulus items and 
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responded to the stimulus item responses. Once this was completed subjects were 
debriefed by being informed as to the true nature of the research and of the fact that the 
interview was not in any sense an actual client interview. Subjects were then informed that 
they could, at this point, withdraw their participation and. were asked to sign a second 
consent form (see appendix G). 
Characteristics of the Experimental Sample 
The researCh instrument was administered to a sample of 77 Master's level social 
worJc.ers with a minimum of two years post-master's practice experience drawn from 
human service agencies in the Cleveland metropolitan area. Background data indicate that 
the mean age of subjects was 41.5 years (SD = 8.9) with a range from 25 to 64 years of 
age. 58.4% of the sample were female and 41.6% were male. At 93.5%, the sample was 
overwhelmingly Caucasian, with Blacks and Hispanics representing 3.9% and 2.6% of the 
total sample respectively. 70.1% of subjects practiced only in the context of the agency 
which employed them at the time of data collection, while 29.9% maintained a private 
practice in addition to their agency work. A mean of 11.6 years (SD = 8.2) was obtained 
for the number of years since earning the Master's degree, with a range from 2 to 40 years. 
Subjects' had a mean of 10.5 years (SD = 7.5, range = 2-39) of post-Master's work 
experience and had been employed at their present agency a mean of 7.3 years (SD = 6.0, 
range 1-27). 
Table 19 shows the primary agency responsibility of subjects in the sample. These 
data were collected in response to an item asking subjects to place themselves in only one 
of the categories listed. Thus, multiple responsibilities are not reflected and the data reports 
only how subjects spend the majority of their agency time. As is noted, the majority of 
subjects were in direct service roles (70.1 %), followed by mid-level management positions 
. . 
(19.5%). Six subjects (7.8%) had primarily administrative responsibilities. Table 20 
shows the preferred method of practice for subjects and again subjects were asked to locate 
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themselves in only one item response category. This item reflects only the methodological 
approach preferred by subjects and may not reflect the actual focus of the work done. It 
can be seen, however, that subjects prefer to engage clients in an individual treatment 
approach (50.6%), with marital and family treatment capturing the next largest-segment of 
the sample (27.3%), followed by group treatment (14.3%). 
Table 21 reports subject's theoretical orientatio~ to pmctice. The difficulty inherent 
in efforts to capture the range of theoretical foci in the social work practice arena is evident 
in the fact that 28.6% of the sample placed themselves in an other category. The individual 
specifications for this category indicate that these subjects consider themselves either to be 
eclectic (23.4% of the total sample) or to ascribe to a family systems approach (5.2% of the 
total sample). Given the limitations noted, however, it is apparent that the largest 
proportion of the sample ascribe to a psychodynamic or psychoanalytic focus (32.5%), 
followed by cognitive or cognitive behavioral approaches (19.5%). The balance of the 
sample is ~ttered throughout the remaining categories. 
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Table 19 Subject's Primary Agency Responsibility 
Agency Responsibility N Percent 
Direct Service 54 70.1 
Indirect Service 1 1.3 
Supervision/ProgIam 15 19.5 
Management 
Administmtion 6 7.8 
Other 1 1.3 
Total 77 100.0 
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Table 20 Subject's Preferred Method of Practice 
Method of Practice N Percent 
Individual Treatment 39 50.6 
Group Treatment 11 14.3 
MaritaVFamily Treatment 21 27.3 
Other 6 7.8 
Total 77 100.0 
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Table 21 Subject's Theoretical Orientation to Practice , 
Theoretical Orientation N Percent 
Psychodynamic! 25 32.5 
Psychoanalytic 
Humanistic 7 9.1 
Cognitive' 15 19.5 
Cognitive Behavioral 
Behavioral 2 2.6 
Gestalt 5 6.5 
Social Learning I 1.3 
Other 22 28.5 
Total 77 100.0 
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Reliability Analysis on Experimental Data 
A reliability analysis was conducted on the experimental data in an effort to assess 
the stability of the dependent measures across samples and across testing situations. The 
results of this reliability analysis are as shown in Table 22. As noted, the reliability 
coefficients are all acceptable with standardized alpha ranging from .69 to .95. A 
comparison of the reliability coefficients from the pilot test and experimental data indicate 
relative consistency in reliability among all the scaled dependent measures with the 
exception of coercion. Here the standardized alpha coefficient decreased from .89 to .69, 
indicating a reduction in the reliable measurement of coercive level responsibility. The 
alpha coefficient obtained with respect to the dependent measure of coercive level 
responsibility is within acceptable limits, however, and does not appear to pose any 
con~em with regard to the reliability of the measure in question (Hudson, 1982). Overall, 
the experimental instrument is judged to reliably measure the dependent variables of interest 
in the experiment. 
Chapter four, which follows, will report the rmdings of the research effort with 
regard to the hypotheses as stated. This will be followed by a discussion of the findings 
specific to the research hypotheses with conclusions drawn with respect to the process of 
assessment in social work practice and to the field of professional social work in general. 
Table 22 Reliability Coefficients for Scaled Dependent Measures 
For Experimental Data 
Scale Alpha Standardized Item Alpha 
Cause .84 .84 
Knowledge .82 .83 
Intention .82 .83 
Coercion .68 .69 
Efficacy .91 .91 
Attraction .88 .88 




RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS 
Prefatory Comment 
As noted in chapter III, there is a potential for confusion which may arise from the 
fact that the four levels of the independent variable and four of the dependent variables 
employed in the study bear the same names, those of cause, knowledge, intention and 
coercion. Therefore, efforts have been undertaken to reduce such potential confusion by 
employing the terms "stimulus attributional variables" and "dependent attributional 
variables" to note the distinction between the levels of the independent variable and the 
dependent measures in question. Again, it is hoped that the careful reader will not find the 
distinction ambiguous. 
Analvsis of Attributional Yariables by Stimulus Condition 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOY A) procedure was used to test the major 
hypothesis of a significant difference between stimulus conditions with regard to the scaled 
dependent attributional variables of cause, knowledge, intention and coercion. A test of 
the homogeneity of dispersion matrices for all dependent measures was carried out and 
Box's M produced an F of 1.33 (df= 84, 11,538) which does not lead to rejection of the 
assumption of homogeneity at p < .001. A test of the assumption of homogeneity of 
Table 23 Means and Standard Deviations for Scaled Dependent Attributional 
and Evaluation Variables by Stimulus Condition 
Stimulus Condition 
1 2 3 4 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Cause 2.66 .45 2.51 .68 2.46 .65 2.45 .70 
Knowledge 2.77 .72 3.20 .75 3.71 .60 3.37 .61 
Intention 2.48 .68 2.31 .57 2.72 .69 2.71 .66 
Coercion 2.51 .53 2.47 .54 2.56 .54 2.40 .46 
Efficacy 3.48 .50 3.71 .84 3.81 .52 4.02 .47 
Attraction 2.85 .75 3.22 .57 3.10 .77 3.36 .66 
Veridicality 2.91 .81 3.34 .64 3.24 .82 3.36 .77 
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within cell variances for the analysis of the scaled dependent attributional variables 
produced an F(max) of 1.69 with 4, 73 d.f. which does not lead to a rejection of the 
assumption (p < .01). Thus, the data do not appear to violate the major assumptions 
underlying the MANOV A procedure (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1983). The ovemll results of 
the omnibus MANOV A for the present analysis supports the hypothesis as stated by Wilks' 
Lambda Criterion (F = 2.30, d.f. = 12, 185.5, p < .01), indicating a significant difference 
between the stimulus conditions with regard to the scaled dependent attributional variables 
of cause, knowledge, intention and coercion taken as a whole. Table 24 presents the 
MANOV A results for this analysis. As may be seen, the univariate analyses within the 
ovemll MANOV A indicate significance only for the scaled depend~nt attributional variable 
of knowledge (F = 6.40, p < .002). The dependent attributional variables of cause (F = 
.49, p < .69), intention (F = 1.71, p < .18) and coercion (F = .32, p < .82) were found to 
be non-significant with 3, 73 degrees of freedom for each univariate F. Thus, it may be 
detennined that the significant difference among the groups with respect to the scaled 
dependent attributional variables of cause, knowledge, intention and coercion is due to the 
strength of the variance in scores on the scaled dependent attributional variable of 
knowledge. 
In an effort to locate the differences between the four stimulus conditions, a 
discriminant function analysis was performed (Huck, 1974, Klecka, 1980). The 
discriminant function analysis produced one significant function (Chi-square = 26.40, d.f 
= 12) accounting for 80.44% of the variance. The discriminant function coefficients 
presented in Table 24 indicate that, in terms of absolute values, scores on the scaled 
dependent attributional variable of knowledge contribute overwhelmingly to the stimulus 
condition discrimination. An examination of the scatterplot of the stimulus conditions for 
the discriminant function coefficients (Figure I) indicates that the analysis primarily 
distinguishes stimulus condition 1 from stimulus conditions 3 and 4 while stimul~ 
condition 2 is relatively evenly distributed along the primary canonical discriminant 
function, represented by the horizontal axis (see Figure 1). Thus, it may be concluded that 
most of the variance in the group means on the scaled dependent attributional variables lies 
between stimulus condition 1 on the one hand and stimulus conditions 3 and 4 on the other 
hand, and that the most significant contribution to the variance in absolute terms is made by 
the responses to the scaled dependent attributional variable of knowledge. 
Table 24 Multivariate Analysis of Variance For Scaled Dependent Attributional 
Variables and Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients 
MS 
Between Univariate 
Variable Groups F* p< SDFC 
Cause .19569 .49327 .69 -.47155 
Knowledge 2.86610 6.39785 .01 1.02657 
Intention .72862 1.71178 .18 -.07152 . 
Coercion .08522 .32090 .82 .11760 
Note. Abbreviated: SDFC: Standardized discriminant function coefficients. 
Multivariate F = 2.30; d.f= 12, 185.5, p < .01 
* d.f= 3, 73 
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Figure 1 All Groups Scatterplot for Discriminant Function Analysis for Dependent 
Attribution Measures 
*Indicates a group centroid 
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As a follow-up to the multivariate procedure, and in an effort to further localize the 
differences among the stimulus groups with respect to the scaled dependent attributional 
variables, a one-way analysis of variance was conducted for each of the separate scaled 
dependent attributional variables (Kennedy and Bush, 1985}. The results of these 
analyses are presented in Tables 25 to 28. A test of the homogeneity of variance was 
carried out and Bartlett-Box F led to rejection at alpha = .05 of the null hypotheses of no 
homogeneity of variance for all analyses. Thus, the analyses do not violate the major 
assumption underlying the procedure. As may be seen by the tables, the analyses produced 
a significant ANOVA only for the scaled dependent attributional variable of knowledge (F 
= 6.3979, d.f. = 3, 73, p < .001). This finding is consistent with the univariate Fs 
produced by the omnibus MANOV A procedure. 
The Scheffe' procedure was then employed to determine those groups significantly 
different at alpha = .05 within the significant ANOV A procedure (Kennedy and Bush, 
1985). Here the results indicate that for the scaled dependent attributional variable of 
knowledge, a significant difference lies between stimulus condition I and stimulus 
conditions 3 and 4. A comparison of the scaled means for the dependent attributional 
variable of knowledge (Table 23) shows that subjects in stimulus condition I (mean = 
2.77) attributed responsibility to the client at a significantly lower level than did subjects in 
either stimulus condition 3 (mean = 3.71) or stimulus condition 4 (mean = 3.37). This data 
appears to support the findings of the discriminant function analysis for the MANOV A 
reported above. 
It was hypothesized that, for each scaled dependent attributional variable, the lowest 
level of a~ributed responsibility would occur at stimulus condition I, followed by stimulus 
conditions 2, 4 and 3 in that order. An examination of the means for the scaled dependent 
attributional variables, presented in Table 23, provides some evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. While such a trend is not evident with respect to the scaled dependent 
attributional variables of cause, intention and coercion, it is strongly evident for the scaled 
dependent attributional variable of knowledge, that variable which appears to most strongly 
influence the overall stimulus group difference with respect to the scaled dependent 
attributional variables taken as a whole. What is most striking about the means for the 
scaled dependent attributional variables in Table 23, however, is the clear trend with respect 
to the effect of the introduction of relevant stimulus attributional information on each of the 
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Table 25 Analysis of Variance for Scaled Dependent Attributional Variable of Cause 
by Stimulus Condition . 
Sum of Mean F 
Source df Squares Squares F Prob. 
Between Groups 3 .5871 .1957 .4933 .6881 
Within Groups 73 28.9610 .3967 
Total 76 29.5481 
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Table 26 Analysis of Variance for Scaled Dependent Attributional Variable of Knowledge 
by Stimulus Condition 
Sum of Mean F 
Source df Squares Squares F Prob. 
Between Groups 3 8.5983 2.8661 6.3979 .0007 
Within Groups 73 32.7025 .4480 
Total 76 41.3008 
Table 27 Analysis of Variance for Scaled Dependent Attributional Variable of Intention 
by Stimulus Condition 
Sum of Mean F 
Source df Squares Squares F Prob. 
Between Groups 3 2.1858 .7286 1.7118 .1721 
Within Groups 73 31.0723 .4256 
Total 76 33.2582 
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Table 28 Analysis of Variance for Scaled Dependent Attributional Variable of Coercion 
by Stimulus Condition 
Sum of Mean F 
Source df Squares Squares F Prob . 
Between Groups 3 .2557 .0852 .3209 . 8102 
Within Groups 73 19.3871 .2656 
Total 76 19.6428 
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scaled dependent attributional variables, the scaled dependent attributional variable of cause 
excepted. That is, and as may be recalled from the methodological discussion, the stimulus 
variable of cause is introduced in the first stimulus condition and is carried throughout each 
subsequent stimulus condition. The stimulus variable of knowledge is introduced in the 
second stimulus condition and is then carried in each subsequent stimulus condition. The 
stimulus variable of intention is introduced in the third stimulus condition and is carried in 
the subsequent stimulus condition. Finally, the stimulus variable of coercion is introduced 
in the fourth stimulus condition alone. 
Thus, the hypotheses essentially suggest that responses the scaled dependent 
attributional variables will correspond to the introduction of the relevant stimulus variable 
information and that such introduction will mark the differences among the stimulus 
conditions with respect to the scaled dependent attributional variables. It is apparent from 
Table 23 that such is essentially the case. That is, responses to the scaled dependent 
attributional variable of cause are relatively evenly distributed across the four stimulus 
conditions. Responses to the scaled dependent attributional variable of knowledge increase 
between stimulus conditions 1 and 2 and remain relatively high across the remaining 
stimulus conditions. Responses to the scaled dependent attributional variable of intention 
increase between stimulus conditions 2 and 3 and remain relatively high in stimulus 
condition 4. Finally, responses to the scaled dependent attributional variable of coercion 
decreases between stimulus condition 3 and 4. 
An examination of these differences was undertaken through a comparison of the 
relevant means using a t-test procedure. That is, with respect to the scaled dependent 
attributional variable of knowledge, a comparison was made between stimulus condition I, 
where the stimulus variable of knowledge is absent, and stimulus conditions 2, 3 and 4 
combined, where the stimulus variable of knowledge is present. Here the analysis 
produced a Student's t value of 3.62 (p < .00 lone-tailed, d.f. = 75), indicating that the 
introduction of the stimulus variable of knowledge produced a significant difference among 
the grouped stimulus conditions on the scaled dependent attributional measure of 
knowledge. With respect to the scaled dependent attributional variable of intention, a 
comparison was made between stimulus conditions 1 and 2 combined, where the stimulus 
variable of intention is absent, and stimulus conditions 3 and 4 combined, where the 
stimulus variable of intention is present. Here the analysis produced a Student's t value of 
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2.14 (p < .02 one tailed, d.f. = 75), indicating that the introduction of the stimulus variable 
of intention produced a significant difference among the grouped stimulus conditions on the 
scaled dependent attributional measure of intention. Finally, with respect to the scaled 
dependent attributional variable of coercion, a comparison was made between stimulus 
conditions 1, 2 and 3 combined, where the stimulus variable of coercion is absent, and 
stimulus condition 4, where the stimulus variable of coercion is present. Here the analysis 
produced a Student's t value of -.86 (p < .20 one-tailed, d.f. = 75), indicating that the 
introduction of the stimulus variable of coercion did not produce a significant difference 
among the grouped stimulus conditions with respect to the dependent attributional variable 
of coercion. 
Analysis of Evaluation Variables by Stimulus Condition 
A second MANOV A procedure examined the effect of the stimulus condition 
variables on the three scaled dependent evaluation variables of efficacy, attraction and 
veridicality. As earlier reported, a test of the homogeneity of dispersion matrices for all 
dependent measures was carried out and Box's M produced an F of 1.33 (df= 84, 11,538) 
which does not lead to rejection of the B;SSumption of homogeneity at p < .001. A test of 
the assumption of homogeneity of within cell variances for the analysis of the scaled 
dependent evaluation variables produced an F{max} of 1.65 with 4, 73 d.f. and does not 
lead to rejection of the assumption {p < .01}. Thus, again, the data do not appear to violate 
the major assumptions underlying the MANOV A procedure {Tabachnick and Fidell, 1983}. 
The overall results of the omnibus MANOVA for the analysis of the scaled dependent 
evaluation variables do not support the hypothesis as stated by Wilks' Lambda Criterion {F 
= 1.30, d.f. = 12, 173, p < .24}, indicating that there is no significant difference between 
the stimulus conditions with regard to the scaled dependent evaluation variables of efficacy, 
attraction and veridicality tak~n as a whole. Table 29 presents the MANOV A results fo"r 
this analysis. As may be seen, the univariate analyses within the overall MANOV A 
Table 29 Multivariate Analysis of Variance For Scaled Dependent Evaluation 
Variables and Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients 
MS 
Between Univariate 
Variable Groups F* p< 
Efficacy .99955 2.83330 .05 
Attraction .93973 1.96397 .13 
Veridica1ity .83706 1.43385 .25 
Note. Abbreviated: SDFC: Standardized discriminant function coefficients. 








Figure 2 All Groups Scatterplot for Discriminant Function Analysis for Dependent 
Evaluation Measures 
*Indicates a group centroid 
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indicate significance only for the scaled dependent evaluation variable of efficacy (F = 
2.83, p < .05). The scaled dependent evaluation variables of attraction (F = 1.96, p < .13) 
and veridicality (F = 1.43, p < .25) were found to be non-significant with 3, 73 degrees of 
freedom for each univariate F. Thus, it may be determined that while there is no significant 
difference among the groups with respect to the scaled dependent evaluation variables of 
efficacy, attraction and veridicality as a wh~le, the scaled dependent evaluation variable of 
efficacy is itself significantly different across stimulus conditions. The discriminant 
function analysis for the second MANOVA did not produce any significant functions and, 
thus, cannot be used as a means of effectively differentiating between the stimulus 
conditions with respect to scores on the three dependent measures. An examination of the 
scattterplot for the discriminant function analysis for the second MANOVA procedure 
indicates that the group centroids are centrally clustered, providing additional evidence that 
the stimulus groups do not significantly differ with respect to the scaled dependent 
evaluation variables entered into the analysis (see Figure 2). 
Again, as a follow-up to the multivariate procedure a one-way analysis of variance 
was conducted for each of the scaled dependent evaluation variables (Kennedy and Bush, 
1985). The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 30 to 32. A test of the 
homogeneity of variance was carried· out and Bartlett-Box F led to rejection at alpha = .05 
of the null hypotheses of no homogeneity of variance for all analyses with the exception of 
the scaled dependent evaluation variable of efficacy. Here a Bartlett-Box F of2.932 (p < 
.033) indicates a violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variance. Kennedy and 
Bush (1985) note, however, that such a violation may be of Httle practical consequence due 
to the fact that the one-way ANOV A procedure is quite robust to violations of the 
assumption when the group n's are equal or nearly so. At any rate, caution is to be 
exercised in an interpretation of this finding since a violation of the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance serves to increase the probability of a Type I error. As may be 
seen by the tables, the analyses produced a significant ANOV A for the scaled dependent 
evaluation variable of efficacy (F = 2.833, d.f. = 3, 73, p < .05). This finding is. 
consistent with the univariate Fs produced by the omnibus MANOV A procedure. 
The Scheffe' procedure was then employed to determine those groups significantly 
different at alpha = .05 within the significant ANOV A procedure (Kennedy and Bush, 
1985). Here the results indicate that for the scaled. dependen~ evaluation variable of 
Table 30 Analysis of Variance for Scaled Dependent Evaluation Variable of Efficacy 
by Stimulus Condition 
Sum of Mean F 
Source df Squares Squares .F Prob. 
Between Groups 3 2.9987 .9996' 2.8333 .0441 
Within Groups 73 25.7535 .3528 
Total 76 28.7522 
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Table 31 Analysis of Variance for Scaled Dependent Evaluation Variable of Attraction 
by Stimulus Condition 
Sum of Mean F 
Source df Squares Squares F Prob. 
Between Groups 3 2.8192 .9397 1.9640 .1269 
Within Groups 73 34.9294 .4785 
Total 76 37.7486 
1 1 1 
Table 32 Analysis of Variance for Scaled Dependent Evaluation Variable' of Veridicality 

























efficacy, a significant difference lies between stimulus conditions I and 4 with subjects in 
stimulus condition 1 (mean = 3.48) indicating a significantly lower belief in the potential 
efficacy of social work 'intervention than do subjects in stimulus condition 4 (mean = 4.02). 
Correlational Analysis of Attributional and Evaluation Variables 
The Pearson product-moment correlations among the scaled dependent attributional 
and evaluation variables were examined for evidence for the prediction that increased 
attributions of responsibility to the client would result in decreased evaluations of 1) the 
potential efficacy of social work intelVention, 2) attraction to the client, and 3) a belief in 
the veridicality of the clients informational statements. The intercorrelations among the 
relevant dimensions are presented in Table 33. It is first noted that there is a positive 
relationship' among all of the scaled dependent attributional variables, with the relationships 
among the scaled dependent attributional variables of cause and intention (r = .382), cause 
and coercion (r = .312), and knowledge and intention (r = .510) reaching significance at p 
< .01 for all comparisons, indicating covariation among the dimensions expressed. It may 
also be seen that there is a significantly positive relationship among all of the scaled 
dependent evaluations variables, with r = .399 (p < .001) for efficacy and attraction, r = 
.350 (p < .002) for efficacy and veridicality, and r = .432 (p < .001) for attraction and 
veridicality, again indicating covariation among the dimensions. 
It is interesting to note the significant negative correlation between the scaled 
dependent attributional variable of intention and the scaled dependent evaluation variable of 
efficacy (r = -.254, p < .014), indicating that as responsibility attributed to the client at the 
intention level increases, a belief in the potential efficacy of social work intervention 
decreases. This fmding is consistent with the hypothesis under consideration since it has 
been proposed that the scaled dependent attributional variable of intention would represent 
the highest level of responsibility attributed to the client for the problem presented. Thus, it 
would be expected that high response values on the scaled dependent variable of intention 
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Table 33 Intercorre1ations Among Scaled Dependent Attributional and Evaluation Variables 
Scale 1 2· 3 4 5 6 7 
I. Cause 
2. Knowledge .147 
.102 
3. Intention .382 .510 
.000 .000 
4. Coercion .312 .055 .130 
.003 .319 .131 
5. Efficacy -.156 -.017 -.254 -.073 
.088 .440 .013 .265 
6. Attraction .063 .079 -.037 .190 .399 
.292 .248 .374 .049 .000 
7. Veridicality -.023 -.062 -.122 .229 .350 .432 
.423 .297 .145 .023 .001 .000 
N = 77 
would produce low response values on the scaled dependent evaluation variable of 
efficacy. 
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An examination of the correlations between the scaled dependent attributional 
variables and the scaled dependent evaluation variable of attraction reveals that it is only the 
relationship between the scaled dependent attributional variable of coercion and the scaled 
dependent evaluation variable of attraction which reaches significance (r = .190, p < .05). 
The correlation is in a positive direction, indicating that as attributions of responsibility at 
the coercive level increase, attraction to the client also increases. This finding runs counter 
to prediction. 
Finally, an examination of the relationships among the scaled dependent attributional 
variables and the scaled dependent evaluation variable ofveridicality reveals that it is only 
the correlation between the scaled dependent attributional variable of coercion and the 
scaled dependent evaluation variable ofveridicality which reaches significance (r = .229, p 
< .03). The positive direction of the correlation is counter to prediction, however, and 
indicates that as attributions of responsibility to the client at the coercive level increase, a 
belief in the veridica1ity of the client's infonnational statements also increases. 
AnalvSis of Evaluation Variables by Attributional Variables 
A more specific examination of the hypotheses that as the level of responsibility 
attributed to the client increased, a decrease would occur in the three client evaluation 
measures was undertaken using multiple regression analyses (Pedhazur, 1982). For these 
analyses, the responses to the scaled dependent attributional variables of cause, knowledge, 
intention and coercion were treated as independent variables and were simultaneously 
entered into three standard multiple regression models in an effort to account for the 
variability in response scores on the three dependent evaluation variables of efficacy, 
attraction and veridica1ity. 
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Table 34 presents the results of the analysis for the regression of efficacy on the four 
attributional variables. As may be seen, the R2 was non-signi.ficant at the .05 level (F = 
1.67541,4, 72 d.f.) and indicates that the prediction model accounts for only .085% of the 
variance. The attributional variable ofintention, however, was found to be significant (F = 
4.743, p < .033). Thus, it may be stated that the linear combination of the independent' 
variables of cause, knowledge, intention and coercion do not successfully predict scores on 
the dependent variable of efficacy but that the independent variable of intention serves to 
predict efficacy scores. Therefore, intention is retained in the equation while the other 
attributional variables are rejected. This must necessarily be treated with caution since the 
overall R2 is non-significant. It is reported, however, since this relationship was predicted 
by the hypothesis 
Table 35 pr~sents the results of the analysis for·the regression of attraction on the four 
attributional variables of cause, knowledge, intention and coercion. The overall R2 was 
found to be non-significant at the .05 level (F = 1.04162, 4n2 d.f.) accounting for only 
.055% of the variance. Thus, the attributional variables entered into the equation do not 
serve to predict attraction scores. Furthermore, no attributional variable was found to 
individually otTer any significant contribution to a prediction of attraction scores and none 
of the attributional variables are retained in the equation. 
Table 36 presents the results of the analysis for the regression ofveridicality on the 
attributional variables and here, again, the overall R2 was found to be non-significant at the 
.05 level (F =,1.52453, 4, 72 d.O indicating that the prediction equation accounts for 
.078% of the variability in veridicality scores. The attributional variable of coercion, 
however, was found to be significant as a predictor ofveridicality (F = 4.875, p < .031). 
Thus, the attr;ibutional variables of cause, knowledge, intention and coercion do not 
successfully predict scores on veridicality. The attributional variable of coercion, however, 
does offer a significant contribution to the explained variability in veridicality scores and 
should be retained in the prediction equation. Again, this must be treated with caution due 
to the non-significant nature of the overall R2. It is reported, however, since the 
relationship was predicted by the hypothesis. 








Sum Qf Squares 
2.44832 
26.30389 
F = 1. 67541 Significance of F = .1651 
Prediction Model 
Variables B 95% Confid. Int. ForB Beta 
Cause -.052088 -.302874 .198698. -.052804 





Intention -.284491 -.544902 -.024080 -.305972 4.743* 
Coercion -.029675 -.315882 .256532 -.024528 .043 
Constant 4.298186 
R Square = .08515 
* Significant at p < .033 








Sum of Squares 
2.06494 
35.68363 
F = 1.04162 Significance ofF = .3919 
Prediction Model 
Variables B 95% Confid. Int. For B Beta 
Cause .045720 -.246378 .337818 .040450 
Knowledge .131716 -.122588 .386020 .137774 
Intention -.157004 -.460312 .146304 -.147370 
Coercion .261498 -.071855 .594852 .188634 
Constant 2.352045 
R Square = .05470 















Sum of Squares 
3.52368 
41.60381 
F = 1.52453 Significance ofF = .2041 
Prediction Model 
Variables B 95% Confid. Int. For B Beta 
Cause -.064951 -.380350 .250448 .052557 
Knowledge .001703 -.272888 .276293 .00"1629 
Intention -.159814 -.487317 .167690 -.137196 
Coercion .398670 -.038724 .758616 .263024 
Constant 2.794099 
R Square = .07808 








In chapter five, which follows, these findings will be interpreted and discussed with 
respect to their implications for the process of assessment in social work practice, for their 
potential impact on the relevant theoretical fonnulations which undergird the research 
effort and for their implications with respect to professional social"work as"a whole. 
Finally, suggestions for future research efforts will be offered. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
Introduction 
The results of the data analysis provide support for the omnibus hypothesis that the 
groups exposed to the four stimulus conditions would differ with respect to the mean 
ratings on the dependent attributional measures of cause, knowledge, intention and 
coercion. The omnibus hypothesis that the g~ups exposed to the four stimulus conditions 
would differ with respect to the mean ratings on the dependent evaluation measures of 
efficacy, attraction and veridicality was not supported by the data. The hypotheses that 
response values to the dependent attributional variables would serve to predict response 
values on the dependent evaluation variables w~re similarly not supported. Prior to a 
discussion of the implications of these findings, it must first be noted that the experimental 
subjects in the study are essentially reSponding to statements which the client makes with 
regard to an interpretation of the responsibility inherent in her situation as described. It is 
posited, on the basis ofan extrapolation from a well developed body of theory, that client 
attributional statements and worker attributional and evaluative responses may well 
represent a fundamental phenomenon when a client seeks professional social work 
assistance and the process of assessment is engaged. An effort was made, therefore, to 
present the experiment as an analogue to actual interview conditions in emulation of the 
assessment process. The limitations posed by this effort will be presented at a later point in 
this chapter. It may be stated, however, that the analogue effort met with relative success 
and a conclusion is drawn that subjects in the experiment were, in fact, responding to the 
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stimulus conditions as an actual interview situation. This contention is supported by the 
efforts undertaken to validate the stimulus items and, in particular, by the values obtained 
on the mting dimension of Real in the stimulus item validation. 
It must also be noted that an additional distinction may he dmwn betWeen the two sets 
of dependent variables in the study and that such a distinction is necessary to a more 
thorough understanding of the findings. This distinction rests essentially on the notion that 
the dependent attributional measures of caUSe, knowledge, intention and coercion are 
process variables while the dependent evaluation measUres of efficacy, attmctfon and 
veridicality are primarily outcome variables. that is, attributed responsibility forms part of 
the process of ass~ment, influencing an .understanding and conceptualization of the 
problem for work, while efficacy, attmction and veridica1ity result from the attributional 
process. There is, of course, an intemction among the seven dimensions constituting the 
dependent measures such that the distinctions dmwn do not achieve an absolute conceptual 
clarity. Fu~er, the terms applied to the distinction are idiosyncmtic to the present research 
and are not suggested to infer a connection to other conceptual uses. 
Stimulus Attributional Variables and Dependent Attributional Variables 
As earlier noted, the study provided results which indicate that subjects' responses to 
the dependent attributional variables of cause, knowledge, intention and coercion differed 
across the four stimulus conditions. These results indicate that stimulus condition 1 is 
differentiated from stimulus conditions 3 and 4 on the basis of responses to the relevant 
dependent variables. It may be recalled that stimulus condition 1 conveys information that 
the client thinks she caused the problems which led to the sepamtion but without 
knowledge that a sepamtion was imminent and without an intention to produce the 
sepamtion. Stimulus condition 2, then, adds information that the client had knowledge that 
a sepamtion might occur to the causal dimension, with a lack of intention to produce the 
sepamtion explicitly stated. Stimulus condition 3 adds information that the client intended 
to precipitate a confrontation to the cause and knowledge dimensions, while stimulus 
condition 4 continues the cause, knowledg~ and intention dimensions, adding potential 
environmental mediators of the client's behavior. 
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The results obtained further indicate that it. was primarily· responses to. the dependent 
attributional variable of knowledge which served to differentiate among the stimulus 
groups. That is, there was greater variability in the response values obtained on the 
dependent attributional variable of knowledge than. on the. other dependent attributional 
variables, and that the strength of this Variability was significl;lP.t in accounting for the 
differences found among the stimulus groups. Finally, it was found that the stimulus 
groups were differentiated on selected ,dependent attributional vap,ables on the basis of the 
introduction of relevant stimulus information. That is, stimulus condition I was 
differentiated from stimulus conditions 2, 3 and 4 combined on the dependent attributional 
variable of knowledge and stimulus conditions 1 and 2 were differentiated from stimulus 
conditions 3 and 4 on the dependent attributional variable of intention. 
An interpretation of the above findings suggests that subject's tended to respond 
differentially to the client's presentation ofinformation concerning the problem of her 
marital sepamtion, and that these differential responses were localized to certain relevant 
dependent attributional dimensions; those of knowledge and intention. First, it would 
appear that for' the dependent attributional variable of knowledge, subjects in the first 
stimulus condition attributed knowledge level responsibility to the client at a compamtively 
low level in response to client stimulus information indicating that she caused the problems 
which led to the sepamtion but did not know that her behavior might lead to the sepamtion. 
When the client presents stimulus information that she did in fact have foreknowledge that 
her behavior might lead to a sepamtion but did not intend the sepamtion, there is an increase 
in the level of knowledge responsibility which is attributed to her for the problem 
presented, although this difference cannot be termed significant. When the client presents 
stimulus information revealing that she caused the problems in the marriage with 
foreknowledge that a sepamtion might result, and presents information that she intended to 
"bring things to a head", however, there is a significant increase in the level of knowledge 
responsibility which is attributed to the client for the problem presented, when compared to 
the presentation of causal information alone. 
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This suggests that it is the presentation of intention infonnation which serves to bring 
to the fore the client's responsibility for the problem presented. Thus, it may be concluded 
that infonnation with regard to the client's intentions in the situation described constitutes a 
sufficient condition for the attribution of knowledge level responsibility. Given that an 
intention to act ·cannot be fonned in the absence of knowledge of the potential consequences 
of the action undertaken, it is not surprising that significant attributions of responsibility 
occur at the knowledge level in response to the presentation· of intention infonnation. It 
would seem to follow, however, that attributions of-responsibility would also achieve 
significance at the intention level. This is not supported· by the data. This may be 
explained, perhaps, by noting that a strong relationship·appears to exist- between the 
dimensions of knowledge and intention. It is reasonable to·conclude, given covarlation, 
that the presentation of intention infonnation, mther than being considered discretely, 
serves to heighten the salience of the client's consequential knowledge of her actions. 
Thus, significant attributions of responsibility accrues at the knowledge level mther than at 
the intention level, or both. 
It may be concluded, then, that while the introduction of knowledge stimulus 
infonnation alone produces an increase in the level of knowledge responsibility attributed to 
the client for the problem presented, it is the combination of knowledge and intention 
stimulus infonnation which serves to engender the highest level of knowledge 
responsibility attributed to the client for the problem presented. Finally, the introduction of 
coercive stimulus information, that is, infonnation suggesting environmental constmints on 
the client's behavior, tends to mitigate the absolute level of knowledge responsibility 
attributed to the client but without a significant reduction. Here it may be concluded that 
while subjects tend to account for environmental stimulus infonnation in making 
atiributions of knowledge level responsibility to the client, such environmental stimulus 
infonnation does not serve to reduce perceptions of the extent of the client's culpability for 
the difficulties encountered. Again, however, the presence of coercion stimulus 
infonnation in combination with causal, knowledge and intention stimulus infonnation 
results in significantly higher attributions of knowledge responsibility than does the 
presence of causal stimulus information alone. 
Second, it is apparent that for the dependent attributional variable of intention, 
subjects in stimulus condition I, where the client presents causal stimulus information 
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alone, tended to attribute intention level responsibility at a comparatively low level. The 
introduction of knowledge stimulus information in stimulus condition 2 actually reduces the 
extent of intention level responsibility attributed to the client but without the reduction 
reaching significance. When intention stimulus information is added in stimulus condition 
3, however, there is a marked increase in the level ofintention responsibility attributed to 
the client but, again, this difference is not significant .. However, when a comparison is 
made between stimulus conditions 1 and. 2 combined~ representing the absence of intention 
stimulus information, and stimulus conditio~ 3 and 4, representing the presence of 
intention stimulus information, the differences in subjects' responses. become significant. 
Here it may be concluded that the intro~ction of intention stimulus infonnation tends 
to significantly influence subjects' attributions of intention level responsibility over the 
presentation of cause and knowledge stimulus infonn:ation alone. It is noted, however, that 
it may again be the combination of knowledge and intention infonnation which serves to 
influence such an increase. This possibility is given credence by both the findings with 
respect to the dependent attributional variable of knowledge and by the strength of the 
relationship between the dependent attributional variables of knowledge and intention .. 
Finally, it is noted that the introduction of coercion stimulus information in stimulus 
condition 4 does not mitigate attributions of intention level responsibility for the client'~ 
problem to any appreciable extent. Thus, it may be concluded that subjects do not account 
for relevant environmental stimulus infonnation in making intention level responsibility 
attributions. 
Contrary to hypothesis, the dependent attributional variable of cause did not produce 
any significantly differentiated responses among the various stimulus groups. This may be 
accounted for through a consideration of the notion that causal determination is at the very 
core of the assessment process, and one of the primary tasks of the worker in the early 
phases of social work intervention is to sift through relevant causal cues in order to 
construct a cogent analysis of those factors contributing to the client's problem. As such, it 
is not surprising, perhaps, that subjects in each of the stimulus conditions established 
causality for the client's problem in response to the presentation of causal stimulus 
information. As has been noted, the detennination of causality is a judgment of physical 
rather than social action. Therefore, as the client presents information indicating that her 
behavior caused the problems in the marriage, there is no reason to infer increasing levels 
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of responsibility at the causal level, a level which implies a detennination of physical 
connection to an outcome. Essentially, in each of the stimulus conditions, subjects made a 
causal connection between the client's behavior in the marriage and the outcome of the 
separation, a detennination which represents an end stage·process. Finally, the lack of 
stimulus group differences with respect to the dependent attributional variable of cause may 
also be accounted for in the fact that causal stimulus information is presented in each of the 
stimulus conditions, providing no comparative basis with which to judge the effect of the 
presence of the infonnation. 
The finding that there was no stimulus group differentiation on the basis of response 
values to the dependent attributional variable of coercion is also contralY to prediction. 
This suggests the possibility that subjects possess sensitivity to environmental factors to the 
extent that such factors are inferred in the absence of direct infonnation concerning the 
influence of relevant environmental factors. This possibility is supported by the finding 
that the level of coercion responsibility attributed to the client for the problem presented was 
relatively low across all stimulus conditions. That is, even in the absence of relevant 
stimulus infonnation with regard to coercive elements, subjects attributed coercion level 
responsibility to the client at a relatively low level, a level which remained constant across 
all stimulUs conditions. This possibility is further supported by the finding that the 
introduction of the coercion stimulus variable did serve to mitigate attributions of 
responsibility for all dependent attributional variables, albeit to a non-significant eXtent. 
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that subjects tend to give weight to relevant 
environmental cues when present and may infer such cues in their absence. 
Stimulus Attributional Variables and Dependent Evaluation Variables 
The study did not provide results to support the hypothesis that a significant 
difference among the stimulus conditions would be found with respect to the dependent 
evaluation variables of efficacy, attraction and veridicality taken as a whole. Thus, it may 
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be concluded that composite evaluations of the client are not significantly affected by the 
differential presentation of responsibility stimulus information. There is data, however, 
which demonstrates that stimulus condition 1 is differentiated from stimulus condition 4 on 
the basis of response values to the dependent evaluation variable of efficacy, with stimulus 
condition 1 producing the most and stimulus condition 4· producing the least negative 
evaluations of the potential efficacy of social work intervention. This is as expected since 
theory suggests that the extent to which one is perceived to have incurred dependency as a 
result of factors beyond his or her mediational control would result in a greater likelihood 
of help giving behavior ensuing. 
There are two findings with regard to the response values to the dependent evaluation 
variable of efficacy which are somewhat surprising and which are contmry to prediction. 
First, it was expected. that the response values for stimulus condition 3 would be lower than 
the response values for stimulus condition I, indicating a lower evaluation of efficacy for 
stimulus conditions 3 than for stimulus condition I. The failure of the data to provide 
support for·this expectancy may be accounted for, perhaps, on the basis of the lack of 
information with respect to the stimulus variables of knowledge and intention in stimulus 
condition I, rather than the presence of such information. It is reasonable to conclude that 
experiIilental subjects may have concluded that since the client engaged in a defined 
behavior in the absence of any knowledge of the potential consequences and in the absence 
of an intention to act in the manner described this may reflect a relatively more serious 
situation than a client who acts in the presence of knowledge and intention. Essentially, 
subjects may have concluded that the client in stimulus condition 1 may possess less insight 
into her problem, or have less understanding of the problem, resulting in a less favorable 
prediction for a successful intervention outcome. 
Second, it was expected that there would be a significant difference in the response 
values between stimulus conditions 3 and 4, with stimulus condition 4 exhibiting the 
highest evaluation of efficacy overall. While it is the case tha~ stimulus condition 4 
produced the highest evaluation of efficacy, the failure of stimulus condition 3 to produce a 
significantly lower evaluation of efficacy may, again, be accounted for, perhaps, on the 
basis of the client's demonstration of an understanding of her behavior and the 
consequences of such behavior. That is, while there may have been some belief that the 
client bore a heavy responsibility for the problem outcome, the fact that she was able to 
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acknowledge the extent of her culpability by admitting to behaving in an intentional manner 
and with foreknowledge of the consequences, selVes as an indication that intelVention has a 
greater potential for success. That is, the work of the client-worker relationship does not 
have to be directed toward helping the client accept responsibility for her behavior since 
such responsibility is already acknowledged. There is, ovemll, less resistance to encounter 
in helping the client adapt to and problem solve her circumstancesL 
The failure of the response values to the dependent evaluation variables of attmction 
and veridicality to differentiate among stimulus conditions may be. accounted. for in 
considemtion of professional values. which suggest respect for the worth and dignity of the 
individual. Such a belief would mitigate against arbitmry considemtions of likability and 
truthfulness, considemtions which are person-based mther than clinical judgments. To 
evaluate the client as being unattractive to the social work relationship and as not being 
veridical in her presentation runs decidedly counter to such professional norms. These 
factors also bear consideration with respect to findings to be discussed below. 
Dependent Attributional Variables and Dependent Evaluation Variables 
The study proposed that as the level of responsibility attributed to the client for the 
problem presented increased, subjects' evaluations with regard to the efficacy of social 
work intelVention, attmction to the client and the veridicality of the client's informational 
statements would decrease. The separate hypotheses contained herein are not supported on 
the basis of the data obtained. The data do indicate, however, that as response values to the 
dependent attributional variable of intention alone increase, subjects tend to decrease their 
belief in the potential efficacy of social work intelVention, lending partial support to the 
hypothesis as stated. This finding is theoretically consistent in that responsibility attributed 
to another, in the presence of a clear causal connection to an outcome and in the presence of 
foreknowledge of and an intention to produce the outcome, would selVe to decrease a belief 
in the potential utility of a helping offer. Here it may be concluded that subjects infer that 
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the stimulus client is responsible for the creation of her own problem condition and, as 
such, is less likely to take advantage of an offer of help. That is, as she acted intentionally 
to produce the outcome of a marital separation, she may not be motivated to work toward 
effecting any change in her situation as described. Thus, social work intervention is 
unlikely to produce the desired outcome. 
What is interesting to note, however,.is the suggestion that the potential efficacy of 
social work intervention may be essentially considered through two distinct paths. First, 
and as noted above, increased attributions of responsibility at the intention level tend to 
decrease evaluations of the potential efficacy of intervention. Second, however, increased 
evaluations of the veridicality of the client's informational statements tends to increase 
evaluations of the potential efficacy of social work intervention. Thus, it may be concluded 
that social work intervention will be viewed as less potentially efficacious to the extent that 
the client is seen as intentionally responsible for the outcome observed. Any evaluation of 
the potential efficacy of social work intervention may be offset, however, to the extent that 
the client is viewed as veridical in presenting information concerning her problem situation. 
This suggests that the potential efflcacy of social work intervention is determined against 
two factors, that of the intentionality of the client's actions and the veridicality of the 
client's presentation, with each factor leading to differential conclusions with respect to the 
potential success of treatment. 
The data also indicate that as response values to the dependent attributional variable of 
coercion alone increase, a belief in the veridicality of the client's informational statements 
also increases. This fmding runs counter to predidion but, on reconsideration, is logically 
consistent with the notion that subject's infer environmental influences in the absence of 
direct infonnational statements as to their presence, and that such inference forms part of 
the process of problem understanding. The client's failure to present such evidence is not 
necessarily taken as a lack of veracity in presentation but is, rather, a reflection ofa lack of 
awareness of the full range of factors which serve to detel;llline the problem presented. 
Thus, the fact that the client does not present relevant environmental data is weighed against 
the worker's inference that such factors are at play, and a conclusion is drawn that the client 
lacks insight rather than that she is not telling the truth. This becomes problem assessment 
data rather than person-focused evaluative data. 
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There are several reasons which may be posited for the failure to fmd support for the 
overall hypotheses that, taken as a whole, an increase in responsibility attributions to the 
client would result in a decrease in evaluations of the client. In the first inStance, and as 
was noted earlier, there is some intuitive reason to suggest that. the' generally positive 
outlook expressed in the findings reflects a norm within the profession. Social work 
practice, like the counseling professions generally, is predicated on the premise that a 
successful intervention outcome is· dependent on the instillation of hope in the context of the 
worker-client relationship. Were the worker to develop·a,negative outcome value at the 
outset of the counseling relationship, this might necessarily inhibit the communication of a 
hopeful perspective to the client and ultimately hinder the progress of the working 
relationship. Essentially, social work professionals may be socialized in the direction of 
espousing a positively biased outlook with regard to end stage predictions. Similarly, the 
development of a hopeful stance with regard to the potential efficacy of social work 
intervention, and the ultimate success of the intervention, is believed to be based on 
positive regard for the client and an acceptance of the client's story. Here again, these are 
values which are explicitly acknowledged in the social work practice literature and which 
permeate 'programs which train professional social workers. Thus, there may be an explicit 
and generalized norm which dictates that social workers should view clients in the most 
favorable possible light. The strength of this belief, then, was not shaken through the 
experimental manipulation. 
In the second instance, there may have been some sense on the part of experimental 
subjects that they were being individually judged on the basis of responses to the outcome 
measures. Given a generalized professional norm for a positive outcome value with regard 
to the intervention effort and a set of professional values which demand regard for and 
acceptance of the client, it is perhaps not surprising that the findings with respect to the 
effect of the dependent attributional'variables on the dependent evaluation variables were 
non-significant. Concern over the prospect of being judged negatively with regard to the 
evaluation variables would tend to pull scores on the various evaluation measures in a 
more positive direction. This would suggest the need for a more sensitive set of measures 
for the relevant dimen~ions than were developed for the present study. While the data 
suggest that the scores on the evaluation measures run generally in the direction predicted 
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by the experimental hypotheses, the strength of the correlations may have been moderated 
by the factors noted above. 
In the third instance, it is suggested that the meaning of the response items for the 
dependent attribution measures was more clear in their implication than was the meaning of 
the response items for the dependent evaluation variables. That is, the dependent 
attributional variables were intended to capture data with respect to assessment, albeit with 
a particular focus on responsibility related issues, and the items were taken by subject's as 
forming, essentially, assessment inferences. This is a professional practice issue and social 
workers are, by and large, comfortable with- making assessment inferences. Subjects did 
not, perhaps, infer any meaning to the attributional response items beyond the demands of 
an assessment of the client's problem. The dependent evaluation response items, however, 
reflected person-based judgments, efficacy excepted, which could be said to be 
independent of assessment processes. Here there was the possibility of multiple meanings 
to the items, or at the least, an ambiguous meaning. The items were more clearly value 
related and engendered, perhaps, a greater discomfort in response formulation. Thus, 
subjects could have been more circumspect in response to the value issues and more 
conservative in response to the ambiguity in item meaning. 
Finally, attention must necessarily be given to the likelihood that a range of other 
factors are extant which might serve to enhance a predictive relationship between the 
dependent attributional and evaluation variables. For example, consideration had been 
given originally to the issue of theoretical orientation to practice as a potential second design 
factor, and one which would serve to influence both the responsibility and the evaluation 
measures. Sampling problems precluded a design control of this factor and while data with 
regard to theoretical orientation was collected as part of the sample demography, it is felt 
that the categorization lacks sufficient clarity to warrant inclusion in the analyses. At the 
same time, sufficient numbers are lacking to warrant post-hoc statistical control. There 
remains the possibility, however, that theoretical orientation to practice might well serve to 
explain some of the variability on the response values to the dependent evaluation variables. 
Similarly, consideration is given to the possibility that primary field of practice might 
serve to influence response values on the dependent evaluation variables. In the present 
study, the sample was drawn from agencies defined by the author as "counseling" type 
agencies, excluding welfare and medical service agencies. While this was done on the 
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basis of the problem area chosen for the stimulus items, there was an intuitive reasoning 
which suggested that the general orientation of the agency practice environment would 
affect the study's outcomes. Resource constrairits precluded the inclusion of a comparison 
sample from the welfare and health care fields. There are, however, intuitive reasons to 
believe that both field of practice specialization and organizational environment variables 
might enhance the predictive power of the dependent attributional variables With respect to . 
the dependent evaluation variables. 
Limitations of the Study 
These above considerations move the present effort to now consider the broader issue 
oflimitations to the study as a whole. Certainly, the points explicated above suggest that 
limitations accrue from the breadth of the sample employed. While there appears to be 
justification for field of practice selection with regard to the present study, this necessarily 
places limitations on the extrapolation of implications for the study to social work practice 
as a whole. It is clear, however, that the study sample does reflect a broad range of 
demographic characteristics and an assumption may be made that these characteristics are 
normally distributed within the population from which the sample is drawn. It may further 
be assumed that the social workers sampled for this study reflect, by an large, the 
characteristics of professional social work as a whole. This l~tter assumption, however, 
would necessarily need to be tested. 
There are several additional issues regarding sampling which need to be discussed. 
First, it must be noted that the agencies which served as a sampling frame for the 
experimental sample were drawn by convenience rather than using the agency population as 
a whole with subsequent random selection. Second, while all agencies identified in this 
manner were ~ntacted for permission to solicit staff participation, not all agencies were 
willing to do so. While only one agency refused directly, once the staff solicitation 
processed commenced a number of agencies were not heard from again and resource 
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constraints precluded adequate follow-up. This implies that either no staff at these agencies 
were willing to participate in the study or that the offer by agency executives to facilitate 
access to the staffwas not honored". There is some reason to believe that the latter case 
predominates. 
Third, at those agencies where staff indicated a willingness to participate, there were 
few instances in which the entire staffagreed to take part in the study. The conclusion, 
therefore, must be that the experimental sample was largely self-selected; again placing 
limitations on the generalizability of the results. This is, of course, a pervasive sampling 
issue in research generally and all efforts were made to account for this through the 
randomization of the sample with respect to the stimulus conditions. Additionally, it is 
believed that those agencies and staff which agreed to participation are representative of the 
field as a whole. 
There must also be recognition given to the limited size of the experimental sample. " 
While the number of subjects who participated is quite good, in fact exceeding 
expectations, a larger sample would have served to reduce the effect of extreme responses, 
or at least would have offered an opportunity to render extreme responses more nonnative, 
and would have allowed for some additional post-hoc analyses. Again, however, the size 
of the present sample must be considered within acceptable limits. The distribution of the 
sample across "experimental conditions produced relatively equal numbers in each cell and 
demographic characteristics of the sample were nonnally distributed across cells. Again, it 
was primarily resource constraints which precluded efforts to secure a larger sample. 
Finally, several limitations must be recognized with respect to the instrument 
employed in the study and the effort to conduct analogue research. First, the response 
items for the dependent measure of coercion are phrased in such a manner as to suggest that 
the client was, essentially, compeiled in her actions. That is, environmental forces were of 
sufficient strength as to limit the range of alternative actions available to the client. This 
was intended and the items are worded to confonn to that intention. It is noted, however, 
that environmental factors may exert a less detennined influence and it is clear that any such 
subtlety does not fonn a part of the response items on the experimental questionnaire. 
Thus, it is possible that subjects perceived the environment as exerting an influence on the 
client's behavior but not as compelling her actions. To the extent that such is the case, it is 
clear that some response data was not captured by the questionnaire as constructed. 
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Second, it is noted that the stimulus items were validated on the basis of the 
tmnscripts of the tapes rather than from the completed tapes themselves. While the content 
of the transcripts met all criteria for validation and it was apparent that a reading of the 
tmnscripts reflected an actual interview, it is fair to suggest that a response to the content 
and a sense of the apparent realism of the interview could have been affected by hearing 
rather than reading the dialogue. It would have been preferable to have presented raters 
with the completed audiotapes but such was not feasible in view of resource constraints and 
in consideration of the potential for revisions of the stimulus items. 
Third, the response sets for each of the scaled dependent measures were constructed 
with subtlety oflanguage in mind. That is, the items reflect an effort to capture the range of 
responsibility related words and to couch them in statements which would be consistent 
with attributional fonnulations in an assessment context. Ther~ can be no absolute 
guarantees that this effort was successful. It is noted, however, that the reliability estimates 
for the scaled dependent measures are quite good, indicating that the response sets do, in 
fact, reliably measure the dimensions of interest. 
Fourth, the response options for the experimental questionnaire were intended to 
express an agreement continuum with a midpoint which would fall between gradations of 
agreement and disagreement and which was expressed as "neither agree nor disagree". In 
retrospect, however, it is possible that subjects interpreted this midpoint option as 
constituting, essentially, a no response category. That is, the middle option was chosen 
when subjects did not wish to provide a clear response to the statements on the 
questionnaire. Thus, midpoint responses would essentially constitute no opinion rather 
than locating subjects' responses at some point on an agreement continuum. At the least, 
sufficient ambiguity exists with respect to the response options to warrant consideration in 
an "interpretation of the findings. 
The limitations posed by efforts to construct an analogue experiment revolve 
primarily on the issue of the realism of the interview. Initially, the stimulus items were 
intended to consist of constructed videotape interviews but this was ruled out in the interest 
of a timely completion of the research and in the face of fmancial constraints. Thus, 
audiotape interviews were substituted. It was detennined to be critical to the analogue 
experience that subjects be told that they were listening to an actual interview. Once the 
tapes were completed, however, it was apparent that this could not be done for several 
reasons. 
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In the first place, the tapes were produced in a professional recording studio and the 
absence of background noise seemed to belie the notion that the tapes were recorded in situ. 
In the second place, the author was not sufficiently schooled in the dramatic arts such that 
the actresses used for the social worker and client roles could be directed to vocalize in such 
a manner as to enhance the believability of the interview tapes. While the actresses were 
professionals in every sense of the word, it was clear that such direction, and much more 
rehearsal than seemed feasible, would be necessary to produce the quality of tapes desired. 
In sum, the audiotapes had a very sanitized quality. An effort was made to account 
for these issues in the introduction given to subjects which stated that, while the interviews 
r~flect~d a literal transcription of an actual interview, professional actresses had been used 
to play the roles and the tapes were produced in a recording studio. Subjects were told that 
this was done in order to enhance the quality of the tapes by removing background noise 
and eliminating vocalized pauses. Subjects were then instructed to listen to the tapes as if 
they were the actual interview with a reminder that it was the content of the interview that 
was important mther than the interview itself. 
This issue is raised to note that some questions may be forthcoming with regard to the 
believability of the interviews and as to whether subjects were, in fact, responding to actual 
interview conditions. The anecdotal evidence in this regard is equivocal at best. At 
debriefmg, most subjects responded to being told that the interview was not an actual 
interview by stating that they either had or had not believed that the interview was real in 
nature with no clear trend emerging. It may be true that the issue is in some sense moot in 
that subjects would respond to the prescription to listen to the interview as an actual 
interview by, in fact, doing so. In the final analysis, however, no clear contention may be 
made that the analogue was successful to the extent desired, particularly in view of the fact 
that the tapes themselves were not subjected to validation. It is believed, however, that on 
the basis of the validation of the tape transcripts and the care taken in the construction of the 
final product that the analogue achieved acceptable results. 
Finally, sevemllimitations must be noted in the use of audiotapes as a clinical 
analogue. First, an audiotaped analogue eliminates the availability of the visual stimuli 
which fonDs part of the data for assessment in a clinical context. That is, non-verbal 
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infonnation fonns part of the means by which social workers derive an understanding of 
the client's problem and serves as a guide to detennining the focus for clinical exploration. 
Second, visual stimuli fonn an essential part of the context in which assessment takes 
place. That is, the experience of the assessment for the worker includes the setting in 
which the assessment takes place and the visUal presence of the client. Essentially, the 
ciient's verbal presentation is viewed against the backdrop of a stimulus field which 
includes visual cues. An audiotaped presentation, then, eliminates some of the contextual 
variables which serve to influence the assessment process. Finally, and as noted, a visual 
presentation would, perhaps, have served to enhance the believability of the stimulus 
presentation. 
It is noted, however, that it is a common practice to make use of audiotaped material 
in both the training of social workers and that social workers often utilize audiotapes in an 
effort to enhance there own clinical practice. In short, social workers are accustomed to 
hearing a client presentation on audiotape. In view of this, it is reasonable to conclude that 
subjects in the present experiment would have experienced audiotaped client presentations 
as a part of their training and practice experience and would not have found unusual the 
experimental request to listen to a taped interview. 
Implications of the Study 
Given the limitations imposed, the study bears importance for the field of social work 
in several respects. First, a contribution has been made to an understanding of the 
assessment process as a whole and of the role of attributional processes within the 
assessment context. The study shows, for example, that infonnation conveyed by the 
client with regard to the client's determination of responsibility for a problem event does 
influence the level of responsibility which the worker places on the client for the problem 
presented. Additionally, the study shows that relevant environmental infonnation, while 
attended to in the assessment context, is not granted the weight warranted by the demands 
of the assessment process, a finding which appears to stand somewhat at odds with the 
prevailing professional sentiment towards an eco-systems perspective in practice. 
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Caution must be exercised at this point, however, on at least two countS. First, and 
as earlier noted, there is some reason to believe that the scaled dependent attributional 
measure of coercion may have lacked the sensitivity necessary to an accurate assessment of 
the implications of the dimension of coercion for an understanding the client's problem as 
presented. Thus, greater reliability for the measure in question may have produced data 
resulting in a more definitive determination of the role of relevant environmental press in 
shaping the worker's attributional understanding of the problem for work. Second, and 
again as noted earlier, the model of attribution employed in the present study may not 
provide a sufficient basis for the particular demands of responsibili°ty determination in a 
social work assessment context. Conceptual refmement and further empirical testing is 
clearly needed. 
Weak support has been generated with respect to the direct outcomes of such a 
process in social work assessment. The data do suggest, however, that differential 
responsibility attributions produce some bias with regard to an evaluation of the potential 
efficacy of social work intervention, attraction to the client and a belief in the veridicality of 
the client's statements. This points to considerable hazard in assessing client problems and 
offering ameliorative services. It is fair to assume that clients do, in fact, offer attributional 
information as part of their problem presentation. In fact, this assumption forms part of the 
primary basis for the present study. Given that such information is conveyed and that it 
serves to influence worker responsibility attributions and lead to potentially negative 
judgments of the client and the client's potential for amelioration, there rests within the 
profession a responsibility to account for such biases. 
This latter point suggests the need for the development of a set of teaching and 
training strategies which would serve to exert an impact on the potential biasing effects of 
attributional processes in assessment. Assessment represents a core activity for social 
work and considerable attention has been given to the critical components of the assessment 
process. The present study suggests an additional dimension which must necessarily be 
accounted for in professional training activities. The profession has long been concerned 
with the problems of assessment and considerable attention has been given to the tendency 
toward a linear cause and effect construction of human difficulties. The present study 
offers support for the notion that cause and effect causal analyses are extant. As social 
work educators are desirous of moving professional practice more in the direction 
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of ecological formulations, the profession would do. well to give attention to the elemental 
processes which seem to inhibit such movement. It is posited that attributional effects form 
the partial basis for such inhibiting processes. 
Finally, the study has offered support for a set of theories which appear to have a 
great utility for social work practice but which have been given scant attention to date from 
within the profession. The profession has long prided itself on the incorporation into its 
theoretical foundation of sound social science fonnulations developed in the allied 
professions. Here is a well developed body of knowledge which has repeatedly and 
empirically tested its fundamental concepts in a variety of settings and situations with 
excellent results. Social work would do well to examine the theories for those constructs 
which may prove useful to a more complete understanding of human nature. 
The utility of the theoretical area for social work practice, however, must necessarily 
be viewed in light oflimitations imposed by the model employed m the present study. 
Essentially such limitations accrue from the fact that the model is intended to generalize 
across a range of phenomena and thus lacks the specificity necessary for a consideration of 
the clinical context. The model essentially evolved from a theoretical area concerned with 
the perceptions of ordinary people detennining responsibility under more or less ordinary 
circumstances. That is, the model is intended to account for situations any person is likely 
to encounter as a nonnal part of living. The theory, then, holds that causal and 
responsibility attributions are evoked in response to those circumstances which are 
negatively valued or which lie outside of the commonplace experience of the observer. 
It is reasonable to assert that the clinical assessment, which essentially demands 
causal explanation and the subsequent assignment of responsibility, is not a negatively 
valued experience for a social worker who has voluntarily chosen to work with people who 
experience problems in living. Additionally, the clinical assessment may be commonplace 
to the experience of social workers whose professional practice is detennined by efforts to 
understand human problems. It is plausible that attributions of cause and responsibility 
acquire a different meaning in a context in which attributional explanations for client events 
are expected in response to circumstances which are not alien to the professional experience 
of those people who are expected to make such attributional judgments. If the theoretical 
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model has utility for social work practice, then the model must necessarily be reviewed and 
revised to account for the specific demands of the assessment experience. 
Conclusions and Research Implications 
In conclusion, the present study suggests several directions for future research. 
Certainly one fruitful avenue for further investigation lies in the direction of a continued 
examination of the process of assessment, particularly as regards the range of appropriate 
environmental variables which serve to influence human problems and which may tend to 
influence the fundamental attributional processes. Such examinations need to take place 
with respect to a variety of client problems and in a variety of field of practice contexts such 
that the profession may gain some greater knowledge of the differential aspects of the 
assessment phase of the worker-client relationship. The present study has offered some 
support for the use of analogues for such research efforts and it would be most interesting 
to do so through the use of Videotaped interviews. It is believed that the use of videotapes 
~ a stimulus would serve to enhance the realism of the analogue experience. 
A second avenue for future investigation lies in the direction of the examination of 
teaching and training strategies intended to exert a significant impact on the process of client 
assessment generally and attributional phenomena in particular. Concern has been 
expressed in some social work circles to the effect that efforts to socialize students in the 
direction of an eco-systems perspective, or at least some non-linear problem construction, 
tends to wash out as students graduate and begin to practice in agency contexts. The 
suggestion contained in this concern is that the general pmctice environment does not, then, 
reflect the value of the eco-systems perspective and that new workers are socialized in the 
direction of agency or general practice norms. If such is the case, and if the profession is 
interested, at least from an educational perspective, in moving practice in the direction of 
more holistic practice conceptualizations, then the profession needs necessarily to 
concentrate some energy on the development of appropriate training mechanisms. Such 
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efforts, to insure success, would necessarily need to contain a component to research the 
outcomes of such efforts. It is proposed, therefore, that the present study serves to identify 
a set of elements which inhibit ecologically oriented practice and that the identification of 
such elements lends itself to the development oftmining efforts designed to overcome the 
potential biasing effects of attributional processes. 
Professional social work offers a broad range of e~e.iting opportunit~es for the 
research investigator and a broad range of opportunities to contribute significantly to the 
development of new knowledge for practice. It is hoped that in some small way the present 
study has been contributory in this respect. Certainly, the author intends to pursue the 
present line of investigation to the extent that .support for such investigation is forthcoming. 
The reality of the broader professional environment, however, mitigates against 
experimental, analogue research for the investigation of problems fundamental to the 
practice are~. It is hoped that this reality will not serve to deter the scholarly investigation 
of relevant practice issues through the use of experimental designs. 
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APPENDIX A 
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TAPE 1: CAUSE 
W: Good morning. 
c: Good morning. 
W: How are you today? 
C: Fine, thank you. 
W: I know that the circumstances here might make it a little more difficult for you to feel 
relaxed in talking about yourself ... 1 just want to let you know how much I appreciate 
your willingness to have our interview taped this inorning. 
C: I'm glad to do it ... 1 am a little nervous though. 
W: If its any consolation, I'm a little nervous too .. .like we Said before, though, any time 
that you want to stop or want us to tum the tape off, just let me know. 
C: O.K ... Thanks. 
W: Good ... Let's get started ... I know we talked a little on the phone about your reasons for 
coming in today but it would help if we started from the beginning this morning. So, 
I'd like for you to tell me a little bit about why you wanted to come in and talk to 
someone. 
C: O.K ... Well, my husband and I separated pretty recently ... Um, he moved out of our 
house ... he's Jiving with his sister now. I'm feeling a bit at a loss, I guess ... you 
know, a little confused about what happened and what I want to do. We've been 
having problems for some time and .. .I guess I really need some help to make a 
decision about my marriage. You know, whether to stay separated and maybe get a 
divorce or to try to work things out and maybe get back together again. I guess I need 
to decide what I want for myself. Does that make any sense to you? 
W: Yes ... yes it does ... This must be a very difficult time for you. 
C: Yeah, it is. 
W: It also sounds like you've been giving the possibility of divorce some pretty serious 
thought? 
C: Yeah. 
W: And your husband ... is he thinking about divorce as well? 
C: Well, things are pretty much up in the air right now but I don't think so .. .1 think he 
would like for us to get back together. At least that's what he says. 
W: I see ... and how long have you been separated now? 
C: Well, he moved out about a month ago. Yeah, exactly a month ago. 
W: I see ... and I take it that you and your husband have had some contact since the 
separation? 
c: A little bit. .. 
W: O.K. 
C: ... a little bit. 
W: All right ... so you haven't reached a point where you're not talking to each other. 
C: No. 
W: And have you been pleased with the talks that you've had with your husband? 
C: Well, things are strained ... and he keeps asking me what I'd like to do about our 
marriage. 
W: And what answer do you give him? 
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C: Well, so far I've told him that I don't know ... that I'm thinking about it but that I've got 
to get some things. worked out for myself first. . 
W: I see ... When we first spoke on the phone, you mentioned that there had been problems 
for some time. When did some of the difficulties begin? 
c: Lets see ... 1 guess about six months ago ... 
W: uh, huh. 
C: ... Yeah, about six months ago. But things weren't so bad at the start you 
know ... lt ... its just gotten gradually worse until about a month ago ... that's when he 
left. 
W: Uh, huh .. .1 see ... and what was your husband's reason for moving out? 
C: Well, I'm not really sure ... 1 mean, I know we've been fighting a lot lately ... and I mean 
a lot ... you know, it just seemed like we were arguing constantly. It was awful. I think 
I brought most of it on. I've been on his case about everything lately. You know, its 
funny though .. .! would jump on him for something he'd done and then I wo~ld feel 
better for a while ... until I started thinking about it and I'd ask myself 'why did you do 
that' and then rd start to feel bad all over again and start in on him again ... 1 mean he 
doesn't deserve the treatment he's been getting, you know .. .1 mean, I really didn't like 
the way I was acting but I couldn't seem to stop' myself. My husband tried to 
understand, you know, he tried to be patient but I guess it was just too much. Finally, 
he said he was going to leave ... that he thOUght we needed some time apart to sort 
things out. I wasn't in favor of it at first but I finally agreed ... ~ mean, after all, I'm the 
one that's been the cause of all ofthis ... 1 sure never thought that it would go this far 
though 
W: What do you mean? 
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C: Well, 1 guess 1 didn't realize that things had gone as far as they had. 1 mean, 1 knew 1 
was acting pretty badly but 1 sure didn't think we were going to separate. 1 had no idea 
this was going to happen and 1 sure didn't intend for it to come to this. 
W: Um ... 1 see ... and these arguments have been going on for about six months? 
C: Yeah. 
W: Can you give me some idea what the arguments have been about? 
C: Just little things .. .it really didn't much matter .. .! mean, he could be a little bit later 
coming home from work than he said he would be ... or it could be something that he 
said that 1 would take the wrong way ... or it could be that he didn't pick something up 
around the house ... it could be anything, you know. Just little things. It really hasn't 
taken very much to set me offlately ... any little thing will do. 
W:" Mmmm ... So .. .it sounds like there's been a lot of tension. You said that these 
difficulties started about six months ago. What was it that happened about that time? 
Did anything happen that may have led to all the tension? 
C: Well ... No, 1 don't think that anything happened ... 1 mean nothing you could really put 
your finger on ... That's just it ... 1 started giving him grief over nothing ... 1 really don't 
understand the way I've been acting ... 1 mean 1 could understand it if he'd done 
something but he hasn't. 
W: 1 see ... and what has been your husband's reaction? .. what has he said to you? 
C: 1 don't know .. J mean, he asks me what's wrong ... you know, and he tries to talk to 
me ... to get me to talk to him ... but 1 just cut him otT ... you know, 1 just tell him to leave 
me alone, that I'll get it worked out ... he's really been very understanding. 
W: And how has he shown you that he's been understanding? 
C: Well, you know, he's really tried to be patient with me ... he's tried to understand but 
his patience has worn thin .. .I guess that's to be expected when someone is jumping 
down your throat for no apparent reason ... 1 really don't understand this ... my husband 
is really a good man and things have been really good for him lately. 
W: What do you mean that things have been good for him lately? 
C: Well ... you know, he's been feeling really good ... 1 mean other than the trouble I've 
been causing ... Like, things have been going really well for him at work lately ... you 
know, he's been pleased with his job and all ... and, then, he's had more free time 
lately ... you know, time to do the things he wants to do. 
W: 1 see ... so have the two of you have had more time together recently? 
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c: Well, yeah ... 1 mean, we've had an opportunity to spend time together ... that's pretty 
much been the case all along ... you know, I mean, that's not any different than its been 
for us ... we've always had time to spend together ... The problem is that we don't really 
spend the time together, you know? I mean, lately when we're together I seem to 
spend all my time picking at him ... giving him grief over some little thing or 
other ... that's not his fault though ... you know, he really doesn't have anything to do 
with this •.. Like I said, he's really been patient ... he's really tried to understand ... its 
been me ... just me .. .1 mean, I've really been giving him a rough time for no particular 
reason that I can see. I've just been acting badly and I've caused a lot of trouble for us. 
W: Hmmm ... so, can you think of any recent changes in your life ... anything different that 
you think might explain the difficulties you and your husband have been having? 
C: No ... no ... nothing at all ... things had been going well for us for the most part ... 1 mean, 
I guess it sounds a little silly to be acting so badly when things seem to be going so 
well ... 1 wish I understood this ... 1 just don't know why I've been so hard to get along 
with ... it just doesn't make any sense and it's really starting to get to me ... you know? 
W: Well ... 1 can certainly understand why you feel confused ... it sounds like you're 
uncomfortable with the way you've been acting and can't seem to find an explanation 
for it. What have you done to try to ease things ... to come to terms with this? 
C: I don't know ... 1 mean, I've tried to talk to my husband but we just don't seem to be 
able to talk to each other any more ... that's not his fault though .. .like I said, I think he's 
really tried ... the problem is with me ... 1 start to say something to him and then I stop 
myself ... ljust find myself pulling further and further away from him ... Then I've tried 
talking to some friends about how I've been acting but what can they say? 
W: I don't know ... what do they say? 
C: Well, for the most part they tell me to lighten up ... that I'm really being hard on my 
husband •.. and myself ... Everybody thinks he's wonderful and in many ways he 
is ... my friends all say that he doesn't deserve this so they tell me to try to get my act 
together. 
W: And have your friends been helpful to you? Have they been supportive? 
C: Yeah, I guess so .. .1 mean, I don't feel like anybody is really down on me. I even think 
my husband is ready to come back and try to work things out ... 1 just don't know if 
that's what I want. 
W: What would you like to see happen? 
C: I don't honestly know ... 1 mean, I don't think that my husband has done anything ... 1 
don't know why I've been t(eating him the way I have .. .1 really think that until I get 
that sorted out there's "not much point in our getting back together. I just want to work 
at figuring this thing out. 
W: I see ... earlier you said that you didn't realize that things had gone this far. What did 
you mean? 
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c: Um ..• just that 1 really didn't think my husband would leave ... 1 really had no idea that it 
would come to this ... 1 mean, 1 knew we were having problems but 1 didn't intend for 
us to separate. 1 just didn't know that it had become that bad. 
TAPE 2: KNOWLEDGE 
W: Good morning. 
c: Good morning. 
W: How are you today? 
C: Fine, thank you. 
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W: I know that the circumstances here might make it a little more difficult for you to feel 
relaxed in talking about yourself...I just want to let you know how much I appreciate 
your willingness to have our interview taped this morning. 
C: I'm glad to do it ... I am a little nervous though. 
W: If its any consolation, I'm a little nervous too ... like we said before, though, any time 
that you want to stop or want us to tum the tape off, just let me know. 
c: O.K ... Thanks. 
W: Good ... Let's get started ... I know we talked a little on the phone about your reasons 
for coming in today but it would help if we started from the beginning this morning. 
So, I'd like for you to tell me a little bit about why you wanted to come in and talk to 
someone. 
c: O.K •.. Well, my husband and I separated pretty recently ... Um, he moved out of our 
house ... he's living with his sister now. I'm feeling a bit at a loss, I guess ... you know, 
a little confused about what happened and what I want to do. We've been having 
problems for some time and .. J guess I really need some help to make a decision about 
my marriage. You know, whether to stay separated and maybe get a divorce or to try 
to work things out and maybe get back together again. I guess I need to decide what I 
want for myself. Does that make any sense to you? 
W : Yes •.. yes it does ... This must be a very difficult time for you. 
c: Yeah, it is. 
W: It also sounds like you've been giving the possibility of divorce some pretty serious 
thOUght? 
c: Yeah. 
W: And yourhusband .. .is he thinking about divorce as well? 
c: Well, things are pretty much up in the air right now but 1 don't think so ... 1 think he 
would like for us to get back together. At least that's what he says. 
W: I see ... and how long have you been separated now? 
C: Well, he moved out about a month ago. Yeah, exactly a month ago. 
W: I see ... and I take it that you and your husband have had some contact since the 
separation? 
C: A little bit ... 
W: O.K. 
c: ... a little bit. 
W: All right ... SQ you haven't reached a point where you're not talking to each other. 
c: No. 
W: And have you been pleased with the talks that you've had with your husband? 
C: Well, things are strained ... and he keeps asking me what I'd like to do about our 
marriage. 
W: And what answer do you give him? 
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C: Well, so far I've told him that I don't know ... that I'm thinking about it but that I've got 
to get some things worked out for myself first. 
W: I see ... When we first spoke on the phone, you mentioned that there had been problems 
for some time. When did some of the difficulties begin? 
C: Lets see ... I guess about six months ago ... 
W: uh, huh. 
C: ... Yeah, about six months ago. But things weren't so bad at the .start you 
know ... It .. .itsjust gotten gradually worse until about a month ago ... that's when he 
left . 
. W: Uh, huh ... 1 see ... and what was your husband's reason for moving out? 
C: Well, I'm not really sure ... I mean, I know we've been fighting a lot lately ... and 1 mean 
a lot ... you know, it just seemed like we were arguing constantly. It was awful. 1 
think. 1 brought most of it on. I've been on his case about everything lately. You 
know, its funny though ... 1 would jump on him for something he'd done and then 1 
would feel better for a while ... until 1 started thinking about it and I'd ask myself 'why 
did you do that' and then I'd start to feel bad allover again and start in on him again .. .! 
mean he doesn't deserve the treatment he's been getting, you know ... I really didn't like 
the way 1 was acting ... 1 mean, I knew that what I was doing would lead to trouble but 1 
couldn't seem to stop myself. My husband tried to understand, you know, he tried to 
be patient but 1 guess it was just too much. Finally, he said he was going to 
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leave ... that he thought we needed some time apart to sort things out. I wasn't in favor 
of it at first but I finally agreed ... 1 mean, after all, I'm the one that's been the cause of 
all of this ... Y ou know, its funny but I knew it would come to this. 
W: What do you mean? 
c: Well, I guess I didn't realize that things had gone as far as they had. I mean, I knew I 
was acting pretty badly and I guess I knew it could lead us to separate. I didn't mean 
for us to separate, though. I never intended this to happen .. 
W: Um ... 1 see ... and these arguments have been going on for about six months? 
C: Yeah. 
W: Can you give me some idea what the arguments have been about? 
C: Just little things .. .it really didn't much matter .. .! mean, he could be a little bit later 
coming home from work than he said he would be ... or it could be something that he 
said that I would take the wrong way ... or it could be that he didn't pick something up 
around the house .. .it could be anything, you know. Just little things. It really hasn't 
taken very much to set me offlately ... any little thing will do. 
W: Mmmm ... So .. .it sounds like there's been a lot of tension. You said that these 
difficulties started about six months ago. What was it that happened about that time? 
Did anything happen that may have led to all the tension? 
C: Well ... No, I don't think that anything happened ... 1 mean nothing you could really put 
your finger on ... That's just it ... 1 started giving him grief over nothing ... 1 really don't 
understand the way I've been acting ... 1 mean I could understand it ifhe'd done 
something but he hasn't. 
W: I see ... and what has been your husband's reaction? .. what has he said to you? 
C: I don't know .. .I mean, he asks me what's wrong ... you know, and he tries to talk to 
me ... to get me to talk to him ... but I just cut him off ... you know, I just tell him to leave 
me alone, that I'll get it worked out. .. he's really been very understanding. 
W: And how has he shown you that he's been understariding? 
C: Well, you know, he's really tried to be patient with me ... he's tried to understand but 
his patience has worn thin ... 1 guess that's to be expected when someone is jumping 
down your throat for no apparent reason ... 1 really don't understand this ... my husband 
is really a good man and things have been really good for him lately. 
W: What do you mean that things have been good for him lately? 
C: Well ... you know, he's been feeling really good .. .! mean other than the trouble I've 
been causing ... Like, things have been going really well for him at work lately ... you 
know, be's been pleased with his job and all ... and, then, he's had more free time 
lately ..• you know, time to do the things he wants to do. 
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W: 1 see ... so have the two of you have had more time together recently? 
C: Well, yeah ... 1 mean, we've had an opportunity to spend time together ... that's pretty 
much been the case all along ... you know, 1 mean, that's not any different than its been 
for us ... we've always had time to spend together ... The problem is that we don't really 
spend the time together, you know? 1 mean, lately when we're together 1 seem to 
spend all my time picking at him ... giving him grief over some little thing or 
other ... that's not his fault though ... you know, he really doesn't have anything to do 
with this ... Like 1 said, he's really been patient ... he's really tried to understand ... it's 
been me ... just me ... 1 mean, I've really been giving him a rough time for no particular 
reason that 1 can see. I've just been acting badly and I've caused a lot of trouble for us. 
W: Hmmm ... so, can you think of any recent changes in your life ... anything different that 
you think might explain the difficulties you and your husband have been having? 
C: No ... no ... nothing at all ... things had been going well for us for the most part ... 1 mean, 
1 guess it sounds a little silly to be acting so badly when things seem to be going so 
well ... 1 wish 1 understood this ... 1 just don't know why I've been so hard to get along 
with ... itjust doesn't make any sense and it's really starting to get to get to me ... you 
know? " 
W: Well ..• 1 can certainly understand why you feel confused .. .it sounds like you're 
uncomfortable with the way you've been acting and can't seem to find an explanation 
foc" it. What have you done to try to ease things ... to come to terms with this? " 
C: 1 don't know .. .! mean, I've tried to talk to my husband but we just don't seem to be 
able to talk to each other any more ... that's not his fault though ... like 1 said, 1 think he's 
really tried ... the problem is with me ... 1 start to say something to him and then 1 stop 
myself .. .Its funny, though ... 1 know that what I'm doing is just bringing on more 
trouble. 1 know that the way I'm acting just isn't helping any ... but 1 don't mean to do 
it ..• 1 just find myself pulling further and further away. Then I've tried talking to some 
friends about how I've been acting but what can they say? 
W: 1 don't know ... what do they say? 
C: Well, for the most part they tell me to lighten up ... that I'm really being hard on my 
husband ... and myself ... Everybody thinks he's wonderful and in many ways he 
is .•• my friends all say that he doesn't deserve this so they tell me to try to get my act 
together. 
W: And have your friends been helpful to you? Have they been supportive? 
c: Yeah, 1 guess so ... 1 mean, 1 don't feel like anybody is really down on me. 1 even think 
my husband is ready to come back and try to work things out ... 1 just don't know if 
that's what 1 want. 
W: What would you like to see happen? 
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c: 1 don't honestly know ... 1 mean, 1 don't think that my husband has done anything ... ! 
don't know why I've been treating him the way 1 have ... 1 really think that until 1 get 
that sorted out there's not much point in our getting back together. 1 just want to work 
at figuring this thing out. 
W: 1 see ... earlier you said that you didn't realize that things had gone this far. What did 
you mean? 
c: Urn ... just that 1 really didn't mean for my husband to leave ... 1 mean, 1 guess 1 should 
have known that the way 1 was acting might lead him to do something like this. 1 never 
intended for him to leave, though. 1 just didn't want this to happen. 
TAPE 3: INTENTION 
W: Good morning. 
C: Good morning. 
W: How are you today? 
C: Fine, thank you. 
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W: I know that the circumstances here might make it a little more difficult for you to feel 
relaxed in talking about yourself ... I just want to let you know how much I appreciate 
your willingness to have our interview taped this morning. 
C: I'm glad to do it ... I am a little nervous though. 
W: If its any consolation, I'm a little nervous too ... like we said before, though, any time 
that you want to stop or want us to tum the tape off, just let me know. 
C: O.K ... Thanks. 
W: Good ... Let's get started ... I know we talked a little on the phone about your reasons for 
coming in today but it would help if we started from the beginning this morning. So, 
I'd like for you to tell me a little bit about why you wanted to come in and talk to 
someone. 
C: O.K ... Well, my husband and I separated pretty recently ... Urn, he moved out of our 
house ... he's living with his sister now. I'm feeling a bit at a loss, I guess ... you 
know, a little confused about what happened and wh~t I want to do. We've been 
having problems for some time and ... I guess I really need some help to make a 
decision about my marriage. You know, whether to stay separated and maybe get a 
divorce or to try to work things out and maybe get back together again. I guess I need 
to decide what I want for myself. Does that make any sense to you? 
W: Yes ... yes it does ... This must be a very difficult time for you. 
c: Yeah, it is. 
W: It also sounds like you've been giving the possibility of divorce some pretty serious 
thought? 
C: Yeah. 
W: And your husband .. .is he thinking about divorce as well? 
C: Well ~ things are pretty much up in the air right now but I don't think so .. .1 think he 
would like for us to get back together. At least that's what he says. 
W: I see .•. and how long have you been separated now? 
c: Well, he moved out about a month ago. Yeah, exactly a month ago. 
W: I see ... and I take it that you and your husband have had some contact since the 
separation? 
C: A little bit. .. 
W: O.K. 
c: ... a little bit. 
W: All right ... so you haven't reached a point where you're not talking to each other. 
c: No. 
W: And have you been pleased with the talks that you've had with your husband? 
C: Well, things are strained ... and he keeps asking me what I'd like to do about our 
marriage. 
W: And what answer do you give him? 
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C: Well, so far I've told him that I don't know ... that I'm thinking about it but that I've got 
to get some things worked out for myself first. 
W: I see ... When we first spoke on the phone, you mentioned that there had been problems 
for some time. When did some of the difficulties begin? 
C: Lets see ... 1 guess about six months ago ... 
W: uh, huh. 
C: ... Yeab, about six months ago. But things weren't so bad at the start you 
know •.• It ... itsjust gotten gradually worse until about a month ago ... that's when he 
left. 
W: Uh, huh ... 1 see ... and what was your husband's reason for moving out? 
C: Well, I'm not really sure ... 1 mean, I know we've been fighting a lot lately ... and I mean 
a lot ... you know, it just seemed like we were arguing constantly. It was awful. I think 
I brought most of it on. I've been on his case about everything lately. You know, its 
funny though .. .! would jump on him for something he'd done and then I would feel 
better for a while ... until I started thinking about it and I'd ask myself 'why did you do 
that' and then I'd start to feel bad all over again and start in on him again ... 1 mean he 
doesn't deserve the treatment he's been getting, you know ... 1 really didn't like the way 
I was acting ... 1 mean, I knew that what I was doing would lead to trouble but I 
couldn't seem to stop myself. I don't know ... maybe I meant for this to happen. My 
husband tried to understand, you know, he tried to be p8:tient but I guess it was just too 
much. Finally, he said he was going to leave ... that he thought we needed some time 
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apart to sort things out. I wasn't in favor ofit at first but I fmally agreed ... I mean, after 
all, I'm the one that's been the cause of all ofthis ... You know, its funny but I knew it 
would come to this. 
W: What do you mean? 
C: Well, I guess I intended to bring things to a head ... I knew that the way I was acting 
would force us to make some decisions about the problems we've been having. I 
guess I knew, too, that there was a chance he might leave ifI kept acting that way. 
Nothing else seemed to be working for us, though, so it came to this. 
W: Um ... I see ... and these arguments have· been going on for about six months? 
c: Yeah. 
W: Can you give me some idea what the arguments have been about? 
C: Just little things .. .it really didn't much matter ... I mean, he could be a little bit later 
coming home from work than he said he would be ... or it could be something that he 
said that I would take the wrong way ... or it could be that he didn't pick something up 
around the house .. .it could be anything, you know. Just little things. It really hasn't 
. taken very much to set me offlately ... any little thing will do. 
W: Mmmm ... So .. .it sounds like there's been a lot of tension. You said that these 
difficulties started about six months ago. What was it that happened about that time? 
Did anything happen that may have led to all the tension? 
C: Well ... No, I don't think that anything happened ... I mean nothing you could really put 
your finger on ... That's just it ... I started giving him grief over nothing .. .! really don't 
understand the way I've been acting ... I mean I could understand it ifhe'd done 
something but he hasn't. 
W: I see ... and what has been your husband's reaction? .. what has he said to you? 
C: I don't know .. .! mean, he asks me what's wrong ... you know, and he tries to talk to 
me ... to get me to talk to him ... but I just cut him off ... you know, I just tell him to leave 
me alone, that I'll get it worked out ... he's really been very understanding. 
W: And how has he shown you that he's been understanding? 
C: Well, you know, he's really tried to be patient with me ... he's tried to understand but 
his patience has worn thin ... 1 guess that's to be expected when· someone is jumping 
down your throat for no apparent reason ... 1 really don't understand this ... my husband 
is really a good man and things have been really good for him lately. 
W: Wbat do you mean that things have been good for him lately? 
C: Well ... you know, he's been feeling really good ... 1 mean other than the trouble 
I've been causing ... Like, things have been going really well for him at work 
lately ... you. know, he's been pleased with his job and all ... and, then, he's had more 
free time lately ... you know, time to do the things he wants to do. 
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W: I see ... so have the two of you have had more time together recently? 
C: Well, yeah ... 1 mean, we've had an opportunity to spend time together ... that's pretty 
much been the case all along ... you know, I mean, that's not any different than its been 
for us ... we've always had time to spend together ... The problem is that we don't really 
spend the time together, you know? 1 mean, lately when we're together 1 seem to 
spend all my time picking at him ... giving him grief over some little thing or 
other ... that's not his fault though ... you know, he really doesn't have anything to do 
with this ... Like 1 said, he's really been patient. .. he's really tried to understand .. .its 
been me ... just me ... I mean, I've really been giving him a rough time for no particular 
reason that I can see. I've just been acting badly and I've caused a lot of trouble for us. 
W: Hmmm ... so, can you think of any recent changes in your life ... anything different that 
you think might explain the difficulties you and your husband have. been having? 
C: No ... no ... nothing at all ... things had been going well for us for the most part ... 1 mean, 
I guess it sounds a little silly to be acting so badly when things seem to be going so 
well ... 1 wish 1 understood this ... 1 just don't know why I've been so hard to get along 
with .. .it just doesn't make any sense and it's really starting to get to me ... you know? 
W: Well ... 1 can certainly understand why you feel confused ... it sounds like you're 
uncomfortable with the way you've been acting and can't seem to find an explanation 
for it. What have you done to try to ease things ... to come to terms with this? 
C: I don't know ... 1 mean, I've tried to talk to my husband but we just don't seem to be 
able to talk to each other any more ... that's not his fault though .. .1ike 1 said, 1 think he's 
really tried ... the problem is with me ... 1 start to say something to him and then 1 stop 
myself .. .Its funny, though ... 1 know that what I'm doing is just bringing on more 
trouble. 1 know that the way I'm acting just isn't helping any ... and maybe 1 mean to 
do it ... 1 just fmd myself pulling further and further away from him ... Then I've tried 
talking to some friends about how I've been acting but what can they say? 
W: I don't know ... what do they say? 
C: Well, for the most part they tell me to lighten up ... that I'm really being hard on my 
husband ... and myself ... Everybody thinks he's wonderful and in many ways he 
is ..• my friends all say that he doesn't deselVe this so they tell me to try to get my act 
together. 
W: And have your friends been helpful to you? Have they been supportive? 
C: Yeah, I guess so ... 1 mean, 1 don't feel like anybody is really down on me. I even think 
my husband is ready to come back ~d try to work things out ... 1 just don't know if 
that's what I want. 
W: What would you like to see happen? 
C: I don't honestly know ... 1 mean, 1 don't think that my husband has done anything .. .! 
don't know why I've been treating him the way 1 have .. .1 really think that until 1 get 
that sorted out there's not much point in our getting back together. I just want to work 
at figuring this thing out. 
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W: I see ... earlier you said that you meant to bring things to a head to force some decisions 
about the marriage ... that nothing else had been working. What did you mean? 
C: Well, I've been acting pretty crummy lately and we've been having some problems ... 1 
guess I knew that the way I was acting would make us look at our problems. Like I 
said, we haven't been able to talk about things ... so, maybe I've been acting this way to 
get us to make some decisions. I guess I intended to force the issue even at the risk of 
a separation. 
TAPE 4: COERCION 
W: Good morning. 
C: Good morning. 
W: How are you today? 
C: Fine, thank you. 
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W: I know that the circumstances here might make it a little more difficult for you to feel 
relaxed in talking about yourself...! just want to let you know how much I appreciate 
your willingness to have our interview taped this morning. 
C: I'm glad to do it ... I am a little nervous though. 
W: If its any consolation, I'm a little nervous too ... Like we said before, though, any time 
that you want to stop or want us to tum the tape off, just let me know. 
C: O.K ... Thanks. 
W: Good ... Let's get started ... I know we talked a little on the phone about your reasons 
for coming in today but it would help if we started from the beginning this morning. 
So, I'd like for you to tell me a little bit about why you wanted to come in and talk to 
someone. 
C: O.K ... Well, my husband and I separated pretty recently ... Vm, he moved out of our 
house ... he's living with his sister now. I'm feeling a bit at a loss, I guess ... you know, 
a little confused about what happened and what I want to do. We've been having 
problems for some time and .. .! guess I really need some help to make a decision about 
my marriage. You know, whether to stay separated and maybe get a divorce or to try 
to work things out and maybe get back together again. I guess I need to decide what I 
want for myself. Does that make any sense to you? 
W: Yes ••. yes it does ... This must be a very difficult time for you. 
C: Y cab, it is. 
W: It also sounds like you've been giving the possibility of divorce some pretty serious 
thought? 
C: Yeah. 
W: And your husband .. .is he thinking about divorce as well? 
C: Well, things are pretty much up in the air right now but I don't think so ... 1 think he 
would like for us to get back together. At least that's what he says. 
W: I see ... and how long have you been separated now? 
C: Well, he moved out about a month ago. Yeah, exactly a month ago. 
W: I see ... and I take it that you and your husband have had some contact since the 
separation? 
C: A little bit ... 
W: O.K. 
C: ... a little bit. 
W: All right ... so you haven't reached a point where you're not talking to each other. 
C: No. 
W: And have you been pleased with the talks that you've had with your husband? 
C: Well, things are strained ... and he keeps asking me what I'd like to do about our 
marriage. 
W: And what answer do you give him? 
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C: Well, so far I've told him that I don't know ... that I'm thinking about it but that I've got 
to get some things worked out for myself first. 
W: I see .•. When we first spoke on the phone, you mentioned that there had been problems 
for some time. When did some of the difficulties begin? 
C: Lets see ... 1 guess about six months ago ... 
W: uh, huh. 
C: ... Yeah, about six months ago. But things weren't so bad at the start you 
know ... lt. .. itsjust gotten gradually worse until about a month ago ... that's when he 
left. 
W: Uh, huh .. .1 see ... and what was your husband's reason for moving out? 
C: Well, we were fighting a lot. I mean, it just seemed like we were arguing constantly. 
It was awful. I think I brought most of it on ... but my husband sure hasn't been 
helping things any ... do you know what he said the other day? He said I was going to 
have to cut down on my spending ... and he just spent two hundred dollars on a new 
sports jacket ... can you believe that? I know money's getting tight and we need to 
watch things but I don't spend much on myself ... and I don't really begrudge him the 
jacket either .. .1 know he needs to look nice for work ... it's just that we agreed to talk 
over any major expenses ... right now two hundred dollars is pretty major and he never 
said a word to me about it .. .1 don't know ... that's not the problem ... 1 mean we were 
arguing so much that I guess it just got to be too much. I guess I knew that all my 
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arguing would lead to trouble, that it might lead us to separate. 1 don't know ... maybe I 
meant for this to happen. Finally, he said he was going to leave ... that he thought we 
needed some time apart to sort things out. 1 wasn't in favor of it at first but 1 finally 
agreed ... I mean, after all, I'm the one that's been the cause of all this ... You know, its 
funny but 1 knew it would come to this. 
W: What do you mean? 
c: Well, 1 guess 1 intended to bring things to a head ... 1 knew that the way 1 was acting 
would force us to make some decisions about the problems we've been having. I 
guess 1 knew, too, that there was a chance he might leave if! kept acting that way. 
Nothing else seemed to be working for us, though, so it came to this. 
W: Umm ... 1 see ... and these arguments have been going on for the past six months? 
c: Yeah. 
W: Can you give me some idea as to what the arguments have been about? 
C: Just little things .. .it really didn't much matter ... 1 mean, like his buying that jacket. Or 
maybe he's a little bit later coming home from work than he said he would be ... he's 
. been doing that a lot lately ... or he doesn't pick up something around the house ... or its 
something he says that 1 take the wrong way ... lt could be anything ... you know, just 
little things. 
W: And what does your husband have to say about these arguments? 
C: What can he say? He doesn't like it and he tells me I need to ease off ... 1 mean, 1 know 
I've been giving it to him pretty good lately but things haven't been going so well for 
us lately ... we've been having a lot of problems and all he does is to try to stay out of 
the way. He's pretty much stopped talking to me about anything except routine, day to 
day stuff. 
W: I see ... and has there been anything else that the two of you have been having difficulty 
ove(! 
C: Well ... yeah, 1 guess ... you know, money's become a little tight recently .... well, maybe 
a lot tight and we've had some fights about money. 
W: So ••. you've been under some financial strain lately. What is it that's brought on 
money problems? 
C: A bunch of things ... 1 mean, we bought a house a while back ... you know, not a new 
house but one we thought we could fix up ... we bought the house thinking that I'd get a 
promotion soon, you know, a new position and a good raise, but now it looks like that 
may not work out ... ifwe don't bring in more money its going to be hard to meet our 
mortgage payments ... so, we argue about that, you know, argue about money. 
W: 1 see ... so, buying the new house has really put a burden on your finances ... Are you 
likely to lose the house? 
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c: I don't know ... 1 don't think so: .. 1 mean, it really depends on what we decide to do 
about staying together .. .1 guess if we stay separated we'll try to sell it. I don't know 
what we'll do if we get back together. 
W: Ummm ... you mentioned anticipating a promotion but you're concerned now that it may 
not work out ... what happened? 
c: Well ... I've been with the same company for six years and I was due for promotion to 
department supelVisor ... but now, now the company has had to layoff some 
people ... you know, they've had some reversals lately ... 1 don't think I'll lose my job 
but its a possibility ... at the very least there won't be any promotion and I probably 
won't even get a raise this year. We bought the house, you know, and we spent a little 
more than we could really afford because I had been told that I could expect a 
promotion this year ... now we're saddled with a mortgage payment that really eats us 
up ... and all we do is fight about it. 
W: It sounds like things haven't worked out the way you expected them to all the way 
around ... you must be disappointed about events at work. 
c: Yeah, I'm disappointed all right. 
W: And what do you plan to do about your job? 
C: Well ... I'Il stay where I arn ... unless things tum really sour, I'll keep my job ... 1 can't 
afford to quit and I don't think I'd. be able to find anything as good as I've got now, 
even without the promotion. Maybe if! stick it out, things will tum around ... 1 don't 
know. 
W: I see ... and do you think that a lot of the arguments that you and your husband have 
been having stem from your financial problems? 
C: Well ... 1 guess that's what set things off ... you know, that and my troubles at work. .. its 
been such a hard time for me, you know .. .I've been trying to figure out what we can 
do ... you know, and wondering whether my job will last or not. We were so excited 
about the new house but now its just a big disappointment ... so we argue about that 
too ... you know, argue about the house. That's not quite accurate ... we don't argue, I 
argue. 
W: What do you mean? 
C: Like I said, I'm the one that started all ofthis ... 1 brought it all on ... you know, I've 
been jumping on him for every little thing ... 1 know we've been under a lot of stress 
lately, both of us, but I don't think I've handled it very well ... maybe I've been under a 
lot of pressure about things ... maybe I've blown things out of proportion ... you know, 
maybe that's the reason I've been so upset. 
W: Uh, huh ... How do you think you could have handled all this differently? 
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c: Well ••. you know, I could have been more relaxed and not taken things out on him so 
much .. .1 guess our money problems might have worked out but it just didn't seem like 
we were getting anywhere, you know ... we just kept arguing .. .1 mean, I've been upset 
and I think I've upset him too ... you know, I've not been fair jumping all over him ... 1 
guess I realized that we were headed for trouble and like 1 said maybe 1 meant for this 
to happen ... but 1 really think I've caused a lot more trouble than we really needed. 
W: I See .•. you said that you meant to bring things to a head to force some decisions about 
the marriage ... that nothing else had been working. What did you mean? 
C: Well, I've been acting pretty crummy lately and we've been having some problems .. .1 
guess I knew that the way 1 was acting would make us look at our problems. Like 1 
said, we haven't been able to talk about things much lately ... so, maybe I've been acting 
this way to get us to make some decisions. There's been so much happening that's put 
pressure on us that 1 just thought that 1 had to do something. 1 guess 1 intended to force 
the issue even at the risk of a separation. 
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APPENDIXB 
STIMULUS ITEM RATING INSTRUMENTS 
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Please circle the number to the right of each statement which best reflects your response to 
the statement 
5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree . 
I = strongly disagree 
1. The transcript shows that the client thinks she caused the problems 
which led to the marital separation. 
2. The transcript shows that the client thinks she knew that her behavior 
might lead to a separation. 
3. The transcript shows that the client thinks she intended to act in a 
manner which might lead to the separation. 
4. The transcript shows that there are factors outside of the client's 
marriage which might have led her to behave as she did. 
5. The transcript appears to reflect an actual client intelView. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
I 2 3 4 5 
Please add any comments or suggestions which you feel would improve the transcript 
either in the quality of the intelView portrayed or in conveying the information intended. 
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Please circle the number to the right of each statement which best reflects your response to 
the statement 
5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
1. The transcript shows that there are factors outside of the client's 
marriage which might have led her to behave as she did. 
, 
2. The transcript appears to reflect an actual client intelView. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please add any comments or suggestions which you feel would improve the transcript 
either in the quality of the intelView portrayed or in conveying the information intended. 
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APPENDIXC 
PILOT TEST INSTRUMENT 
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This study is concerned with professional social workers perceptions of marital 
disruption. You will shortly listen to an audiotape of an assessment interview which 
represents the first meeting between a client and a social worker at a counseling center 
located in the Cleveland metropolitan area. The roles of client and worker are portrayed by 
professional actresses and the tapes were produced in a recording studio. The content of 
the interview, however, is a literal transcription of the actual interview. The decision to use 
actresses rather than presenting the actual interview. itself was undertaken for several 
reasons. First, it is the content of the interview which is of intereSt for the research rather 
than the interview itself. Second, the use of actresses proVides an additional guarantee of 
confidentiality for both client and worker.· Finally, a professionally produced tape 
eliminates any factors (Le., background noise, poor recording quality) which may interfere 
with the content of the interview. Again, the actresses are reading a transcript of the 
interview just as it took place. The segment of the session which you will hear occurs at 
the beginning of the interview proper and the interview· continues beyond the portion of the 
tape you will hear. 
After listening to the tape you will be asked to respond to a series of statements about 
the client, her situation and the assessment itself. You will also be asked a few brief 
questions about yourself. Please respond carefully to each item. 
Before beginning, it would be helpful for you to know just a little about each of the 
participants: 
The Client: Jane S is 29 years old and has been married for five years. 
There are no children. She is employed full time in the 
accounting department of a large corporation in the Cleveland 
area. 
The Worker: Barbara N. earned a B.S.W. in 1914 and an M.S.W. in 1918. 
She has practiced professionally in clinical settings for 11 
years, including two years as a senior clinical supervisor. 
Thank yo,:, for your participation. 
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On the following five pages you will find a series of statements which refer to the 
audiotape you just heard. Please circle the number to the right of each statement which best 
reflects your response to the statement 
5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
1. Ms. S was coerced into acting as she·did by events beyond 
her control. 1 i 3 4 5 
2. Ms. S was purposeful in her actions toward her husband. I 2 3 4 5 
3. I think that Ms. S has told her story accurately. I 2 3 4 5 
4. Ms. S really seems to know what's going on in her marriage. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Ms. S is the direct cause of the problems in her marriage. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. The prospects of Ms. S working out her problems are quite good. I 2 3 4 5 
7. I think Ms. S is a person I could enjoy getting to know. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Ms. S probably realized that her behavior would lead to disharmony. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. The marital separation was the result of Ms. S's behavior. I 2 3 4 5 
10. Ms. S seems to really understand her situation. I 2 3 4 5 
11. The chances for the successful treatment of Ms. S are quite good. I 2 3 4 5 
12. Outside factors forced Ms. S to act in the manner described. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. This situation can be resolved with appropriate help. I 2 3 4 5 
14. Ms. S should have known her behavior would lead marital problems. I 2 3 4 5 
15. Ms. S can resolve her difficulties with professional help. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. With help Ms. S has good prospects of resolving her difficulties. I 2 3 4 5 
17. The source of the separation is to be found in Ms. S's actions. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Ms .. S caused her marriage to break up. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Ms. S acted intentionally to bring about the problems described. 1 2 3 4 5 
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5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree 
I = strongly disagree 
20. Ms. S knew a separation would derive from her behavior. I 2 3 4 5 
21. Ms. S meant to act as she did. I 2 3 4 5 
22. Ms. S acted purposefully in bringing about her marital problems. I 2 3 4 5 
23. Ms. S is the kind of person I am attracted to. I 2 3 4 5 
24. The treatment outlook for Ms. S is most favorable. I 2 3 4 5 
25. The separation resulted from Ms. S's behavior. I 2 3 4 5 
26. Ms. S has told her story with honesty. I 2 3 4 5 
27. Ms. S wanted to bring about the problems she described. I 2 3 4 5 
28. Ms. S has been open and honest in describing her situation. I 2 3 4 5 
29. Ms. S seems to have a pleasant personality. I 2 3 4 5 
30. Ms. S brought about the rift in her marriage on purpose. I 2 3 4 5 
31. Ms. S has a good chance of overcoming her .problems. I 2 3 4 5 
32. Ms. S deliberately caused problems in her marriage. I 2 3 4 5 
33. I would be willing to engage Ms. S in treatment. I 2 3 4 5 
34. Ms. S's problems appear amenable to treatment. I 2 3 4 5 
35. I enjoy working with people like Ms. S. I 2 3 4 5 
36. I think that intervention with Ms. S would be successful. I 2 3 4 5 
37. Ms. S most likely perceived the potential effects of her behavior. I 2 3 4 5 
38. Ms. S has been forthcoming in describing her marital situation. I 2 3 4 5 
39. Ms. S was justified in her actions due to outside pressures. I 2 3 4 5 
40. I think I could help Ms. S resolve the problems in her marriage. I 2 3 4 5 
41. Ms. S was driven to act as she did by factors outside of her control. I 2 3 4 5 
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5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
42. Ms. created her marital strife. 1 2 3 4 5 
43. Ms. S's behavior brought about the problems in her marriage. 1 2 3 4 5 
44. People like Ms. S are generally pleasant to work with in treatment. I 2 3 4 5 
45. Ms. S's difficulties have been provoked by her behavior. I 2 3 4 5 
46. Ms. S's behavior engendered the marital problems she describes. 1 2 3 4 5 
47. The prospects for a favorable treatment outcome are quite good. 1 2 3 4 5 
48. Ms. S is an agreeable sort of person. 1 2 3 4 5 
49. Ms. S has accurately portrayed her situation. 1 2 3 4 5 
50. I would find working with Ms. S to be pleasant. I 2 3 4 5 
51. Ms. S should have known that trouble was coming. 1 2 3 4 5 
52. Ms. S should have been clear as to the effects of her actions. I 2 3 4 5 
53. Ms. S probably realized the potential consequences of her actions. I 2· 3 4 5 
54. The basis for the marital separation is Ms. S's behavior. I 2 3 4 5 
55. Ms. S meant to cause the problems she described. I 2 3 4 5 
56. The separation reflects deliberate actions on Ms. S's part. I 2 3 4 5 
57. Ms. S knew that her actions would cause her husband to leave her. I 2 3 4 5 
58. Ms. S behaved as she did with a clear intention. I 2 3 4 5 
59. I think that treatment for Ms. S would have a favorable outcome. I 2 3 4 5 
60. Ms. S acted intentionally to get her husband to leave her. I 2 3 4 5 
61. I believe Ms. S to have been honest in telling her story. I 2 3 4 5 
62. I find Ms. S to be a likable person. I 2 3 4 5 
63. I would enjoy working with Ms. S in treatment. I 2 3 4 5 
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5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
64. Ms. S is the kind of person who is generally truthful. 1 2 3 4 5 
65. In this case treatment would most likely succeed. 1 2 3 4 5 
66. Ms. S is the originator of the problems described. 1 2 3 4 5 
67. Ms. S has been honest with the worker. 1 2 3 4 5 
68. Ms. S should have foreseen the effect of her behavior. 1 2 3 4 5 
69. Ms. S's behavior may be excused under the circumstances. 1 2 3 4 5 
70. Ms. S appears to be an interesting person. 1 2 3 4 5 
71. Ms. S acted as she did due to forces outside of her marriage. 1 2 3 4 5 
72. Ms. S acted in a deliberate manner to bring her marital 
problems to the fore. I 2 3 4 5 
73. I think Ms~ S has a good grasp of her situation. 1 2 3 4 5 
74. Ms. S's behavior was compelled by forces beyond her control. I 2 3 4 5 
75. I think Ms. S and I are similar in many respects. 1 2 3 4 5 
76. The problems described by Ms. S can be resolved through 
treatment. 1 2· 3 4 5 
77. Ms. S had to act as she did given her circumstances. 1 2 3 4 5 
78. Ms. S was aware of the consequences of her actions. I 2 3 4 5 
79. Ms. S was made to act as she did by forces in the environment. 1 2 3 4 5 
80. Ms. S has presented her situation accurately. 1 2 3 4 5 
81. Ms. S was the cause of her husband's decision to leave. 1 2 3 4 5 
82. I think Ms. S has been open with the worker. 1 2 3 4 5 
83. Ms. S can satisfactorily resolve her problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
84. Ms. S really had no choice in acting the way she did. 1 2 3 4 5 
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5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
85. Ms. S seemed to understand the potential consequences 
of her actions. 1 2 3 4 5 
86. Factors outside of Ms. S's marriage led her to act as she did. 1 2 3 4 5 
87. Ms. S could tell that a separation would result from her behavior. 1 2 3 4 5 
88. The potential for a separation was known by Ms. S in advance. 1 2 3 4 5 
89. Ms. S's behavior is understandable under the Circumstances. 1 2 3 4 5 
90. Ms. S behaved as she did on purpose to cause her marriage 
to break up. 1 2 3 4 5 
91. Ms. S has personal problems which caused her difficulties. 1 2 3 4 5 
92. Working with Ms. S would be an enjoyable experience. 1 2 3 4 5 
93. Ms. S impresses me as a forthright and honest person. 1 2 3 4 5 
94. Ms. S could probably see that her actions might cause a breakup. 1 2 3 4 5 
95. I think that Ms. S has been truthful in her presentation. I 2 3 4 5 
96. Ms. S is the kind of person I would like to know personally. I 2 3 4 5 
97. Ms. S was most likely conscious of the effects of her behavior. I 2 3 4 5 
98. Environmental forces compelled Ms. S's actions. 1 2 3 4 5 
99. Ms. S clearly intended to bring about the problems in her marriage. 1 2 3 4 5 
100. The problems Ms. S describes originated in her behavior. I 2 3 4 5 
10 1. Ms. S acted as she did in order to cause her husband to leave her. 1 2 3 4 5 
102. I would enjoy meeting Ms. S under other circumstances. 1 2 3 4 5 
103. Ms. S's actions are behind her marital problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
104. Ms. S was compelled in her actions. 1 2 3 4 5 





This study is concerned with professional social worker's perceptions of marital 
disruption. You will shortly listen to an audiotape of an assessment interview which 
represents the first meeting between a client and a student social worker at a counseling 
center located in the Cleveland metropolitan area. The roles of client and worker are 
portrayed by professional actresses and the tapes were professionally produced in a 
recording studio. The content of the interview, however, is a literal transcription of the 
actual interview, with the exception of the deletion of name references and the elimination 
of vocalized pauses. The decision to use actresses rather than presenting the actual 
interview itselfwas undertaken for several reasons. First, it is the content of the interview, 
rather than the interview itself, which is of interest' for 'the research. Second, the use of 
actresses provides an additional guarantee of confidentiality for both client and worker. 
Finally ,a professionally produced tape eliminates any factors (i.e., background noise, poor 
recording quality) which may interfere with the content of the interview. Again, the 
actresses are reading a transcript of the interview just as it took place. The segment of the 
session which you will hear occurs at the beginning of the interview proper and the 
interview continues beyond the portion of the tape you will hear. 
After listening to the tape you will be asked to respond to a series of statements about 
the client and her situation. You will also be asked a few brief questions about yoursel f. 
Please respond carefully to each item. 
Before beginning, it would be helpful for you to know just a little about each of the 
participants: 
The client: Jane S is 29 years old and has been married for five years. 
There are no children. She is employed full time in the 
accounting department of a large corporation in the Cleveland 
area. 
The worker: Barbara N was completing her first year of graduate study in 
social work at the time of this interview. She earned a 
bachelor's degree in education in 1978 and taught in special 
education for 8 years prior to beginning the present degree 
program. 
Finally, in considering that this is a student interview, I would ask that you make 
every effort not to judge the quality of the interview. Again, it is the content of the 
interview which bears importance for the research. 
~ you for your participation. 
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On the following three pages you will find a series of statements which refer to the 
audiotape you just heard. Please circle the number to the right of each statement which best 
reflects your response to the statement as follows: 
5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree 
I = strongly disagree 
1. Ms. S could tell that a separation would result from ~~r~~vior. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I think that treatment for Ms. S would have a favorable outcome. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. With help Ms. S has good prospects of resolving her difficulties. I 2 3 4 5 
4. I think that Ms. S has told her story accurately. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 .. I would enjoy meeting Ms. S under other circumstances. I 2 3 4 5 
6. Job stress often underlies marital conflict. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. The chances for the successful treatment of Ms. S are quite good. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Ms. S was made to act as she did by forces in the environment. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Ms. S probably realized the potential consequences of her actions. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Ms. S has told her story with honesty. I 2 3 4 5 
11. Ms. S caused her marriage to break up. I 2 3 4 5 
12. I suspect that Ms. S and her husband have had long standing 
problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Ms. S acted purposefully in bringing about her marital problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. The source of the separation is to be found in Ms. S's actions. I 2 3 4 5 
15. Ms. S was most likely conscious of the effects of her behavior. I 2 3 4 5 
16. Ms. S was the cause of her husband's decision to leave. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. I would fmd working with Ms. S to be pleasant. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Conjoint treatment is the best approach in this case. 1 2 3 4 5 





















5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
I find Ms. S to be a likable person. 
I think that Ms. S has been truthful in her presentation .. 
The potential for a separation was known by Ms. S in advance. 
Working with Ms. S would be an enjoyable experience. 
Success with Ms. S will depend on the strength of her 
support system. 
The prospects for a favorable treatment outcome are quite good. 
Ms. S's behavior was compelled by forces beyond her control. 
Outside factors forced Ms. S to act in the manner described. 
Ms. S meant to cause the problems she described. 
Environmental forces compelled Ms. S's actions. 
This will most likely be a long term treatment situation. 
People like Ms. S are generally pleasant to work with in treatment. 
Ms. S meant to act as she did. 
The separation reflects deliberate actions on Ms. S's part. 
Ms. S has been honest with the worker. 
Ms. S was aware of the consequences of her actions. 
It would be best to interview Ms. S's husband before proceeding 
further. 
Ms. S behaved as she did with a clear intention. 
In this case treatment would likely succeed. 
Factors outside of Ms. S's marriage led her to act as she did. 
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1 2 3 4 5 
1 . 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4. 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 







5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
I believe Ms. S to have been honest in telling her story. 
The marital separation was the result of Ms. S's behavior. 
Marital disruptions such as this are difficult treatment cases. 
Ms. S acted as she did due to forces outside of her marriage. 
Ms. S has accurately portrayed her situation. 
Ms. S is the originator of the problems described. 
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1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Thank you .. Finally, I would like to ask you a few questions about yourself. 
1. What is your sex? (circle one number below) 
o MALE 
1 FEMALE 
2. What is your age? 





5 AMERICAN INDIAN 
6 OTHER (SPECIFY) 
4. What year did you receive your Master's degree in Social Work? 
5. How many years post Master's social work experience do you have? 
6. What is your present practice arrangement? (circle one number below) 
I AGENCY BASED PRACTICE ONLY 
2 PRIVATE PRACTICE ONLY 
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3 A COMBINATION OF AGENCY BASED AND PRIVATE PRACTICE. 
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7. How many years have you worked at your present agency (if applicable)? __ _ 
8. How many years have you been in private practice only (ifapplicable)? 
9. What is your primary agency responsibility? (circle one number below) 
1 DIRECf SERVICE 
2 INDIRECT SERVICE (I.E., TRAINING~·CONSULTATION) 
3 SUPERVISIONIPROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
4 ADMINISTRATION 
5 OTHER (SPECIFY) _________ __ 
10. What is your preferred method of practice? (circle one number below) 
I INDNIDUAL TREATMENT 
2 GROUP TREATMENT 
3 MARITAlIFAMILY lREATMENT 
4 OTHER (SPECIFY) _________ ...-
11. What is your theoretical orientation to practice? (circle one number below) 
1 PSYCHODYNAMICIPSYCHOANAL YTIC 
2 ~ISTIC 
3 COONITIVF/COGNITIVE BEHAVIORAL 
4 BEHAVIORAL 
5 GESTALT 
6 SOCIAL LEARNING 
7 OTHER (SPECIFY) _________ ...-
Thank you for your participation. 
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MEMORANDUM SOLICITING PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH 
189 
Dear Colleague 
I am presently conducting research for my dissertation and I am looking for Master's 
level Social Workers with two years post Master's practice experience who would be 
willing to take part in a study of Social Worker's perceptions of marital disruption. The 
study would require that you listen to a twelve minute segment of an interview between a 
worker and a client and then respond to a set of 45 items concerning the client and her 
situation. There are also a few brief demographic qllestions. The entire process would 
take approximately 20 minutes of your time .. Your participation is, of course, wholly 
voluntary and your responses to the questionriaire will not ·be associated in any manner 
with your name. In return for your participation, I will provide you with a brief written 
report of the results, if you so desire. . 
If you are interested in taking part in the study, please fill in the blanks on this form 
and return it to (NAME). She will then fOIWard the foons to me and I will contact you to 
arrange a time and place for the study at your convenience. If you have any questions, 




James R. McDonell 
Instructor in Social Work 
School of Applied Social Sciences 
Case Western Reserve University 






CHECK HERE IF YOU WOULD LIKE A REPORT OF THE RESULTS. 
190 
APPENDIXG 
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
I hereby consent to participate in the research project under the direction ofJames R. 
McDonell. I understand that my participation will consist oflistening to a 12 minute 
(approximately) audio-tape of an interview between a social worker and a client and 
responding to the items contained in the research questionnaire. I understand that I will not 
be asked to perfonn in any other manner. I also understand that my consent is given 
voluntarily and may be withdrawn at any time without prior notification. I further 
understand that my consent to participate in this research will be held in confidence and that 
my responses to the research questionnaire will not be identified with my name. 
Name. ______________________________ __ 
Date'--________ _ 
192 
SUPPLEMENTAL CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
I have been infonned as to the true nature of the research project entitled 
"Attributional Influences in the Social Worker's Assessment of the Client's Problem" and 
fully understand that the interview tape presented to me as part of the research was 
constructed for the purposes of the research and was not an actual interview. With this 
knowledge, I freely give my consent for the use of my responses to the research 
questionnaire by James R. McDonell for the purposes of the research as explained. This 
consent is given with the understanding that my participation in the research will be held in 
confidence and that my responses to the research questionnaire will not be identified with 
my name. 
Name ____________________________ __ 






Thank you for your participation. There are two things I need to talk to you about. 
First, the study does not concern social worker's perceptions of marital disruption. Rather, 
it concerns the effect of differential information in regard to a model of attributed 
responsibility on social worker's attributions of responsibility, clinical judgment, attraction 
to the client and belief in the client's truthfulness. I can explain this further in a moment. 
Second, the tape you heard does not in any sense represent an actual client interview. 
Rather, it was wholly constructed for the purposes of the research. There are four different 
tapes and you heard tape number _. In the first tape, the client says that she caused the 
problems in her marriage but did not know that her husband might leave her and did not 
intend her husband to leave her. In the second tape, the client says that she caused the 
problems in her marriage and knew that her husband might leave her but did not intend her 
husband to leave her. In the third tape, the client says that she caused the problems in her 
marriage, knew that her husband might leave her and intended to bring things to a head. In 
the fourth tape, the client says the same things as in tape three but presents some 
infonnation about outside stresses which might have accounted for her behavior. These are 
job jeopardy and some financial pressures. 
Each of these tapes, then, expresses a different dimension ofa model of attributed 
responsibility: cause, knowledge, intention and coercion. The study, then, concerns the 
effect that differential information in regard to cause, knowledge, intention and coercion as 
presented by the client has on a social worker's attributions of cause, knowledge, intention 
and coercion and the effect this information has on social worker's judgments as to the 
potential efficacy of social work intervention and attraction to the client. I have a more 
detailed explanation of the study if you would like to have it. Also, if you have any further 
questions about the study, please feel free to call lim McDonell at 368-6682. 
Now, I would ask that you read and sign a supplemental consent form which states 
that you are now aware of the true nature of the study and are aware that the tape was not 
an actual interview and you continue to consent to participation. (if data remains to be 
collected in the agency, ask people not to talk about the study to others as it will 
contaminate the sample). 
(If anybody asks about the need for the deception, explain that disguising the true 
nature of the study is necessary to avoid sensitizing subjects to the theoretical model and 
that misleading in regard to the interview is necessary in an effort to emulate, in as much as 
possible, actual interview conditions. People are more likely to respond as if it were an 
actual interview if they believe it to be so.) 
